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Abstract 
This dissertation argues for a rethinking and expansion of film genre theory. As the variety of 
media exhibition platforms expands and as discourse about films permeates a greater number of 
communication media, the use of generic terms has never been more multiform or observable. 
Fundamental problems in the very conception of film genre have yet to be addressed adequately, 
and film genre study has carried on despite its untenable theoretical footing. Synthesizing 
pragmatic genre theory, constructivist film theory, Bourdieusian fan studies, and rhetorical genre 
studies, the dissertation aims to work through the radical implications of pragmatic genre theory 
and account for genres role in interpretation, evaluation, and rhetorical framing as part of 
broader, recurring social activities. This model rejects textualist and realist foundations for film 
genre; only pragmatic genre use can serve as a foundation for understanding film genres. From 
this perspective, the concept of genre is reconstructed according to its interpretive and rhetorical 
functions rather than a priori assumptions about the text or transtextual structures. Genres are not 
independent structures or relations among texts but performative speech acts about textual 
relationships and are functions of the rhetorical conditions of their use. This use is not only 
denotative, but connotative, as well, insofar as certain genre labels evoke aesthetic or moral 
judgments for certain users. This dissertation proposes the concept of meta-genres, or the sum 
total of textual and extra-textual attributes plus the evaluative valances a given user associates 
with a generic label. Meta-genres help guide interpretation and serve as a shorthand for 
evaluative judgments about certain kinds of films, and are thus central to the kinds of taste 
politics negotiated through film texts. The rhetorical conditions of genre use can be typified, and 
this dissertation adapts concepts and methods from the field of rhetorical genre studies to show 
that the film genre use is most readily observable through its uptake rhetorical genres. These 
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rhetorical genres, in turn, index the social groups and recurring situations that they are called 
upon to meet. By studying examples like academic writing, popular press reviews, filmmaker 
interviews, internet message board comments, and digital media recommendation systems, one 
can identify how specific deployments of generic terms serve as a nexus of text, user, group, and 
social activities, and can develop a methodology for studying genre as use relative to those 
dimensions.      
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Introduction 
 
 
We have various kinds of lands, various forms of government, with estates and 
without them, imperial towns, a nobility of whom some are immediate, subjects of 
all different sorts, and a thousand other such things—to think for oneself, what 
good is it here? Not the slightest! What can the Philosoph do about it? Not the 
slightest! These are plain facts, things I must accept … as they are, unless I want 
to deform and ruin our German Empire.  
 
Johann Jakob Moser 
Neues teutsches Staatsrecht, 17761  
 
 
Science fiction is what we point to when we say it. 
 
Damon Knight2 
 
 
 Johann Jakob Moser was an 18th century German lawyer and expert on the legal systems 
of the Holy Roman Empire. By Moser’s time the Empire was fragmented into a jigsaw puzzle of 
thousands of different political entities, some large territories with sophisticated administrations 
on the verge of modernizing, some rural properties with a nominal lord that wouldn’t cover an 
American county. Not only were the entities varied in size and wealth, but they each had unique 
legal standing and political relations. Some were subject to a local vassal, and some owed 
allegiance directly to the Emperor. Centuries of wars, treaties, marriages, alliances, largesse, and 
other ad hoc political actions had produced a hopeless tangle of inherited rights and privileges 
particular to a given principality and which frustrated the futile systematizing efforts of scholars 
like Moser. But Moser’s exasperation is coupled with and perhaps aggravated by the Empire’s 
                                               
1 See Walker pp. 334-5. 
2 See Knight p. 23  
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indispensability as a political entity. The Empire could not be reformed and maintain any 
semblance of its traditional core. In short, it worked. Not rationally or efficiently, but it worked 
well enough. 
 
Get Out and the Stakes of Genre 
As self-identified fans of one or another film genre we enjoy not only watching but also 
discussing our favorite films in the genre. It is likely we can posit some common generic 
features, explain away exceptions, cite canonical and liminal examples—all with more or less 
authority. It is likely also that we regularly discriminate between social situations in deciding 
when a detailed, complex account of a genre is appropriate and when we have other things to do. 
When we need to navigate a retail or library shelf or streaming interface to find a movie, to fill 
out a dating or social media profile, to interpret a poster or trailer, to make sense of a review, or 
to briefly describe a film to someone when we can’t or would rather not have a long 
conversation? In these latter cases, a genre is a crudely instrumental term, one that allows us to 
interact with manifold other texts and people as we go about our lives. Genre acts as something 
of a stop-gap in these situations, a term that allows us to talk about a corpus while deferring its 
inconsistencies and special cases in order to pursue some other activity.   
As scholars, however, and especially as scholars trained in traditional genre study, we 
tend to emphasize the importance of the former kind of genre-related discourse at the expense of 
the latter. Our identity as scholars turns both on an ethos of thorough, sober, independent 
assessment as well as on our participation in institutional discursive activities that demand 
precisely this kind of textual engagement. But while this mode of engagement is valued in papers 
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and lectures and seminars and books, it is neither the only nor, as I suggested above, necessarily 
the most useful approach to genre available to us at any given moment, in any given social 
situation.  
Genre always seems to be a problem for critics, partly because it wouldn’t really be worth 
talking about if it weren’t. Genres historically have been cobbled together in the ad hoc, 
instrumental way described above by critics, producers, advertisers, scholars, and fans. Each 
instance on its own terms should make sense, because that particular classification is directed 
toward some other goal or activity. Taken in toto, however, with each invocation of genre 
abstracted from its social use, genres look messy, inconsistent, incommensurable, irrational, and 
unsystematic. When the genre theorist sees it as her or his task to systematize, s/he alienates 
genres from the pragmatic and rhetorical practices that produce and reproduce them. Genres may 
be unsystematic, but they work for most people most of the time. They are indispensable 
cognitive and communicative tools, not despite but because of their indeterminate variability. It 
is only from the elevated, systematizing perspective of the genre scholar, like that of Moser’s 
Philosoph, that this messiness is really a day-to-day problem. 
This is not to say that genre is only ever a problem for scholars. Films may be framed 
relative to one set of generic criteria or another. Those criteria are situationally specific, but the 
framings themselves may find broader reading audiences. Problems arise when generic 
denotations and connotations conflict within one or among multiple audiences, if the participants 
deem it important enough to contest a given framing. On one hand, it may not be worth the effort 
to complain to a Target manager that “drama” is too broad a category or to correct a coworker 
who calls American Psycho (2000 dir. Mary Harron) a slasher. On the other hand, there are 
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fanzines and social media groups whose raison d’etre is precisely to promote and host arguments 
among genre enthusiasts.     
The stakes of genre framing extend beyond the limited intersubjective discourse of fan 
communities to broader industrial and institutional activities. A recent example is the 2017-2018 
awards season controversy over Jordan Peele’s 2017 film Get Out, which was nominated for two 
Golden Globes as a comedy.3 This categorization sparked tremendous debate over the film’s 
proper genre and the value implied by one generic designation over another. Fans and critics had 
been similarly confused in 2016 when The Martian (dir. Ridley Scott, perf. Matt Damon) won 
the Golden Globes for Best Film and Best Actor in a Comedy or Musical. However, the concern 
then had largely centered on the unfairness of a big-budget film with an A-List director and star 
competing against more modest productions.4 In this latter case, some fans and critics felt that 
the designation “comedy” trivialized Get Out’s critical themes of racist violence and white 
liberal hypocrisy.  
Though early after its release Peele himself had discussed the film in terms of horror and 
explicitly compared its themes and style to other horror films, he also referred to it as a “social 
thriller” and later, more sardonically, as a documentary.5 The film is indeed funny in some parts, 
and it also clearly evokes the atmosphere and imagery of horror—not that those elements are 
mutually exclusive. Moreover, as Peele makes clear in his Fresh Air interview, he doesn’t 
believe that horror is trivial, insofar as it allows us to confront historical, real-life horrors. But 
                                               
3 Who nominated the film as a comedy is a complicated question. Eric Kohn of IndieWire explains that “while 
Universal submitted Get Out as a comedy to the Hollywood Foreign Press Association, Peele clearly had no input 
into that decision. [....] In fact, submissions are made to individual categories, but the HFPA makes the final decision 
about which categories each film falls into” (Kohn ¶4). 
4 See Child. 
5 See Kohn and Peele. 
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not everyone shares Peele’s esteem for the horror tradition and, in light of the conventional 
wisdom that genre movies don’t win awards, it makes sense to hedge. At stake in this 
controversy is how seriously movie audiences and institutions take its formal approach and 
thematic content, as well as the millions of dollars in extra revenue that a major award can 
generate.  
Now, we might ask also why the Golden Globes have a comedy or musical category but 
no “horror” and “science fiction” categories, or why the HFPA makes generic distinctions in the 
first place. One perspective on this suggests itself in light of the Academy of Motion Picture Arts 
and Sciences’ recent embarrassment over a proposed and quickly withdrawn Achievement in 
Popular Film Oscar category. Again, reactions from fans and critics ranged from nonplussed to 
indignant, but for different reasons. Some felt that inclusion of high-grossing films—if that’s 
what were to define “popular”—would compromise the Academy’s elite cultural authority by 
recognizing films that people actually go see. Others believed it would create a tiered system in 
which otherwise serious Best Picture contenders like Black Panther (2018, dir. Ryan Coogler) 
would be permanently relegated based on its lower generic classification.6 Whatever one’s take 
on the whole imbroglio, it highlighted the Academy’s increasingly untenable situation: the 
tension between its roles as both arbiter of art and profit-driven industrial organization; its 
traditional crisis of competition with other entertainment media, most recently with digital 
platforms; its perception among some as irrelevant, elitist, or even reactionary, especially in light 
of the #OscarsSoWhite and #MeToo movements. These industrial issues turn on the aesthetic 
                                               
6 The new category was announced by Academy CEO Dawn Hudson in August of 2018 and rescinded the following 
month after the outcry. For a retrospective overview, see Igoe. 
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and moral value accorded a given film, the received value of a given genre, and how those might 
affect the profitability and/or cultural authority of a given institution.       
The point of bringing up Get Out is not to correct and admonish the HFPA or Universal 
for miscategorizing the film as a comedy. I am not claiming that it is definitely a horror film and 
not a comedy. I am not claiming that it is neither genre, or both, or no genre at all. Get Out is a 
horror film and a comedy (and a horror-comedy) and a social thriller—not inherently, or because 
of any internal textual features, or because of Jordan Peele’s special authority as filmmaker. 
Because it has been interpreted, evaluated, and talked about as a horror, comedy, and social 
thriller by groups who use those terms for particular rhetorical purposes and social activities, it 
belongs to those genres for those groups.   
A major goal of this project is to frame genre in terms of this kind of use, and that use in 
terms of social conditions, or the kinds of groups, activities, institutions, and discourses that fans, 
scholars, and fans who are scholars interact with. While modes of understanding and engaging 
with genre vary widely across user groups and social situations, the common principle is 
precisely that: use among user groups in social situations. In other words, genre entails use by 
someone for someone for some purpose. This is the broader framework for my main claim that 
genre is a function of the rhetorical conditions of its use. 
 
Genre and Use 
Use is a bit of a fuzzy concept, though, and defining it as “social use” only goes so far 
toward sharpening it. One theoretical task this project tackles is distinguishing among the various 
functions ascribed to genre. Let’s take one function to illustrate the complexity of the issue. 
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Genres classify, but for what purpose? Some kinds of classification serve to elucidate an 
individual text or to illuminate a broader pattern among texts. Genre functions as a “metaphoric 
premise” for this kind of interpretive reading, though to leave it at that is to ignore the immediate 
rhetorical practices and purposes surrounding the reading—e.g., how that interpretation is 
communicated—as well as the broader social and cultural groups and institutions for whom such 
interpretations are meaningful and useful. George Kamberelis explains that 
the value of genres and genre theory lies not so much in their powers of classification but 
in their powers of clarification and generativity. Genres are convenient fictions used in 
the attainment of pragmatic and rhetorical ends. They allow us to create or to see 
particular texts in a genre's terms, and, paradoxically they signal the interpretive limits of 
those terms. As such, a genre's definition is not constituted and constrained by "a deeper 
ground," whether it be an entity or a category. It is always constrained pragmatically and 
rhetorically by a set of specific situations, purposes, and audiences. Genres are not classes 
of texts but classifying statements [....] Genres provide communication systems, for the 
use of speakers and writers in producing texts, and readers and critics in interpreting 
them. (158) 
Kamberelis succinctly describes the pragmatic, anti-textualist position I will take as a starting 
point for this project in film genre theory. I will say plenty more about pragmatic anti-textualism 
shortly, but note for now that it rejects the “textualist assumption” that genre is somehow 
intrinsic to the text and that understanding genre requires methods of textual analysis—close 
reading, comparative analysis, historical analysis (Mittell “A Cultural Approach” 4-5). Without a 
tenable textual “deeper ground” to by which to define a genre, we can only look at how it is and 
has been used, by whom, and for what purposes. The rhetorical approach I will advocate 
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decenters the primary text as object of analysis, directing us instead to look at how other writing 
about the primary text frames it, to examine precisely how a genre’s composition, boundaries, 
associations, values, and communicative faculties are not “constrained by” but are indeed 
functions of the “specific situations, purposes, and audiences.”  
Below is the basic trajectory of this project. Beginning with an anti-foundationalist 
rejection of the textualist assumption, I try to work out the functions conventionally ascribed to 
genre in its interpretive and evaluative capacities along pragmatic and specifically rhetorical 
lines. Understanding genre pragmatically as performative genrefication, I question whether there 
is any good reason to believe that something called genre exists beyond instances of public 
genrefication or genre use. This perspective requires that we understand genre’s interpretive, 
evaluative, and rhetorical functions as different—if inextricable—because they serve different 
pragmatic and social purposes. A radically pragmatic genre theory then would understand genre 
as a function of the rhetorical conditions of its use. More specifically, I will pursue four 
directions following from this position on film genre.  
1. Building on constructivist and radical constructivist theories of schematic 
interpretation and adaptive knowledge, I will try to describe genre’s function in 
the interpretative process, specifically how textual and extra-textual attributes are 
subject to constant reconfiguration under different received schemata.  
2. Since we don’t have unmediated access to the private interpretations of “readers 
and critics,” we have to look at what they themselves have written or otherwise 
recorded. But these writings are themselves rhetorically and (therefore) socially 
situated documents, and must be framed as such. Hence, we must try to 
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reconstruct the rhetorical situation and implied audience for a given instance of 
recorded interpretation and genre use. The aim is not to expose or qualify or 
excuse an ‘incorrect’ use of genre, but to show how a given genre’s denotative 
and connotative attributes and associations are integral to the communicative and 
persuasive utility of that genre in a given rhetorical situation. 
3. I will consider the specific evaluative functions of genre and how closely they are 
tied to social identity and group dynamics. This includes, say, expressing one’s 
preference for “art films” or disdain for “chick flicks,” but it also goes beyond 
that. Fan studies across different media have shown how certain subcultural 
identities are asserted, negotiated, and authenticated through arguments about the 
definition, composition, boundaries, and broader cultural politics of a given genre. 
This sociological dimension of genre manifests through the written or otherwise 
recorded accounts of fans, critics, and scholars, which testify to the crucial role of 
genre in reproducing and challenging dominant and oppositional taste politics. 
4. Because film genre use is defined as social use in rhetorical situations, and 
because the social groups that use film genres do so via other kinds of writing in 
recurring situations, I propose adapting a methodology that studies film genres by 
attending to how they are “taken up” or put into social action by rhetorical genres 
such as journalistic reviews, scholarly articles, filmmaker interviews, social media 
posts, or streaming platforms.                    
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My goal is to take seriously and tease out the implications of deconstructivist and pragmatic 
critiques of conventional genre studies, stripping away untenable foundational assumptions and 
trying to describe and account for the functions of genre as instrumental to other social activities.    
 
Generic Textualism and Generic Realism  
There are shades of understanding among different groups about just what genres are or 
where they come from or what they do. As I suggested earlier, for most people they are likely 
workhorse concepts that serve well enough to achieve everyday goals. Though I suggested that 
genre was a perennial problem for scholars, really it is only for genre theorists, those who try to 
systematize, rationalize, find a generalizable principle for generic composition or boundaries or 
social functions. For many scholars, genre is a workhorse academic concept as well, one that 
allows them to delimit a study or define a corpus or establish a set of working stylistic features in 
service of some other project. It is in these cases that genre acts, in Kamberelis’ terms, as 
premises for an argument. These are then, practically speaking, enthymemes, insofar as the genre 
of a given text or the connotative and/or denotative attributes of a given genre are rhetorically 
deferred by such a move. Indeed, there is much left unspoken in popular and even scholarly use 
of genre.  
Toward the beginning of his 1998 Film/Genre, Rick Altman identifies and summarizes 
ten widespread assumptions in film genre criticism and theory as practiced from the 1960s 
through the 1990s.  
● Genre is a useful category, because it bridges multiple concerns 
● Genres are defined by the film industry and recognized by the mass audience 
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● Genres have clear, stable identities and borders 
● Individual films belong wholly and permanently to a single genre 
● Genres are transhistorical 
● Genres undergo predictable development 
● Genres are located in a particular topic, structure, or corpus 
● Genre films share certain fundamental characteristics 
● Genres have either a ritual or an ideological function 
● Genre critics are distanced from the practice of genre7  
Altman briefly raises doubts about each of these assumptions, even though he spends much of 
the rest of his book refuting them. Some of these assumptions seem particularly dated and 
restricted to a small field of genre theory. For instance, the question of whether genres have a 
ritual or an ideological function was of particular concern for the structuralist genre critics of the 
1970s and 1980s, who adopted Levi-Strauss and Althusser as their respective models.8 Some of 
these assumptions, on the other hand, persist and are evident in contemporary criticism, 
scholarship, and fan discourse. I will address each of these questions directly or indirectly over 
the course of this project to greater or lesser degrees. But note for now that I am building my 
project on groundwork laid in Film/Genre, which itself refutes each of the above assumptions 
                                               
7 See Altman ch.2, 14-29. 
8 Among the “ritual” genre critics Altman names himself, Leo Braudy, John Cawelti, Frank McConnell, Thomas 
Schatz, Robin Wood, and Will Wright. On the “ideological side Altman cites Jean-Louis Comolli and Jean-Louis 
Baudry, as well as the journals Cahiers du Cinema, Cinéthique, Screen, Jump Cut, and Camera Obscura (Altman 
27). 
 
It is worth noting that Altman and one of the ideological structuralists, Steve Neale, have a long history of critiquing 
one another. This relationship is not really worth going into here, since by Film/Genre Altman has completely 
rethought and rejected much of his own older ritual structuralist model. One of Neale’s concepts, “inter-textual 
relay,” has been influential. I will discuss Altman’s critique of inter-textual relay in Chapter 2, and moreover I will 
show in Chapter 4 that Altman’s own understanding of fan communities is vulnerable to the same critique. See 
Altman Ch. 2 and Conclusion.    
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about film genre. Indeed this project can be seen as a revision and expansion of Altman’s 
Film/Genre, which itself was a rethinking of conventional film genre theory. In a sense I am 
accepting Altman’s position on textualist film genre theories and the principles of pragmatic film 
genre theory. However, I am expanding his model to account for genre’s role in interpretation, 
evaluation’s role in genrefication, and the rhetorical conditions under which genrefication 
occurs. 
Because this model focuses less on films themselves than on how people write about 
those films under varying circumstances, I am very much interested in the spoken and unspoken 
assumptions about film genre and, moreover, how one knows about it or justifies knowledge 
claims. To explain this further, I will say a little more about the textualist assumption—
henceforth just textualism—and also discuss what I am calling “generic realism.” These two 
general assumptions or appeals encompass several of Altman’s more specific assumptions listed 
above, and can be thought of as characterizing less the ontology of genre than its epistemology—
less about what genres are than about how we know about them.       
Generic textualism looks to texts and applies close reading and comparative 
methodologies in order to identify genres as similarities between and across textual boundaries. 
Genres, it assumes, are discovered by but exist independent of critical activity. Generic authority 
is found in the film, but it can be displaced onto the professional critic or scholar or the auteur. 
The movie, in a sense, tells us what genre it belongs to if we are shrewd enough to decode and 
identify it. Disagreements among fans, critics, or scholars about a film’s genre or a genre’s 
characteristics can be resolved by appeal to more precise and insightful analytic methods that can 
get to the deeper ground and reveal the true genre. 
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This is a common assumption, and the one that I shall argue most strongly against, 
especially in Chapter 2, since 1) the position is neither logically nor historically tenable and 2) it 
does not tell us what genres mean and for whom. From the perspective of pragmatic genre 
theory, genre cannot be reduced to textual similarity, in part because there are too many 
similarities. Even if it were the case that formal similarity defined genre, sorting out the relevant 
similarities still involves selective critical activity. The films have to be made to speak in a 
particular way to suit a particular end. From a pragmatic perspective, we would think not just 
about how they are similar, but how pointing out or sorting films according to particular kinds of 
similarities serve certain social and institutional ends, whether scholarly or journalistic or 
commercial. Genre is found in the use to which a social group puts a label and body of films. 
Generic authority is rhetorical authority—it is exerted in advertisements and textbooks, YouTube 
reviews and journal articles, seminar and barroom discussions, and other supposedly ancillary 
paratexts. This more expansive understanding of genre considers the points of articulation 
between the textual and extra-textual features—what I am calling attributes—by which genre 
users interpret texts and the social groups as well as their constituent activities and discourses 
through which genres are expressed as meaningful and useful. 
The second term, generic realism, is less explicitly invoked, but still operates in 
conventional genre criticism. “Realism” here is akin to a kind of metaphysical realism, as if 
genres are like Platonic forms and exist independent not only of critical activity but of texts 
themselves. I suspect few would make this claim expressly, but it is implicit in many 
conventional positions on genres, especially in attempts to account for inconsistency and change 
among the texts that ostensibly compose them. This is especially pronounced in the case of the 
genre labels that have persisted for decades, the (for lack of a better term) classic genres, like 
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westerns, musicals, horror films, and so forth. These terms are only useful if they posit continuity 
among texts, so obvious differences that cannot be ignored must be accounted for. Genres that 
change over time, or that vary from studio to studio or country to country, prompt ever more 
intricate taxonomies and evolutionary models of period or subgenre or generic hybridity. In a 
sense, the genre as a stable type has to be saved from the chaotic manifestations of its tokens. 
How, we might ask instead, do we know coherent genres exist if the instances of genre are so 
incoherent? Why try to save the concept of genre when the textual examples require so much 
explanation? 
I do not deny that genres exist, but I do deny that they have an independent ontology. 
Genres exits as speech acts, and they are variable because the conditions of their use are 
variable—the social groups that use them and the purposes they are used for change. An 
advertisement, a scholarly book, and a word-of-mouth recommendation entail a pragmatic 
framing of a film relative to the rhetorical conditions that obtain: who the reader is, what s/he 
knows about similar films, what s/he values, what one wants her or him to do.   
I should note that, while I assume a skeptical position with regard to genre and to filmic 
texts as self-contained totalities, I do not deny the existence of texts as such. I can explain this in 
an illustrative anecdote. A friend-of-a-friend, exasperated with my opaque explanations, 
contended that, “whatever you want to call it, a dog is a dog.” At first I pivoted to the ontological 
uncertainties surrounding film and artworks in general. Later, however, it occurred to me that he 
was right, and the thrust of my argument lay in the commonsense understanding of dog-as-a-dog. 
The really important question is when is a dog a sporting dog, a stray, a service animal, or under 
50 pounds? These and other questions point to the social conditions under which a “dog” might 
be framed and understood. The definitions relevant to an American Kennel Club judge are not 
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the same used by an animal control officer or a restaurant owner or a landlord, for whom “dog,” 
by itself, is necessary but insufficient. Clearly the analogy between dogs and films is tenuous at 
best, and I do not mean to elide the tension between the materiality of film and its ideal image.9 
The simpler point is that, where use is concerned, whatever the ontology of the object, it is 
regardless subject to definition under the social and rhetorical conditions of its use. In a sense, 
even if we could reach the deeper, essential structure of a body of films, independent of its use 
by producers, scholars, critics, and fans, that ontic nature would be beside the point, since what 
matters—that is, how genre functions in everyday life—is precisely its social, intersubjective, 
rhetorical use. 
 
Literature Review 
This section will lay out the scaffolding of the approaches I synthesize in this project, 
which pulls together a number of different threads in film theory, genre theory, and fan studies. I 
begin with the biggest influence, Altman, whose poststructuralist account of genre as a pragmatic 
process undercuts the structuralist assumptions of earlier genre criticism and theory and ties the 
development and use of film genres to institutional discourses. Altman’s account, however, 
doesn’t provide a sense of what role genre plays in the construction of meaning. I intend at this 
basic level to use Altman’s pragmatic genre theory and David Bordwell’s account of meaning 
construction to complement one another and to synthesize a theory of film genre’s role in 
informing interpretation. Though Bordwell and Altman combined give us a sense of the 
mechanics of generic interpretation in a strictly denotative sense, they do not explain the 
                                               
9 Cf. Usai. 
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evaluative, connotative function genre serves in broader cultural discourses. Mark Jancovich’s 
theory of genre in social use includes an account of genre’s role in taste politics, especially as 
expressed through certain social “mediations,” such as fan magazines or film reviews. One issue 
I raise is that the form of these mediations affects the content of the genre use and entail a certain 
power dynamic among those involved in a given particular rhetorical act. A film genre’s social 
use is ad hoc, and so it would seem to imply an ad hoc, atomistic method of study. However, the 
field of Rhetorical Genre Studies treats exactly the kinds of generic discourse—genres of writing 
like letters to the editor or film reviews—as social interactions that are typified and recurring and 
thus amenable to a systematic methodology for study. By combining Altman’s pragmatic genre 
theory, Bordwell’s constructivism, Jancovich’s Bourdieusian sociological focus, and Rhetorical 
Genre Studies’ analytical methodology, I hope to provide a theoretical account and methodology 
for studying cinematic genre as a matrix of interpretation, communication, evaluation, and social 
distinction.       
This notion of genre as a social, discursive process is central to Rick Altman’s rethinking 
of film genres in Film/Genre. Responding to a body of scholarly genre criticism that has wrestled 
with the complexities and contradictions of generic textuality and historicity, Altman proposes a 
pragmatic, industry-focused model in which competition among studios drove a dialectic of 
imitation and product differentiation. In the classical studio era, film producers would imitate 
their own successes by repeatedly employing and highlighting proprietary textual elements, such 
as trademarked characters or contract stars, to generate a studio-specific cycle. Alternately, 
studios would also imitate a competitor’s successes by replicating the more general, non-
proprietary elements, such as setting, tone, general visual style, or subject matter. This inter-
studio imitation produced significant textual similarities and apparent genres, but only insofar as 
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critical discourse among film reviewers identified certain textual`commonalities and grouped 
these bodies of films together accordingly, making finer and finer distinctions along the way. 
From melodrama, for example, critics generated musical melodrama, western melodrama, crime 
melodrama, and so forth. Through studio replication and critical reiteration of textual 
commonalities, these modifiers became substantized, creating “musicals,” “westerns,” and 
“crime films.” This process, called genrefication, is performative in the (Austinian) sense of 
proposing that certain configurations of attributes are significant and ought to inform 
interpretation. It is also iterative in the sense that the lack of stable textual foundation requires 
repeated, ongoing regenrefication for the genre to survive.   
One hallmark of Altman’s model is an expanded notion of “the critic,” from a narrow 
sense of a professional reviewer or scholar, to a “critical reading position” more broadly. 
Obviously, film reviewers perform these kinds of readings, but film producers also act as critics 
insofar as they analyze the textual elements of box office successes to inform their production 
decisions in pursuit of further successes. Moreover, where many scholarly genre critics operated 
under the assumption that they were deducing the existence of or describing objective genres via 
comparative film analyses, Altman shows how scholarly and other professional critical 
discourse, too, produces and reproduces genres, even and especially retroactively, such as in the 
case of film noir or the woman’s film. This is because the textual elements identified as typical 
of a genre in one context—such as historical film reviews—are not necessarily the same that 
later scholarly critics would look to when compiling their own groupings. Moreover, Altman’s 
theory of genre as genrefication challenges the stability of a given text by showing how it is 
always already subject to an ongoing process of regenrefication. Texts are configurations of 
textual elements akin to astronomical constellations, in that the meaningful and agreed-upon 
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arrangement of the most relevant textual features must be repeatedly reimagined and articulated 
in discourse. This also implies that different imagined configurations of textual elements could 
lend the film to multiple genres. Thus the nature of a text’s genericity is not only historically 
situated but also multivalent. At any given point in time a text can belong to multiple genres 
simultaneously. One crucial implication of this is that we can neither appeal to textual elements 
nor to historical context to settle and stabilize a text’s genre. 
A comparable approach to the “critical reading position” is that offered by David 
Bordwell in Making Meaning. Bordwell’s constructivist theory holds that meaning does not 
reside in the text. Filmmakers can (and do) use conventional cues to direct or suggest a particular 
meaning, but the viewer must construct the meaning for her/himself. From basic referential 
systems like narrative causation, continuity editing, or depth of field, to more complex schemata 
like personification or metaphor meaning is actively constructed by the viewer as she observes 
and frames visual and auditory data. No less than ideological interpretations, even the most basic 
acts of comprehension—understanding the literal or referential images and events that appear on-
screen—turn on a viewer’s ability to pick up on textual cues and to apply to the text interpretive 
schemata and semantic fields, or structures and relations of meaning. Meaning is produced by the 
viewer, who is subject not only to broader socio-historical and cultural conditions, but also to the 
more immediate context of a discourse group, such as academic film criticism. Thus both the 
interpretation and its articulation are constrained by the rhetorical conditions or the interpreter, 
which may privilege some strategies and philosophies of interpretation—such as Marxist or 
psychoanalytic symptomatic close readings—depending on the values and priorities of the 
institutional milieu at that point in history. 
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Bordwell focuses on the interpretive practices of academic critics, but his account can be 
expanded for our purposes in three useful ways. First, his constructivist argument holds that all 
viewing involves meaning making to one degree or another, and so his model of meaning 
construction is applicable to film viewers beyond scholarly critics and professional film 
reviewers; his is a model of comprehension and interpretation as such. Likewise, Bordwell’s 
consideration of rhetorical conditions in the academy should direct us to look to the rhetorical 
conditions under which students, fans, and casual viewers construct and express meaning in a 
film. Second, though Bordwell’s own discussion of genre as a schema is restricted to received 
Hollywood genres and limited by the notion of genre as stable, a reconstructed pragmatic 
conception of genre like Altman’s coupled with Bordwell’s account of the function of schemata 
in interpretation provides a powerful framework for theorizing the role of dynamic, multivalent 
genres in interpretation and rhetoric. Third, combining the two provides a way of 1) theorizing 
the influence of cinematic genres—as historically variable public schemata—in the interpretive 
process in a manner that lends more precision to Altman’s account of the critical reading 
position, and 2) understanding all interpretive schemata as potential pragmatic genres, given 
favorable rhetorical conditions. In other words, the extent to which the schema “Oscar nominee” 
or “psychodrama” or “observational documentary” functions pragmatically in interpretation and 
expression, it is in effect a genre.10  
                                               
10 This expanded notion of genre could thus provide a response to Thomas Beebee, who somewhat sarcastically 
questions Frederic Jameson’s inclusion of “bestseller” among such airport paperback genres as thrillers, westerns, 
and romance novels. Insofar as “bestseller” 1) signifies some category of texts that 2) is meaningful for some group 
or groupings of users and 3) in some way informs users’ reading practices, it can be said to be a genre. Thus, insofar 
as “bestseller” is a meaningful classification used by publishers, retailers, marketing departments, consumers, and 
reviewers, and it appears to inform the readings of derisive critics like Jameson, it can be said to be a genre. (Beebee 
8)       
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Altman’s and Bordwell’s respective systems provide accounts of the denotative or value-
neutral mechanics of genre. However, Altman’s model of genre fan communities tacitly assumes 
a harmonious coexistence among genre fans that is not supported by fan studies. Mark 
Jancovich, in “Genre and the Audience” and “A Real Shocker,” extends the Bourdieusian 
analysis of cinematic fan communities advanced by Jeffrey Sconce to an explicit focus on film 
genres and how genre functions as a medium of cultural distinctions.11 In the former piece, 
Jancovich examines film reviews of and critical responses to The Silence of the Lambs, 
especially in publications like The New Yorker, The Wall Street Journal, and The Nation aimed 
at middle-class, educated readers. He shows how the film’s genre designation—whether or not it 
is labelled a horror film in a particular review—is bound up in the aesthetic, moral, and political 
value judgments a given reviewer makes about the film and the horror genre, as well as the taste 
formation a given publication both reflects and contributes to. In the latter article Jancovich 
focuses on genre fan discourse within niche publications like Fangoria or Fear. In letters to the 
editor Jancovich finds film genre functioning as a medium for establishing and expressing 
subcultural capital within a fan community. The authenticity of a particular text is a paramount 
concern in these disputes, and Jancovich finds abundant argument about whether a film like 
Alien belongs to the horror genre, or whether it’s really a science fiction film. These intra-group 
contestations turn on disparate readings as well as different ideas about what constitutes an 
authentic genre film—what the essence of the genre is or ought to be. For example, the slick 
production value of Alien disqualifies it as ‘authentic’ horror for some readers, for whom horror 
                                               
11 Jancovich critiques Sconce’s concept of paracinema and its application in a later article. See  Sconce and 
Jancovich, “Cult Fictions.”  
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cinema’s transgressive nature dictates that a film ought to offend aesthetic as well as moral 
values.  
Jancovich provides a bridge from the mechanics of inferential interpretation and the 
discursive transformations of genre labels to an account of the conflicting values between and 
among different discourse groups and the associated taste formations that frame and indeed 
suffuse acts of genrefication. This added dimension brings into relief the motivations and 
sociological stakes of generic discourse within, without, and among industrial, academic, and 
journalistic institutions. “Motivations” here should not be understood in any kind of furtive or 
disingenuous sense, as if users deliberately miscategorize films to suit an agenda; such a 
suspicion would have to entail that there is a “right” genre to which a given film objectively 
belongs. To understand genre in the multivalent, pragmatic sense offered here we would need to 
accept that genre is defined by its use within a discursive framework, for one or more groups of 
genre users, toward some purpose. Jancovich shows us that the social context of this use-value 
implies a social use-value, that the standpoint and values of a user or community of users 
informs the reading position and inferential strategies, as well as how the user frames the film in 
communicative acts. While Jancovich attends to different “mediations” of generic discourse, his 
definition of genre and its structural relationship to those forms of mediation remains 
unsystematic. What is needed is an approach to genre that defines genre in terms of use and 
directs us toward a methodology for studying genre qua discourse.   
Rhetorical Genre Studies – which developed out of English, communication, and rhetoric 
and composition studies – conceives of rhetorical genres as “social action.” (Miller 163). 
Specifically, Carolyn Miller defines genre as “a conventional category of discourse based in 
large-scale typification of a rhetorical action [which] acquires meaning from situation and from 
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the social context in which that situation arose” (163). In other words, rhetorical genre approach 
considers these issues less in terms of the formal or thematic character of a given text and more 
in terms of repeated and/or ongoing interactions and the social need that these rhetorical acts 
meet. Much RGS focuses on institutional settings as dynamic contexts and may incorporate 
ideological implications in its analyses. Examples of such genres include student papers, lab 
reports, business memos, grocery lists, or the State of the Union Address. Anis Bawarshi and 
Mary Jo Reiff broaden the definition of genre to include “forms of cultural knowledge that 
conceptually frame and mediate how we understand and typically act within various situations” 
(4). The rhetorical approach, simply put, looks at how addresser and addressee relate to one 
another in a given concrete situation; how exigences, purposes, forms of address, and other 
rhetorical genres shape the rhetorical genre and situation; and how rhetorical genre and situation 
shape one another.  
One key concept from RGS is “uptake,” which describes the ways genres interact with 
one another in a given rhetorical context. A genre is taken up when it is brought into meaningful 
social action (Bawarshi and Reiff 83-4). Thinking of film genre as a discursive process of 
genrefication, we would have to conclude that genres appear only through uptake into a 
rhetorical genre. That is, genrefication and regenrefication can only occur in rhetorical 
communication—whether discussions, reviews, or scholarly writing—because film genres are 
performative discourse and discourse is mediated by rhetorical situation. A film review of a 
western takes up the film genre ‘western’ into the rhetorical genre ‘film review.’ In this case, we 
would want to understand what textual attributes the author identifies as characteristic of ‘the 
western,’ how positing those attributes contributes to an evaluative argument (and relative to 
what evaluative criteria), and what audience or group the author is writing for. How, by this 
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hypothetical writer’s account, does the intertextual baggage of the genre designation interact 
with the textual particulars of the film and what rhetorical end is it meant to serve?  
In Writing Genres, Amy Devitt outlines and engages with the various critical 
perspectives on RGS. Chapter 2 in particular lays out several points important for the current 
inquiry. Though I have used the term “communities” fairly loosely here, Devitt argues that to 
understand rhetorical genres in terms of their utility for social groups requires that we make more 
careful distinctions among those groups as communities, collectives, and networks, three 
divisions that share decreasing frequency and intensity of interaction, but share one or more 
rhetorical genres. Furthermore, we have to understand the genre/user relationship as reciprocal 
and dynamic; users construct rhetorical genres, but they are also to some degree constructed by 
them as genres mediate communicative activities. The functions that rhetorical genres serve for 
groups are not neutral; “a genre reflects, constructs, and reinforces the values, epistemology, and 
power relationships of the group from which it developed and for which it functions” (Devitt 63).  
 
Chapter Overview 
In Chapter 2, “Genre as Interpretive Schema and Rhetorical Frame,” I will lay out a 
model of genre’s interpretive and rhetorical uses as two dimensions of a pragmatic genre theory. 
In the former case, I will argue for an adaptation of David Bordwell’s constructivist theory of 
meaning augmented by Altman’s pragmatic definition of genre. This chapter will argue that, 
though texts are interpreted according to conventional schmata, their systems of textual and 
extra-textual attributes are in principle infinitely reconfigurable. This allows and in fact requires 
a given text to be constantly regenrefied and thus framed according to present exigences. There 
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is no special kind of method that allows scholars to study and talk about genre without 
participating in genrefication. Since film history and genre studies are mutually dependent—each 
relies on the other for conceptual frameworks and critical evidence—rhetorical genrefication has 
profound implications for film historiography, as I will demonstrate in the first of my chapter use 
cases. A critical reading of Amanda Ann Klein’s recent American Film Cycles will illustrate the 
need for an explicit historiographic approach to genre study and genre history, one which 
emphasizes the scholar’s participation in framing genres along the lines of constructivist 
interpretation. Klein’s application of genre theory to social film history inherits the limits of 
traditional genre criticism and perpetuates some of its mistaken assumptions about generic 
stability and the mutual independence of genre and scholarly discourse, and her methodology 
and broader argument are weakened as a result.        
To describe the second dimension i.e., genre as a rhetorical frame, I draw on Bordwell, as 
well as Altman, Jancovich, and literary genre critics like Thomas Beebee and Adena Rosemarin 
who insist on genre as defined by use. Following from Rosemarin’s claim that genre is a 
classifying statement rather than a class in itself, I will demonstrate how the public use of genre 
entails framing films and genres relative to one another in institutional and non-institutional 
discourse (Rosemarin 46). In some cases of scholarly practice, genres orient critical perspectives 
on historical and cultural studies, allowing academics to call upon certain genres and films as 
mutually explicatory frames.12 In other scholarly cases, academics actively construct new genres 
by emphasizing different sets of apparently common features.  In some cases of industrial 
practice, promotional materials exploit multivalent genre reading practices by combining 
                                               
12  This reliance on the explanatory power of received genres exhibits the same structure and is subject to the same 
critique as “context,” in the sense that Mieke Bal and Norman Bryson, following Jonathan Culler, criticize as 
simplifying matters and introducing an “incipient positivism.” See Bal and Bryson (175-180) and Culler (xiv). 
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semantic elements and allowing the potential audience to invoke multiple genres. In other 
industrial cases, promotional discourse explicitly invokes one genre in service of distancing a 
film from another. To illustrate this rhetorical dimension, examine Adam Lowenstein’s article 
“Spectacle Horror and Hostel: Why ‘Torture Porn’ Does Not Exist” and its rhetorical dimensions 
relative to those of David Edelstein’s coinage from five years earlier. I will argue that 
Lowenstein’s titular claim evinces a normative genre criticism that turns on a textualist premise. 
As an alternative, I will considers the rhetorical conditions under which popular press film 
writers use that term in contradistinction to Lowenstein’s argument, which was published in an 
academic journal. Rather than appeal to historical context, I’ll try to reconstruct the specific 
rhetorical conditions—exigence, appeals, audience, etc.—that obtain in either case. By 
emphasizing the use of a genre for a particular user group, I hope to show that genre is a 
configuration of textual features commonly identified among a user group as a function of the 
rhetorical use it is put to.         
In Chapter Three, “Meta-Genre and Social Action,” I introduce the concept of meta-
genres, which are generalized performative utterances about film genres but which are dislocated 
from concrete textual examples. Meta-genres contain the sum total of possible semantic, 
syntactic, and extra-textual elements known to a given viewer and also imbue film genres and 
genrefication with their evaluative content; hence they serve both denotative and connotative 
functions. Meta-genres guide our active classifications of films as part of larger communicative 
acts. But meta-genres also serve as a rhetorical shorthand for those discourses and values, and 
meta-genres implicate politics and ideology in acts of genrefication. Not all uses of genre or 
meta-generic shorthand are expressly political in the style of ideological genre criticism. Instead, 
power flows through filmic genre and meta-genre’s uptake into a range of institutional and 
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informal social discourses, including in particular evaluative classifications that evince 
individual taste. Here, I will show how the concept of meta-genre fills the evaluative gap 
between the denotative mechanics of Bordwell’s and Altman’s accounts and the axiological 
judgments inherent in the taste politics described by Jancovich. The chapter will explore how 
genres become reified and doxic through institutional use, especially in industrial and academic 
discourses, where a meta-generic label can anchor genrefication to negative connotations.    
In order both to illustrate meta-genre and to expand upon the rhetorical framework 
introduced in Chapter Two, I will analyze institutional and fan discourse around the 2002 film 28 
Days Later and its relation to the zombie meta-genre. Director Danny Boyle and screenwriter 
Alex Garland’s 2003 interview with film critic Kim Newman will be contrasted with a Reddit 
discussion of the film from 2011. In each case the film’s genre is explicitly discussed and 
contested to greater or lesser degrees, but evident also are the different historical periods at the 
beginning and height, respectively, of the so-called zombie renaissance in popular culture.13 
Thomas Beebee’s claim that genres are defined negatively, whether explicitly or implicitly, will 
illuminate Boyle and Garland’s pre-emptive invocation of science fiction and apocalypse 
narratives to describe what was then and is still widely seen as a zombie film.14 On one hand, 
their avoidance of the zombie meta-genre designation is indicative both of the lower evaluative 
                                               
13 The early 2000s saw an explosion in the popularity of zombie-related films, television series, novels, graphic 
novels, video games, board games, apparel, and other pop culture miscellany dubbed the “zombie renaissance.” 28 
Days Later has been seen retrospectively as an important watershed film that helped to both reinvigorate and also to 
legitimate to some degree a traditionally disreputable move monster, and thus to help precipitate the zombie 
renaissance. 28 Days Later was released after decades of B and Poverty Row and then exploitation pictures 
featuring zombies which, with the occasional exception of a George Romero film, were not highly regarded. It was 
not at all clear at the time that there would be a renewed popular interest in the genre. 28 Days Later emerged after 
Sony’s big-budget video game adaptation Resident Evil but before critically acclaimed transmedia titles like Shaun 
of the Dead, The Walking Dead, World War Z, and Zone One. This historical framing helps to explain why an indie 
art-house director would want to distance his film from a genre associated with schlock, whether low-budget or 
blockbuster. For more on the zombie renaissance, see Bishop and Russell.  
14 Cf. Elley’s 2002 Variety review and the Rabin et al’s. 2015 AV Club retrospective listicle. 
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valence associated with zombie narratives at the time as well as the acknowledgement of the 
interpretive schema it implies. On the other hand, it illustrates how differently Boyle’s, 
Garland’s, Newman’s, and Filmmaker’s institutional rhetorical concerns shape the framing of the 
film’s genre in contrast to an anonymous online discussion among niche genre fans whose ethos 
is fluid and ad hoc. In the Reddit thread, part of the “/r/zombies” page, a self-selected group of 
users can be observed jockeying for ethos through appeals to their own textual analyses and their 
knowledge of zombie film aesthetics and history, thus exhibiting both the critical reading 
position as well as their subcultural capital as members of a community of zombie fans for whom 
the meta-genre is not pejorative.            
In Chapter Four, “Rhetorical Genre and Film Genre Uptake,” I will introduce rhetorical 
genre studies and sketch some of its key concepts. While the piecemeal identification of the 
rhetorical conditions of given instances of generic discourse would be tedious, it also would miss 
the broader structural characteristics and power dynamics inherent in certain kinds of rhetorical 
discourse. To produce systematic and generalizable analyses of the rhetorical use of film genres, 
I advocate the adaptation of the concepts and tools of rhetorical genre theory for a methodology 
for film genre studies. First I will argue that a theory of genre that focuses on its use cannot take 
the content of its use for granted. Instead, we must consider the rhetorical conditions of its use. 
The RGS concept of uptake attends to the relations between artistic and rhetorical genres, or how 
each incorporates the other and puts it into social action. This principle of uptake directs our 
attention to the rhetorical genres in which film genres and meta-genres participate.  RGS also 
provides a framework for distinguishing precisely among different kinds of rhetorical genres 
based upon which groups use them and for which purposes. Rigorous discernment among 
rhetorical genres is crucial because the situation varies according to the users and purposes of 
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each genre, as do their corresponding power relations—audience in any rhetorical situation is 
always to some degree a construct of the rhetorical process (Devitt 31). This rhetorical 
construction is reciprocal but not symmetrical. The interests of the rhetor, speaker or writer, and 
the ability of the audience to push back or construct itself vary broadly depending upon the 
situation.  
My use case for this chapter will examine industrial discursive use of film genres by 
Netflix in its streaming algorithm. In particular, it will focus how Netflix’s digital 
recommendation system, which reconfigures textual elements to match curated “microgenres” to 
precise user tastes. Netflix engages in the same pragmatic regenrefication that has characterized 
industrial filmic genre use through its history, even if now on a scale at once broader, in terms of 
number of titles, as well as more focused on individual consumers.15 The Netflix case will also 
demonstrate how uptake functions in the digital realm, whereby classical film genres, along with 
other genrefied schemata, are taken up into the rhetorical recommendation genre. Moreover, 
framing the Netflix DRS rhetorically will underscore the asymmetrical construction of Netflix 
and its users, as well as how the other genres in its genre system (such as user agreements) and 
genre set (such as the Netflix Tech Blog) function to maintain and elide this asymmetry. 
I will conclude by recapping the overall model and offering some thoughts on the 
methods and methodologies of genre theory relative to those of genre criticism and pedagogy. 
While genre theory ought to attend to writing about films rather than films themselves, and to 
adopt a hermeneutic reading strategy, genre criticism and pedagogy ought to reflect on the 
positivist implications of textualism and the rhetoricity of their discursive activities. In the 
                                               
15 For more on the Netflix RS, see Amatriain and Basilico and Madrigal.  
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conclusion I also address the question of why rhetorical genres might be relatively more stable 
than the filmic genres they take up. This leads to the question of how to distinguish 
philosophically between rhetorical and artistic genres. I suggest tentatively that all texts are 
potentially rhetorical and potentially artistic, depending upon how they are received relative to 
situated cultural norms and values as well as rhetorical need. I briefly discuss paracinema, 
operationalism, and documentary modes as film-specific examples.            
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Chapter 2: Genre as Interpretive Schema and Rhetorical Frame    
 
Genre as Interpretive Schema 
I noted in the introduction the difficulty critics have had as they looked more closely at the 
genres they employ. Neither textualist definitions, such as those of structuralist film critics, or 
more historical definitions hold up under skeptical scrutiny. All we can justifiably say is that 
genres have been and are used—some more general, some more specialized—and in various 
forms over time. Genre theory, then, as I have suggested, ought to concern itself with this use, 
with how genres have been and are employed, by whom, and toward what end.    
 This notion of genre as a social, discursive process is central to Rick Altman’s rethinking 
of film genres in Film/Genre. Responding to a body of scholarly genre criticism that has wrestled 
with the complexities and contradictions of generic textuality and historicity, Altman proposes a 
pragmatic, industry-focused model in which competition among studios drove a dialectic of 
imitation and product differentiation. In the classical studio era, film producers would analyze 
and imitate their own successes by repeatedly employing and highlighting proprietary textual 
elements, such as trademarked characters or contract stars, to generate a studio-specific cycle. 
Alternately, studios would similarly analyze and then imitate a competitor’s successful films by 
replicating the more general, non-proprietary elements, such as setting, tone, general visual style, 
or subject matter. This inter-studio imitation produced genres, but only in an indirect sense. The 
films might closely resemble one another, and this was due to producers’ calculated attempts to 
capitalize on a hit formula. But it was the critical discourse of reviewers that identified textual 
commonalities and grouped these bodies of films together accordingly, making finer and finer 
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distinctions along the way—from melodrama, for example, generating musical melodrama, 
western melodrama, crime melodrama, and so forth. The general acceptance of the categories in 
popular use among other reviewers and audiences that constituted them as genres. Once readers 
understood what reviewers meant by gangster picture as opposed to urban crime melodrama, the 
genre was up and running. Through replication and reiteration of textual commonalities, these 
modifiers became substantized, creating musicals, westerns, and crime films. From these gradual 
variations in discourse about films, new genres emerge as they are proposed and adopted by 
other reviewers, producers, scholars, readers, viewers, and other genre users.  
One hallmark of Altman’s model in Film/Genre is an expanded notion of “the critic,” 
from a narrow sense of a professional reviewer or scholar, to a “critical reading position” more 
broadly (44).16 Obviously, film reviewers perform these kinds of readings, but film producers 
also act as critics insofar as they analyze the textual elements of box office successes to inform 
their production decisions in pursuit of further successes (43-4). Moreover, where many 
scholarly genre critics operated under the assumption that they were deducing the existence of or 
describing objective genres via comparative film analyses, Altman shows how scholarly and 
other professional critical discourse, too, produces and reproduces genres, even and especially 
retroactively, such as in the case of film noir (60-1) or the woman’s film (72-7). This is because 
the textual attributes identified as typical of a genre in one kind of discourse—such as historical 
film reviews—are not necessarily the same that later scholarly critics would look to when 
compiling their own groupings. I shall have quite a bit more to say about scholarly discourse 
later, but for now note that Altman’s theory of genre and genrefication challenges the stability of 
                                               
16 N.B. All subsequent citations of Altman will be from Film/Genre unless otherwise noted.  
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a given text by showing how it is always already subject to an ongoing process of 
regenrefication.  
Genres are configurations of textual attributes akin to astronomical constellations, in the 
sense that the meaningful and agreed-upon arrangement of the most relevant textual features 
must be repeatedly reimagined and rearticulated. While the component stars or textual data may 
be independent phenomena, the relations among them that constitute constellations or genres are 
wholly imaginary and performative. This also implies that different imagined configurations of 
textual attributes could lend the film to multiple genres. Thus the nature of a text’s genericity is 
not only historically situated but also multivalent; that is, at any given point in time a text can 
belong to multiple genres simultaneously or, rather, it can participate in one or more genres 
while never belonging properly to any one (Derrida 230). One crucial implication of this is that 
we can neither appeal to textual attributes nor to historical context to settle and stabilize a text’s 
genre. For example, The Great Train Robbery (1903, dir. Edwin S. Porter) can neither positively 
be said to be a western by virtue of its semantics and syntax—that is, its iconography and 
structure—nor can it positively be said to be not a western simply because the genre didn’t exist 
at the time of the film’s production. It is a western because and only because it eventually 
became and continues to be widely talked about as a western.17 
 Altman’s poststructuralist account of genre as a pragmatic process undercuts the 
structuralist assumptions and/or teleological historiography of earlier genre criticism and theory, 
and it ties the development and use of film genres to institutional discourses while also resisting 
                                               
17 For an overview of the genrefication of the western, see Altman 34-8.  
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the sort of ideological genre criticism that conflates industrial generic discourses.18 Altman’s 
model, however, doesn’t provide a sense of what role genre plays in the construction of meaning, 
in both interpretation of and in rhetoric about films. To put that another way, Altman tells us that 
producers and critics sorted films according to select and variable textual similarities, but he 
doesn’t tell us how or why they chose the similarities as they did or what function those 
selections played in interpreting films. To address these questions, we will need to augment 
Altman’s model with an account of the mechanics of spectator interpretation.  
David Bordwell offers a comparable approach to Altman’s critical reading position in his 
1989 Making Meaning. Bordwell’s constructivist theory holds that meaning does not reside in 
the text. Filmmakers can (and do) use conventional cues to direct or suggest a particular 
meaning, but the viewer must construct the meaning for her/himself. From basic referential 
systems like narrative causation, continuity editing, or depth of field, to more complex schemata 
like personification or metaphor meaning is actively constructed by the viewer as she observes 
and frames visual and auditory data.but is actively constructed by the viewer as she observes and 
frames visual and auditory data (13).19 No less than ideological interpretations, even the most 
basic acts of comprehension—understanding the literal or referential images and events that 
appear on-screen—depend on a viewer’s ability to pick up on textual cues and to apply to the 
text semantic fields, or relations of meaning (such as nature vs. civilization), and schemata, or 
the textual data structures that convey those meanings (such as personification or metonymy or 
structuring absence). There are more or less conventional semantic fields and schemata a viewer 
might look for, depending on the conventional poetics of the time and her own social standpoint. 
                                               
18 Altman criticizes Steve Neale in particular for treating film criticism and film production as part of the same 
industry and refusing to distinguish among their often divergent interests and practices (72).  
19 N.B. All subsequent citations from Bordwell will be from Making Meaning unless otherwise noted.  
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For instance, how a 21st century viewer interprets the gun comparison scene between John 
Ireland and Montgomery Clift in Red River (1948, dir. Howard Hawks) may depend largely upon 
her exposure to theories of camp, homosociality, or queer theory, or simply on the extent to 
which she is attuned to look for coded homoeroticism in classical Hollywood cinema. Meaning 
is produced by the viewer, who is subject not only to broader socio-historical and cultural 
conditions, but also to the more immediate context of a discourse group, such as academic film 
criticism. Both the viewer’s interpretation and its articulation are constrained by the rhetorical 
conditions that obtain.20 These conditions that may privilege some strategies and philosophies of 
interpretation—such as Marxist or psychoanalytic symptomatic close readings—depending on 
the values and priorities of the institutional milieu at that point in history.21  
Bordwell’s own discussion of film genre largely frames it in terms of category schemata. 
He recognizes that genres cannot be deductively defined, nor can genre as a principle be clearly 
distinguished from modes, cycles, formulae, or—as the marginal annotations in my second-hand 
copy suggest—movements and schools. (147). “One could [...] argue that the concept of genre is 
so historically mutable that no set of necessary and sufficient conditions can mark off genres 
from other sorts of groupings in ways that all experts and ordinary film-goers would find 
acceptable” (ibid.) The “one could” here is representative of Bordwell’s hesitance to make a 
positive claim about genre proper as currently used. He is content to leave those fuzzy 
distinctions be as such and to focus instead on genre’s interpretive and rhetorical functions as a 
                                               
20 N.B. First, “Rhetorical conditions” is not Bordwell’s term, but this consideration is central to my own project and 
is relevant to Altman’s and Bordwell’s respective accounts, as I shall argue later. Second, I don’t wish to give the 
impression that rhetorical conditions are some kind of burden or limitation. On the contrary, given the rhetorical 
genre’s role as nexus of subject, group, text, and social action, it might be more accurate to say that rhetorical 
conditions necessitate and facilitate as well as constrain. I will discuss the multidimensional nature of rhetorical 
genres in greater detail in Chapter Four.  
21 As we shall see shortly, Altman’s critique of Todorov turns on identifying the sensibilities of French structuralism 
at work in his distinction between theoretical and historical genres.  
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category schema, which in principle are identical to those of other category schemata. Genre for 
Bordwell is prototypical of how critics use categories in general to structure meaning in their 
interpretive and rhetorical practices.   
This point is crucial. Having discarded textualism as a foundation of genre, we have 
turned to genre use—what it does, how it functions. Genre, in its interpretive functions, is a 
category schema and, in its rhetorical functions, a category schema is a genre. Consider 
Bordwell’s list of  
the variety of categories at work in film criticism—grouping by period or country 
(American films of the 1930s); by director or star or producer or writer or studio; by 
technical process (CinemaScope films); by cycle (the ‘fallen woman’ films); by series 
(007 movies); by style (German Expressionism); by structure (narrative), by ideology 
(Reaganite cinema); by venue (‘drive-in movies’); by purpose (home movies); by 
audience (‘teenpix’); by subject or theme (family films, paranoid-politics movies) (148). 
We might also add to this list production and distribution conditions (low-budget or direct-to-
video); public notoriety (“video nasties”); ratings classifications (G, PG, PG-13, R, NC-17 and 
“Unrated” films); franchise (Marvel Cinematic Universe); relations to source material (original 
screenplays, adaptations, sequels, prequels, remakes); cultural status (canon, cult movies, trash 
cinema). Because these are performative classifications that both index and prompt a particular 
kind of reception for an audience they function as genres just as much as “western,” “musical,” 
or “science fiction.” Hence, insofar as they might serve as rhetorical frames, all category 
schemata are at least potential genres. 
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Bordwell focuses on those interpretive practices of academic critics, but his account can 
be expanded in three useful ways.  
1. His constructivist argument holds that all viewing involves meaning making to 
one degree or another, and so his model of meaning construction is applicable to 
film viewers beyond scholarly critics and professional film reviewers; his is a 
model of comprehension and interpretation as such (8-10).22 Likewise, Bordwell’s 
consideration of rhetorical conditions in the academy should direct us to look to 
the rhetorical conditions under which students, fans, and casual viewers in their 
own ways construct and express a film’s meaning (20).  
2. Though Bordwell’s own discussion of genre proper as a schema is restricted to 
received Hollywood genres and limited by the conventional notion of genre as 
stable (which he doesn’t necessarily share), he does identify genre’s function as 
category schema with a range of classificatory criteria. A reconstructed pragmatic 
conception of genre would encompass category schemata as well as Hollywood 
genres.  
3. Synthesizing Altman’s and Bordwell’s models provides a way of theorizing the 
influence of cinematic genres—as historically variable public schemata—in the 
interpretive process in a manner that lends more precision to Altman’s account of 
the critical reading position, while also admitting all interpretive schemata as 
                                               
22 It is in these pages that Bordwell lays out his distinctions among referential, explicit, implicit, and symptomatic 
meanings. The first two, which Bordwell calls comprehension, are evident on the face of the film: the literal events 
and actions represented on-screen and the explicitly stated themes, respectively. The latter two terms indicate 
meanings that critics infer through textual analysis: implicit meanings are deeper themes not available on the 
surface, and symptomatic meanings are those determined by and which evince a broader extra-filmic context, such 
as late capitalism, the instability of the sign, or the structure of the psyche.    
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potential pragmatic genres, given favorable rhetorical conditions. That is, the 
extent to which the schemata like “Oscar nominee” or “psychodrama” or 
“observational documentary” or “Michael Bay movie” function pragmatically in 
interpretation and expression for some group, they are genres.23 
 The more dramatic challenge to conventional genre study here has to do with how genres 
are configured and what counts as a genre. Altman’s deconstruction of the genres Bordwell cites 
as discrete types of schemata means that any and all attributes including but not limited to 
schemata and semantic fields are fair game for genrefication. That is, semantic fields and 
schemata manifest as textual attributes and Altman’s own semantic and syntactic elements are all 
in play.24 Moreover, as we saw above, extratextual attributes such as filmmaker(s), historical 
period, country, production or exhibition conditions, and even broader institutional 
noteworthiness could potentially be generically significant, since generic significance is not an 
inherent property of the text but is contingent upon a viewer’s interpretive and rhetorical activity. 
 This is not to say that there are no constraints, or that any film could belong to any genre. 
In principle, this may be true, but interpretive activity is not a free-for-all. Instead, it is an 
adaptive process in the epistemological sense I borrow from Nick Redfern’s application of 
radical constructivism to film historiography.25 Experiences are not tested against the objective 
                                               
23 This expanded notion of genre could thus provide a response to Thomas Beebee, who somewhat sarcastically 
questions Frederic Jameson’s inclusion of “bestseller” among such airport paperback genres as thrillers, westerns, 
and romance novels. Insofar as “bestseller” 1) signifies some category of texts that 2) is meaningful for some group 
or groupings of users and 3) in some way informs users’ reading practices, it can be said to be a genre. Thus, insofar 
as “bestseller” is a meaningful class designation used by publishers, retailers, marketing departments, consumers, 
and reviewers, and it appears to inform the readings of derisive critics like Jameson, it can be said to be a genre. 
(Beebee 8)       
24 See Altman “A Semantic/Syntactic Approach to Film Genre” in Film/Genre 
25 Redfern describes his historiography as a sort of Humean radical empiricism, built on Ernst von Glaserfeldt’s 
radical constructivist philosophy of science, which derives its conception of adaptive knowledge from Jean Piaget. 
See Redfern section 3 ¶ 3.   
38 
world—to which radical constructivism denies we have access—but are organized according to 
what Redfern calls schemes (related to but not to be confused with Bordwell’s schemata) or 
existing configurations of knowledge. If possible, new experiential knowledge is assimilated into 
an existing scheme. If the new experience cannot be assimilated, if it causes a perturbation, then 
existing schemes must be altered or new schemes must be created to accommodate the 
incongruity. Experience and knowledge are thus evaluated according to functional utility and 
internal consistency, not independent objective verification (Redfern Sec. 3 ¶ 3). 
The correlation between Altman’s genre theory and radical constructivist adaptation is 
fairly straightforward. Films are experienced and are analyzed via their semantic and syntactic 
textual features, as well as their extratextual attributes, which function as facts in the radical 
constructivist sense of “constructs based on regularities in a subject’s experience,” i.e. 
experience of filmic and historical artefacts in the present (Redfern Sec. 4 ¶ 4). This perspective 
helps us to resist treating iconography or plot as objectively knowable or meaningful outside of 
our present experience of it. These textual facts are organized according to certain interpretive 
schemes, which includes conventional genres. If possible, textual elements and their relations are 
configured to assimilate the film into an existing generic scheme. If the variant features cause too 
much perturbation, the genre must be reorganized so as to accommodate the film or a new genre 
must be posited.26 One benefit of this adaptive approach is that it frames genre as a process in 
terms of constant experiential encounter and allows for revision and adjustment without claiming 
any transformation of the physical object (i.e. the filmic text), which remains independent of but 
metaphysically inaccessible to the interpreter.  
                                               
26 Cf. Bordwell and “recalcitrant data” (31). We will see examples of this in Ch. 3 when discussing fan discourse 
and responses to 28 Days Later’s running zombies. 
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Constraints on this adaptive process include internal consistency or ‘best fit’ of data and 
schemata, but also the plausibility of a given configuration for whomever the interpreter 
proposes it to. Absent justification for genre as a special case among other schemes or schemata, 
the effective difference among them is one of rhetorical mobilization and efficiency, or whether 
the proposed generic schema is plausible and useful for a given rhetorical audience. Whether or 
not such configurations of attributes have been or are currently employed as genres is an 
empirical question, about which I shall have more to say shortly. For now, suffice it to say that 
there is a broad range of filmic attributes that could potentially become genrefied—could be 
employed to function as genres—under favorable rhetorical conditions.  
Consider the interpretive function of descriptors like silent era, foreign language, 
blockbuster, low budget, grindhouse, art house, or pre-Code. All of these terms do interpretive 
work both in extension—i.e. by positing similarity among a variety of texts—and also in 
intension, or by opening up one text in detail, and thereby, paradoxically, establishing its 
particularity (Kamberelis 158).27 These terms, however, are also historically and culturally 
situated. Obviously “pre-Code” doesn’t make any sense as a category in the pre-Code era, nor 
does “video nasties” before the 1982 UK moral panic and ban on violent videos. Tom Gunning 
notes that early Pathé and Biograph catalogues from 1901-1906, put together for exhibitors, 
include fiction, trick and mixed comedy films, views of notable persons, and parade views. By the 
1990s, however, Blockbuster and other video rental stores classified their offerings in now more 
familiar terms, such as drama, children’s, horror/suspense, western, foreign films, and adult (54-
5). Video stores provided a sense of who their customer base might be according to the 
categories they employed, and for some those interests might include the work of a particular 
                                               
27 See also Bordwell “The Art Cinema as a Mode of Film Practice” in Poetics of Cinema. 
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filmmaker. The now-defunct local video store I frequented as an undergrad featured sections 
devoted to (and labelled) Kubrick, Hitchcock, Kurosawa, and other directors, catering to the 
auteurist sensibilities of the cinephiles who would make of point of patronizing independent 
stores at the height Blockbuster’s and Hollywood Video’s dominance.28 In doing so, the store set 
apart the corpuses of directors not as categories alongside genres but as genres.       
The idea of director qua genre is perhaps a hard sell. Surely it is a simple historical fact 
that, say, Alfred Hitchcock directed Psycho, and it is thus surely less objectionable a term than 
subjective and/or teleological generic designations like psychological crime thriller or proto-
slasher or early post-classical horror. But the schematic function of the director—especially of 
such a notable and written-about director—greatly exceeds the fact of a production role, and that 
excessive function is the interpretive and rhetorical domain of genre. Thinking about filmmakers 
as genres requires understanding how the explicit association of a film with a director mutually 
qualifies each.  
This understanding is comparable to Michel Foucault’s description of the “author 
function,” in which the simple attribution of a text to an author is functionally equivalent to a 
description (209).  
The author’s name [....] permits one to group together a certain number of texts, define 
them, differentiate them from and contrast them to others. In addition, it establishes a 
relationship among the texts [....] The fact that several texts have been placed under the 
                                               
28 Though they are not quite extinct, I describe video stores in the past tense here because their dwindling numbers 
accompany a decline in their active influence in sustaining codified genres, even if their categories still largely 
anchor current genres as a legacy of their former prominence. The emergence and triumph of video streaming 
services such as Netflix seem to represent a disruption of these industrial practices, but I shall argue in Chapter 4 
that, as far as genrefication goes, Netflix in particular intensifies in scale and precision of rhetorical genrefication 
rather than disrupts it.   
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same name indicates that there has been established among them a relationship of 
homogeneity, filiation, and authentification of some texts by the use of others, reciprocal 
explication, or concomitant utilization. (Foucault 210-11)29 
While Foucault is speaking here of a literary author, whose singular creative genius may be a 
more plausible proposition (though Foucault is of course denying this), this mode of textual 
organization is nevertheless common in cinematic discourse, both in formal and casual appeals to 
auteurs. But the ‘author’—as opposed to the director, screenwriter, DP,  editor, etc.—is an 
attribute or attribution of the interpretive process, not an empirical or historical fact independent 
of the viewer. Foucault goes on to claim that the “aspects of the an individual which we 
designate as making him [sic.] an author are only a projection [...] of the operations we force 
texts to undergo, the connections we make, the traits we establish as pertinent, the continuities 
we recognize, or the exclusions we practice” (213). These impositions on the text are so central 
to and useful for interpretation that we do not recognize their theoretical or practical limits, 
except perhaps where there are two names with strong and contrastive associations, such as in 
the case of Poltergeist (1982, dir. Tobe Hooper, prod. Steven Spielberg).30 
 The ‘auteur function’31 here is just one example of how a category schema like ‘author’ 
can function like a genre, doing the extensive and intensive work of interpretation and framing 
                                               
29For an application of this Foucauldian approach to film noir, see Naremore.  
30 The classic case study here is The Thing from Another World (1951, dir. Christian Nyby, prod. Howard Hawks). 
But Nyby never had the auteurist associations that Hooper (The Texas Chain Saw Massacre [1974], Salem’s Lot 
[1979]) and Spielberg each enjoyed relative to horror cinema, and Poltergeist’s authorship remains controversial. 
The issue is complicated considerably by the framing at work by Poltergeist’s paratexts. Spielberg received top 
billing over Hooper; publicity interviews featured Spielberg and co-producer Frank Marshall; the novelization 
credited Spielberg as having written the story and screenplay (and does not mention Hooper); and the official 
soundtrack album features liner notes about the importance of music in horror films written by Spielberg, nevermind 
that Hooper (along with Wayne Bell) actually co-composed and performed the score for his Texas Chain Saw 
Massacre (1974). Thanks to Shannon Blake Skelton for sharing his presentation slides on Poltergeist’s and other 
horror films’ pressbooks. 
31 Cf. Naremore 
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for a user group. This is not to claim that all auteurs are genres unto themselves, only that the 
authorial attribute of a text is one available interpretive schema that a user may or may not 
employ in interpretation and framing a text for her user group. I might call Se7en (1995) a David 
Fincher film, and that could carry its own thematic, stylistic, temporal, and intertextual 
associations. But I might also call it a crime drama, a thriller, a Brad Pitt movie, a serial killer 
film, a neo-noir, a revisionist noir, a detective-horror hybrid, a proto-torture porn, a 90s indie 
film, and so forth. Whether each of these designations is useful depends entirely upon the 
interpretive and rhetorical situation it is called upon to meet. All textual and extra-textual 
attributes and combinations from among them are potential genres, and whether they are 
manifest as genres or not cannot be discerned through normative textual analysis but through 
descriptive discourse and rhetorical analysis—not by grouping and looking at the films but by 
looking at how people group and talk about the films. 
 
Genre and Context 
Film history contributes evidence to critical and theoretical scholarship on genres and is thus 
crucial to any discussion of genrefication. Whether locating genres in broader artistic traditions,32 
tracing the ideological contours of a genre in a given period, 33 or identifying the impact of 
technological development on genre aesthetics,34 genre critics and theorists necessarily look to 
historical context for before-and-after evidence of change and its causes. Some older models of 
genre theory posit a transhistorical deep generic structure rooted in synchronic structures of 
                                               
32 See for example Braudy 
33 See for example Wood. 
34 See for example Mathijs 
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meaning or essential human capacities or quasi-Platonic ideal forms. But even these accounts 
must square their formulations with fact that we experience genres in history, and that their 
manifestations evidently change, even if their structures or functions or essences supposedly do 
not.35 
 We might consider the more radical idea that genre theory in some sense is genre history. 
That is to say, they are mutually constitutive insofar as genre is essentially temporal in its use 
and that history is invariably mediated by genre. To explain this claim, I want to contrast it with 
a perspective on genre that sees it as serving an ancillary function to history and textual 
representation. This latter approach might be summed up by what Frederic Jameson 
characterizes as “the mediatory function of the notion of genre,” which he argues “allows the 
coordination of immanent formal analysis of the individual text with the twin diachronic 
perspective of the history of forms and the evolution of social life” (105). For Jameson, genre 
helps us to connect history—both aesthetic and material—with a given text. By this account both 
the text and material history are granted primacy over genre, as if each was more self-evident, 
independent, and accessible. I propose instead a notion of texts, of the history of forms, and even 
of social history as accessible only and always already mediated by genre.  
Jameson’s reliance on the given-ness of social history evokes what Jonathan Culler calls 
“the incipient positivism of ‘context.’” Culler contends that “the notion of context frequently 
oversimplifies rather than enriches discussion, since the opposition between an act and its 
context seems to presume that the context is given and determines the meaning of the act” (xiv). 
Mieke Bal and Norman Bryson elaborate on Culler’s point, arguing that “it cannot be taken for 
                                               
35 In his overview of transhistorical genre theory, Altman cites Andre Bazin, Thomas Schatz, Will Wright, John 
Cawleti, Peter Brooks, Robert Lang, Gerald Mast, Stanley Cavell, and Jerome Delamater, as well as his own earlier 
work. (19-20).  
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granted that the evidence that makes up ‘context’ is going to be any simpler or more legible than 
the visual text upon which such evidence is supposed to operate.” (177) ‘Context,’ for Bal and 
Bryson, often operates as a static guarantor of meaning, a fixed and unquestioned point of 
reference by which the meanings of localized phenomena can be pinned down.  
“Context” is in fact unable to arrest the fundamental mobility of semiosis for the reason 
that it harbors exactly the same principle of indeterminability within itself [....] “Context” 
can always be extended; it is subject to the same process of mobility that is at work in the 
semiosis of the text or artwork that “context” is supposed to delimit and control. (Bal and 
Bryson 177)  
Essentially, context is assumed to stabilize and constrain the dynamic array of meanings a text 
may elicit because context itself is assumed to be more stable by virtue of its self-evident 
independence from the subject. But demarcating and qualifying the context are themselves acts 
of interpretation.  
For example, what is the implicit meaning of a film like Invasion of the Body Snatchers 
(1956, dir. Don Siegel)? Is the film concerned about communist infiltration and indoctrination or 
the conformist ideology of the capitalist organization man? The answer depends not only on the 
film’s genre and period—e.g. 1950s sci-fi and/or horror—but on how we would characterize the 
1950s (and its anxieties) and the thematic preoccupations of science fiction and/or horror in that 
period.36 But those characterizations have to be derived ex post facto from the totality of texts 
                                               
36 Bruce Kawin’s “The Mummy’s Pool” opposes science fiction and horror to one another along the lines of 
whether a film validates progressive scientific discourse or the conservative military. Kawin concludes that The Day 
the Earth Stood Still (1951, dir. Robert Wise) is science fiction while The Thing from Another World is horror. The 
interpretation of each film clearly relies on presuppositions about the ideological valances of each genre, as well as 
the ideological character of these institutions in the 1950s. See Kawin.    
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that belong to it. This structural circularity is isomorphic with Andrew Tudor’s “empiricist 
dilemma.”  
To take a genre such as a western, analyze it, and list its principle characteristics is to beg 
the question that we must first isolate the body of films that are westerns. But they can 
only be isolated on the basis of the “principal characteristics,” which can only be 
discovered from the films themselves after they have been isolated. That is, we are caught 
in a circle that first requires that the films be isolated, for which purposes a criterion is 
necessary, but the criterion is, in turn, meant to emerge from the empirically established 
common characteristics of the films. (Tudor 5) 
Tudor here is questioning the very definition of a genre, but this circular structure applies beyond 
abstract logical relations and to what we do with events and contexts or texts and genres, how we 
interpret them in light of each other and how they function in discourse. Because the meanings of 
contexts are determined by their constitutive events, contexts are themselves bounded by the 
very interpretive strategies that determine what events belong in what contexts. Hence, contexts 
like genre are not given but are instead produced by the very discourses that rely upon them for 
interpretive structural models. As a function of its non-fixity, moreover, context is potentially 
unlimited in its extension,37 and its bounds are determined pragmatically by argument and other 
speech-acts rather than by any internal logic or external constraint.   
Culler and Bal and Bryson point here to a set of formal relations similar to those implied 
by our reconstructed notion of genre. Just as the meaning of an historical period is not given but 
is constituted through the often contested significance and meanings of its events, so a text’s 
                                               
37 See Bordwell’s list of category schemata above for examples of the degrees of extension under which a single 
film could be contextualized. 
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genericity or a genre’s definition is dependent on the relative coherence or best fit and functional 
utility of a certain organization of facts—attributes or texts—and not of external independent 
verification. The genre or ‘generic context’ doesn’t help to explain the text without begging the 
questions of 1) which other texts constitute the generic corpus and 2) according to what criteria. 
This is not to say that genre isn’t useful for explaining the text; indeed, that is one of its defining 
functions. But appeal to generic context is effectively a deferral, and its termination can only be 
an act of pragmatic circumscription, not the arrival at a logical conclusion.   
 
Academic Discourse, Interpretation, and Framing 
Just as texts and genres are deployed in a strategy of mutual explication, so are texts and 
historical periods. These texts may be films, but they may also be letters, diaries, memoranda, 
legal documents, government reports, advertisements, speeches, and other written artefacts that 
historians rely upon as data and evidence. We do not have access to the past, only to our current 
experiences of the texts that date to it, and it is from these that we attempt to reconstruct the past 
as best as we can understand it. But these textual forms, too, participate in their own genres and 
serve their own rhetorical functions, which vary over time.38 In the case of films, for example, 
we have print, radio, TV, and digital reviews and interviews; posters, trailers,39 TV spots, 
                                               
38 A missive between friends, for instance, could be a correspondence, a family keepsake, evidence in a trial, and/or 
an archived historical document. These written genres are defined not by their internal form but by the rhetorical 
exigence they are called upon to meet. Each of these rhetorical genres can be “taken up” or incorporated into artistic 
genres, as well, such as in the case of epistolary fiction from Samuel Richardson’s 1740 novel Pamela to Tom 
Waits’ 1978 song “Christmas Card from a Hooker in Minneapolis.” I will discuss a particular instance of rhetorical 
framing later in this chapter and will go into further detail about the relations of uptake between filmic and rhetorical 
genres in Chapter 4.  
39 For example, in a video posted by Cracked.com, Cracked writers  analyze and discuss the differences between the 
American and British trailers for Pride and Prejudice and Zombies and conclude that the American audience is 
being sold an action zombie film set in the early 19th century, rather than an ironic parody of a specific historical 
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pressbooks, and other promotional materials (“ballyhoo”) for audiences and exhibitors; home 
video packaging and bonuses like commentary tracks and featurettes; box office returns and 
industry analysis in trade publications; fan letters, blogs, video essays, message boards, and other 
digital discourse; and internal studio correspondence and memos.40  
This evidence does not constitute a reliably neutral context that can be referred to in order 
to define a film. It has to brought to bear on the problem actively. “Since,” Culler writes, “the 
phenomena criticism deals with are signs, forms with socially constituted meanings, one might to 
think not of context but of the framing of signs: how are signs constituted (framed) by various 
discursive practices, institutional arrangements, systems of value, semiotic mechanisms?” (xiv) 
Thorough attention to the milieux through and in which texts operate and are operated upon 
requires consideration of the critical activity and procedures of scholars. In advocating a framing 
approach to art history, Bal and Bryson remark that “not only is this more truthful, it advances 
the search for social history itself. For by examining the social factors that frame the signs, it is 
possible to analyze simultaneously the practices of the past and our own interaction with them, 
an interaction that is otherwise in danger of going unnoticed” (175 emphasis added). This is to 
say that, for our purposes, an investigation and reconstruction of genre along these lines must 
recognize first the active role of the scholar as participant in the ongoing construction and 
reconstruction of genres.      
Altman’s various case studies, such as the emergence of the biopic (38-44), the buddy 
cop movie (46-7), or the woman’s film (82), stress the historicity of genrefying and regenrefying 
                                               
novel. This is of course an instance of a paratext from one rhetorical genre commenting on another as they both 
pertain to an actual filmic text. See “Why Hollywood Thinks Americans Are Stupid - Cracked Responds.”   
40 See, for example, Schatz’s historiographic use of the studio “recapitulation,” a specialized weekly or semi-weekly 
production memo in the classical studio era. (Schatz 40). I will discuss recapitulations in more detail in Ch. 4.   
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practices of the early studio system, 1980s Hollywood, and academic film studies in the 1970s 
and 1980s, respectively. These examples demonstrate that neither the historical context nor our 
standpoint on them can be taken for granted. Historical contexts are not neutral periods in which 
genre emerges independently; rather they are pragmatic constructs that dynamically shape and 
are shaped by their contemporaneous discourses, our retrospective understanding of those texts 
and discourses, and the texts and discourses that constitute our own contextual standpoint. There 
are many moving parts we must consider in conceptualizing genre historically, and historical 
context cannot simply be tacked on to a catalogue or chronicle of genre. The historical aspect 
introduces transformations of the object that must be dealt with in their ontological and 
epistemological dimensions. 
By way of illustrating the historical positionality of critical discourse, consider the 
following example. In his seminal work The Fantastic, literary theorist Tzvetan Todorov 
provides a now well-known distinction between theoretical genres and historical genres. The 
former are normative or hypothetical genres deduced from critical works on poetics,41 while the 
latter are descriptive categories “derived from observation of literary reality” (13). Todorov 
critiques Northrop Frye’s synchronic genre theory for its failure to distinguish genres posited 
according the internal structure of literary works from those recognized and actively used at 
given point in time. Altman contends that Todorov’s distinction rests on a fundamental, 
unreflexive assumption broadly shared among scholarly critics—namely, that there exists some 
historical Archimedean point, or a space outside time from which theorists can posit purely 
theoretical genres. Consequently, Altman questions Todorov’s premise that Frye’s classifications 
are somehow not historical, as if Frye’s critical use is removed from history and “literary 
                                               
41 E.g. those of Plato, Diomedes, Lessing, and Frye. (Todorov 14). 
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reality.” Altman points out moreover that Todorov’s own proposed genre, ‘the fantastic,’ is itself 
historical, not because (or not only because) it developed in or became familiar to situated 
milieux of readers, writers, and critics, but because Todorov’s definitions so clearly bear the 
imprint of French structuralism and its generation. Altman writes, “the ‘fantastic’ as defined by 
Todorov is already (was always already) a historical genre [….] Just as the critic is always a part 
of culture, thus undermining and attempt to oppose the critical to the cultural, so the theoretician 
always stands on the historically marked ground of a particular era” (9, original emphasis). In 
pointing to the historicity of Todorov’s own proposed theoretical genre, Altman seeks to collapse 
Todorov’s distinction by showing that all theoretical genres are in fact historical. By the same 
token, since genre use is inherently performative and involves some degree of interpretation in 
Bordwell’s sense, historical genres are also necessarily theoretical. 
While we cannot justify a definition of a genre that is removed from its empirical use, 
neither can we responsibly omit ourselves from the history of that use. Genre use, even and 
especially in genre history, is performative in an Austinian sense; it activates or calls into being 
and transforms one or more genres through differential framing. Though the critic may not 
occupy the same time or place from which her object of study arose, or may not participate in the 
discourse groups that initially formed it, this in no way removes her from its history. On the 
contrary, the critic actively participates in writing the history of her text—whether or not that is 
her stated project—and, in the case of genre, she actively reshapes it. Scholarly use is use par 
excellence, and it is use that is actualized in its own discourse groups. A given instance of that 
use implies 1) a particular way of configuring textual elements, emphasizing certain attributes 
over others, and drawing explicit or implicit comparisons with other texts such that their 
attributes are similarly framed. It also implies 2) a use such a configuration is put to, a 
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proposition or premise framed as evidence for an argument advanced by someone and for 
someone.  
The remainder of this chapter with explore the theoretical and methodological problems 
that arise when scholars do not recognize the interpretive and rhetorical dimensions of their 
active genre use. Before moving forward, however, I want to take a moment to reiterate that 
these examples are just that: examples. They are not meant to be exhaustive case studies that 
establish definitively what critics or scholars or filmmakers or fans in general thought about a 
film or genre or how a genre was defined at a certain point in time. They are rather documented 
instances meant to illustrate the principle of rhetorical genrefication, of pragmatic genres as 
produced through some social activity under certain rhetorical conditions. As I shall propose in 
the concluding chapter, my model here could inform future scholarship of this type, which might 
look at how explicit or implicit genre definitions change under variable historical and rhetorical 
conditions or how genre is employed by a particular user group and its particular modalities. But 
the reader should not take my examples here as any kind of exhaustive description of the 
particulars of my examples and should note instead the structures and general principles of 
adaptive interpretation and rhetorical framing. 
 
American Film Cycles  
In her 2014 book American Film Cycles, Amanda Ann Klein sets out to build on the 
genre theories of Altman and others through a series of applied genre case studies. She offers her 
own concept of “film cycles” to complement existing film genre theory and to refine its approach 
to historically specific instances of film production and reception. Klein posits that short-term 
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cycle reception and production are symptomatic of social history— that popular cultural interests 
and tastes translate to short-term box office returns. “Cycle studies’ focus on cinema’s use 
value—the way filmmakers, audiences, film reviewers, advertisements, and cultural discourses 
interact with and effect the film text—offers a more pragmatic, localized approach to genre 
history” (Klein 5). This use value connects texts’ themes to their historical moment and, so 
considered, proffers these groupings of films as social documents (9). 
Klein’s project is compelling, and her goal of connecting film pragmatics to historical 
cultural climates suggests a worthy direction for genre history. However, where early genre 
theory was inadequately historical, Klein has swung too far the other way and undertheorized the 
concept of genre in which she grounds her historical project. Though she cites Altman 
extensively, her working conceptualization of genre doesn’t capture the nuances of or address the 
radical challenges Film/Genre presents. This is no small problem, because Klein builds her 
concept of cycles in contrast to genre, but many of the theoretical and methodological problems 
with genre that Klein’s cycles address are already accounted for in Altman’s later model. Klein 
begins from a textualist model of genre and, as a result, her selection criteria rely on the 
durability of genres and the independence of historical context and thus founder on Culler’s 
incipient positivism.  
I should note first that Klein is not alone in neglecting the dramatic turn Altman makes 
from his earlier structuralist work in his “Semantic/Syntactic” essay and The American Film 
Musical to the pragmatic poststructuralist Film/Genre. Indeed, one of the goals of this project is 
to work through and extend the radical principles Altman lays out but have not taken hold. Barry 
Keith Grant, in a 1996 article, critiques Altman for failing to recognize the flexibility of the 
horror genre (17). In 1996, this is perhaps a fair claim. But Grant’s article was republished in 
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2016—eighteen years after Film/Genre—without updating or revising the critique of Altman, 
although the edition of Film Genre Reader from which Altman’s essay was sourced was updated 
to 2003. This may suggest that Altman’s early work was so successful and influential that it has 
overshadowed his attempts to rethink and revise his own models. It may also indicate that 
Film/Genre appeared at the tail end of genre theory as an active field of study, and a sort of 
systematizing fatigue had set in among genre scholars, who preferred to pursue more modest, 
localized, and concrete projects. In any case, the fundamental overhaul of genre theory 
Film/Genre attempts seems to have gone unnoticed by most scholars.   
Klein’s theory of cycles is inextricably bound to her own understanding of genre. She 
defines a genre in textualist terms, as a “series of films associated with each other through shared 
images, characters, settings, plots, or themes” (4). Genres are “stable and coherent” across time 
(79) because they are “founded on a large corpus of films that accumulates for decades” and 
“address a profound psychological need” in audiences (16). Cycles, on the other hand, though 
also a series associated through repetition of textual elements, are defined primarily through use 
(4).  They are produced to capitalize on box-office success of a particular trend—e.g. juvenile 
delinquency films in the 1950s (12) —and intensified through inter-textual relay and broader 
socio-cultural discourses (4). The sudden intensity of popular interest means that cycles are 
typically short-lived; market saturation precipitates backlash or parody (14-15) within five to ten 
years (4).  
She explains that cycles garner neither the cultural capital of prestige features nor the 
critical value associated with durable genres (8-10). Cycles are antithetical to quality Hollywood 
cinema because they are associated with vulgar commercial appeal, with deviant subject matter, 
with sensationalist promotion, and with low production quality and a high degree of didacticism 
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(6-8). These associations all point to cycles’ timeliness—rushed through production to capitalize 
on the intense but fleeting interest of a fickle audience market in some social issue. It is this 
timeliness that makes them valuable social documents (9). The study of a cycle and the inter-
textual relay surrounding it reveals a “small, detailed snapshot” of audience tastes and attitudes 
regarding particular social topics during a limited time frame (19). 
In distinguishing her concepts from Altman’s, Klein elides some subtle but crucial 
characteristics of Altman’s genre theory. Whether through equivocation or general 
misunderstanding, Klein misrepresents Altman’s conceptions of both genre and cycle. It is 
important to clarify the distinctions between each author’s understanding of the terms “genre” 
and “cycle.” Not only will this facilitate a more precise contrast between the authors’ general 
approaches, it furthermore will direct our attention to their respective theoretical assumptions 
and, in turn, to their theories’ historiographic and methodological implications. 
Altman, too, offers a specialized definition of “cycle,” one which Klein claims to 
“disprove” (Klein 199 n.5). She correctly notes that Altman defines a cycle in terms of studio 
production. For Altman, a cycle is the immediate output of a single studio seeking to capitalize 
on a recent success by reconfiguring what are believed to be the popular proprietary elements, 
including “contract players, house directors, proprietary characters, and patented processes” 
(Altman 115). What separates a cycle from a genre here are the legal dimensions such as 
copyright and trademark protection whereby one studio can distinguish its products from others. 
Hence, when publicizing their films, studios have no incentive to appeal to generic elements, 
which any other studio can imitate, as opposed to those legally protected, name-brand elements 
owned by or contracted to one production studio (59). In her chapter on the Dead End Kids and 
their imitators, Klein claims that because the concurrent, industry-wide proliferation of “Dead 
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End knockoffs” never developed into a “stable and coherent genre,” Altman’s conception of 
cycle is wrong (Klein 79).42 Exploring this this argument will help to illustrate Altman’s and 
Klein’s different approaches to genre history.  
Klein’s claim that she “disproves” Altman’s theory of cycles is curious and prompts three 
related objections. First, Altman uses cycle in a specialized sense and as an integral part of a 
theory of genrefication. It seems strange to claim to disprove a defining characteristic of a 
theoretical concept, especially through appeal to the characteristics of a second specialized sense. 
A closer look at their underlying assumptions shows the incommensurablity of their definitions 
of “cycle.” Whereas Altman’s general definition rests on the filmic output of a single studio or 
the concrete written work of a discourse group, Klein’s definition relies on a general range of 
years and her own interpretative sorting of films relative to contemporaneous events. Appeals to 
historical period do not make her competing conceptualization of cycle any more positively 
correct, since it begs the question of context discussed above. I shall address this general issue in 
more detail later.  
Second, insofar as Klein repeatedly refers to Warner Bros.’s Dead End Kids, 
Monogram’s East Side Kids, etc. as separate cycles, she uses the term at least partly in Altman’s 
sense of it. This objection requires a little explanation. The Dead End Kids, Little Tough Guys, 
East Side Kids, and Bowery Boys all consisted of at least some of the same contract actors as the 
initial Dead End (1937, dir. William Wyler) troupe. For future films, they were either loaned out 
to or their contracts were acquired by the other studios. This means that, in the legal context of 
                                               
42 The cycles include The Dead End Kids cycle (UA and Warner Bros., 7 films 1937-1939); The Dead End Kids and 
Little Tough Guys cycle (Universal, 15 films 1938-1943); the East Side Kids cycle (Monogram, 22 films 1940-
1945); the Bowery Boys cycle (Monogram, 47 films 1946-1958); and miscellaneous imitators of the original Dead 
End Kids cycle (Monogram, Columbia, MGM, Warner Bros., RKO, Million Dollar Productions, and Goldseal 
Productions, 9 films 1938-1942) (Klein 192-5).  
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the star system, they remained proprietary assets. Hence, none of these groups of films would 
qualify as generic imitations (in Altman’s sense) anyway, because the featured semantic element 
remains the property of one studio. These films remain studio cycles, which, incidentally, have 
no guarantee of becoming genrefied (Altman 67-8).  
Finally, and most crucially, Klein distinguishes her use of “cycle” from Altman’s in 
terms of cycle’s relation to genre, and her characterization of genre—and specifically Altman’s 
definition of genre—appears to be based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the concept. This 
may be due to her intermingling of concepts from Altman’s older semantic/syntactic model with 
his more recent work on pragmatic genrefication (Klein 4-6). In any case, she repeatedly 
contrasts her notion of cycle with a structuralist notion of genre. 
Even though the themes and images of the Dead End Kids were expanded into an 
industry-wide, intergeneric cycle (that is, a cycle whose films are released by multiple 
studios at the same time) within one year of their cinematic debut in 1937, this juvenile 
delinquent cycle never developed into a stable and coherent genre (Klein 79, emphasis 
added). 
Altman already acknowledges that few cycles ever become genrefied (68). Moreover, Klein uses 
the word “stable” to define genres three times in this same paragraph, this despite the fact that 
Altman devotes multiple chapters to challenging the notion of generic stability (Chapter Four of 
Film/Genre is actually titled “Are genres stable?”). Recall that, for Altman, genre is a process 
born of critical reading positions by which filmic elements, proprietary and generic, are 
repeatedly reconfigured by a variety of readers and discourse groups. Genres are not “stable” or 
“coherent,” and appeals to longevity are misleading. Generic terms may endure, but the corpus 
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of films—and their own relevant textual attributes—that constitute the genre are always already 
subject to negotiation and revision. Hence genre is an ongoing process, not a stable or coherent 
category   
Many cycles begin as what we might call studio cycles, or the corpus of textually similar 
variations on proprietary elements. However, industrial discourse is not the defining force here, 
but critical institutional discourse more broadly. Altman does not privilege film producers as 
solely responsible for generating cycles. Chapter Five of Film/Genre examines the productive 
role of critical academic discourse in rethinking genres, cycles, and other bodies of films, and 
Altman traces the genealogy of the woman’s film in the scholarly literature.  
Family melodrama, first constituted as a cycle by Thomas Elsaesser, became a genre 
virtually replacing melodrama when first Thomas Schatz (1981), and then the feminist 
critics [such as Mulvey, Modleski, and Doane], reiterated in their analyses Elsaesser’s 
implied corpus, context, and reading formation. The woman’s film in turn remained no 
more than a cycle, slightly redefined from contemporary critical usage, until the removal 
of its quotation marks and assertion of its affinities with the newly redefined family 
melodrama (82). 
For Altman, cycles are descriptive signifiers that refer to a negotiated set of texts and that are 
distinguished from genres by the breadth of their use. Where genres have widespread, shared 
cultural or industrial use (59), cycles are limited to relatively closed institutional user groups, 
such as studios (59) or scholarly criticism (82). I shall return to this distinction and question 
Altman’s justification for defining genre and cycle quantitatively, but for now note that part of 
what makes cycles and genres so unstable is their capacity to be rethought and reorganized ad 
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infinitum. Both Klein and Altman see cycles as constituted by use, but where Klein defines 
cycles according to the relation between textual features and the socio-historical context of their 
production, Altman’s theory of genre claims that cycles and genres are necessarily constellated 
through repeated acts of critical imagining among particular discourse groups or general users.    
Contrast between Klein’s and Altman’s terms brings into relief fundamental theoretical 
differences in how they understand their objects of study and how they as scholars relate to them. 
First, Klein appears to treat cycles and other historical phenomena as independent, accessible 
objects. Her definition of cycles, for instance, presupposes that cycles’ semantic elements—or 
relevant semantic elements—are somehow self-evident. This leads to a version of Tudor’s 
empiricist dilemma by way of a reliance on historical context.  
Klein acknowledges the empiricist dilemma as a problem for genre study, and she rightly 
criticizes evolutionary models of genre for founding historical generic trajectories on theoretical 
or ahistorical genres such as an idealized gangster genre (30). However, though her own 
methodology relies on textual features and paratexts to define her cycles, she doesn’t subject her 
own selection method to the same examination. She doesn’t recognize the empiricist dilemma as 
applicable to her project because apparent semantic similarity seems both to prompt and to be 
verified by production histories and contemporaneous industrial materials. But this of course 
begs the questions of context discussed above. Justification of generic definition is deferred to 
industrial context, which has to be assumed to terminate the semiotic mobility of text and genre. 
This reliance on contextual deferral indicates a tacit self-fulfilling methodology. Textualist 
justifications such as these reify the critic’s interpretive schemata by virtue of their correlation 
with the putatively independent empirical phenomena that those schemata order in the first place.       
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The critic’s schemata by themselves don’t have the force of genrefication, but have to be 
posited and systematized rhetorically. Though Klein doesn’t explicitly address historiography or 
epistemology, her empirical assumptions are evident through telling metaphors: “We can 
therefore view film cycles as a mold placed over the zeitgeist, which, when pulled away, reveals 
the contours, fissures, and complicated patterns of the contemporary moment” (Klein 20). The 
verb “reveals” suggests that cycles serve as a sort of plaster cast of the zeitgeist—that the 
nuances of spirit of the age remain as legible traces in the temporally localized corpus of texts. 
Indeed, she describes the book’s project as investigating “how and why [film cycles] form, why 
they thrive, and why they disappear” (Klein 24). The active verbs Klein gives to film cycles 
point to her conception of those cycles as independent historical objects that can be identified 
and examined without essential deformation rather than configurations of and constructed links 
among experiential phenomena. Furthermore, her language here points to the assumption that 
problems of generic transformation over time can be surmounted if the historical scope is more 
precisely defined and localized to only a few years.   
Klein’s appeal to the zeitgeist as 1) an independent phenomenon that is 2) separable from 
the interpretations it informs and 3) is knowable as such effectively mystifies her own 
performative role in genrefication. Where Klein sees the strength of her cycle model in its 
historical specificity, it falters precisely insofar as it takes historical context as an empirical given 
rather than a configuration of her own experiences and received models. Moreover, the apparent 
precision of a smaller historical window and body of films may actually exacerbate the problem, 
since it seems more accurate even if it is just as problematic in principle.  
Before moving on to a concrete example, let’s recap. Klein’s approach generally runs 
into two fundamental problems. The first is that it appeals to context to resolve (actually, to 
59 
defer) the empiricist dilemma. That is, the empiricist dilemma begs questions about the relations 
between text and genre, but those questions are deferred to historical context without 
examination of the criteria of selection and interpretation of the texts—including but not limited 
to film texts—that constitute context’s meanings. Second, and related, Klein’s approach begs 
questions about the textualist critic’s relation to cycles and genres. If, as Tudor and Culler point 
out, we cannot take context as given, then we must turn our attention to the critic and her framing 
activities, which, as Bordwell and Redfern point out, are constrained by her own available 
schemes/schemata and the rhetorical conditions that obtain.  
Note, moreover, that there are ideological stakes involved. If we fail to recognize the 
proliferation of genres as an active, adaptive process carried out by critical discourses among 
user groups, we also risk neglecting and thus perpetuating the cultural dominance of particular 
kinds of films. Klein characterizes cycles as akin to exploitation cinema in their shared 
opportunistic and often sensationalist commercialism. In so doing she implicitly accepts the 
premise that cycles and exploitation films in general are a deviation from the Hollywood norm of 
the artistically worthwhile quality picture, and this opposition structures her general argument. A 
careful application of Altman’s model shows how major productions also participate in genres 
and the economy of cycles even as they mystify that participation under the pretense of artistry 
and cultural value. 
Klein claims that certain films, no matter how popular, can’t be effectively imitated and 
thus don’t produce cycles. Her example of a cycle non-starter is Forrest Gump (1994, dir. Robert 
Zemeckis). The movie’s outstanding box-office take and pop cultural impact should have 
flagged it for imitation as an “originary film” in a mid-1990s cycle. However, though it was the 
top-grossing movie of 1994 and won six Oscars, the film’s “most successful elements—its 
60 
folksy, handicapped protagonist and its historical vignettes—could not be easily duplicated in a 
series of films” and no film cycle developed (Klein 11). It is against this kind of film that Klein 
defines cycles. 
The mistake in this approach is assuming that the exact same semantics are present in the 
imitations, and it impacts Klein’s selection method. Studio cycles did not operate that way, 
according to Altman. In one example, he explains that the cycle that spawned the biopic genre 
imitated Disraeli (1929, dir. Alfred E. Green) by repeating the star (George Arliss) and 
replicating features like set-pieces (speech-making), settings (18th and 19th centuries), and certain 
themes (political intrigue, Jewishness), but not necessarily all or all at once (39-42). In the 
Producer’s Game, studios rely on initial box-office figures to identify a hit and proceed to dissect 
and imitate what are believed to be the most successful features. These features may be 
proprietary, such as franchised characters or contract actors, or they may not. Variations are 
introduced so as not to replicate too closely past films or to correct for mistaken guesses, and so 
the cycle changes: “Not even the simplest description of a film holds up throughout the game, 
because each new film undermines our previous understanding (41)” Moreover,  “since 
producers don’t stop evaluating successful films in order to produce further hits, no film can ever 
achieve a stable definition in the Producer’s Game” (42). In our terms, we would say that the 
producers’ adaptive mechanism of interpretation transforms not only the films about to be 
produced, it also transforms what were believed to be the salient features of the earlier films as 
they are revisited and their success reassessed interminably. . 
In the case of Forrest Gump, we might provisionally accept the “originary film” conceit 
and arbitrarily limit the span to five years, since this is Klein’s rough window. We can include in 
the semantics the mentally disabled character, southern setting, and historical vignettes, but, 
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since recognizable stars and directors are also thought to be box-office draws—and since Altman 
includes them as significant factors in cycle production— we might also include “Tom Hanks” 
and “Brand-Name Director” (i.e. one with significant box office and/or critical successes and 
broad market recognition). Six more films immediately jump out: Apollo 13, Sling Blade, Ghosts 
of Mississippi, That Thing You Do!, Saving Private Ryan, and The Green Mile. The tabular 
comparison below shows that, though not all elements match up in all categories, there is strong 
set of family resemblances among the films. Moreover, certain, more specific similarities present 
themselves, such as an historical setting at least partly in the 1960s (which conveniently offers a 
baby boomer-friendly soundtrack) and Gary Sinise as costar.  
 
 Starring Tom 
Hanks 
Set in American 
South 
Mentally Disabled 
Character 
Period Piece Brand-Name 
Director 
Forrest Gump 
(1994, dir. Robert 
Zemeckis) 
X (and Gary 
Sinise) 
X X X (1960s) X 
Apollo 13 (1995, 
dir. Ron Howard) 
X (and Gary 
Sinise)  
  X (1960s) X 
Sling Blade (1996, 
dir. Billy Bob 
Thornton) 
 X X   
Ghosts of 
Mississippi (1996, 
dir. Rob Reiner) 
 X  X (1960s) X 
That Thing You 
Do! (1996, dir. 
Tom Hanks) 
X   X (1960s) X 
Saving Private 
Ryan (1998, dir. 
Steven Spielberg) 
X   X X 
The Green Mile 
(1999, dir. Frank 
Darabont) 
X (and Gary 
Sinise) 
X X X X 
 
From this table we can see that all six films share at least two elements in common, and 
period pieces by brand-name directors appear to have been popular in this five-year span as well. 
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There are, of course, other relevant semantic axes, such as source material. In this case, since we 
don’t have a candidate for originary film, we can begin to move backward as well as forward 
from Forrest Gump to include films adapted from historical literary works. This would include 
Dances with Wolves (1990, dir. Kevin Costner, novel by Michael Blake); Goodfellas (1990, dir. 
Martin Scorsese, book by Nicholas Pileggi); Legends of the Fall (1994, dir. Edward Zwick, 
novel by Jim Harrison); Interview with the Vampire (1994, dir. Neil Jordan, novel by Anne 
Rice); The Shawshank Redemption (1994, Darabont, short story by Stephen King); Casino 
(1995, Scorsese, book by Pileggi); Apollo 13 (book by Jim Lovell and Jeffrey Kluger); and The 
Green Mile (novel by King). Surely this seems arbitrary, but despite being prestige pictures, 
these films can be easily reconfigured into an historically localized grouping based on semantic 
axes. 
Finally, the notion that, because of its financial and cultural success, Forrest Gump might 
have been an originary film—if only its textual elements were easier to replicate—ignores the 
broader tropes it exemplifies. For example, Forrest Gump’s portrayal of an extraordinary 
mentally disabled man carries forward a tradition that goes at least as far back as Harvey (1950, 
dir. Henry Koster), and includes Charly (1968, dir. Ralph Nelson), Being There (1979, dir. Hal 
Ashby), Rain Man (1988, dir. Barry Levinson), and The Green Mile. If we extend this to 
extraordinary characters with mental illness or disorders more broadly, then we can include A 
Beautiful Mind (2001, Howard), The Aviator (2004, Scorsese), and The Imitation Game (2014, 
dir. Morten Tyldum), all three of which, incidentally, are 20th century period pieces with 
bankable stars.  
This exercise is meant to illustrate two points. First is the principle of adaptive genre 
historiography. Even without deeper research into these potential cycles/genres, I can provide the 
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beginnings of multiple schemes based on the configuration of various filmic and extrafilmic 
attributes, and the viability of our contradictory schemes is testable by the degree of internal 
consistency and potential utility. In so doing, however, it would behoove me to acknowledge that 
my proposed cycles are not historically or empirically guaranteed, but are instead ad hoc 
configurations of experiences that must be revised and adapted to emerging exigencies.  
Second, the unreflexive, empirically oriented nature of Klein’s model leaves it more 
vulnerable to the effects of unexamined biases in selection and adaptation. Klein’s Forrest Gump 
example doesn’t consider that prestige pictures might also potentially constitute cycles and 
genres; they might also exploit audience interest in a topic by imitating each other’s textual 
elements; and they might also be didactic. This has to do with the material and discursive 
conditions that frame her understanding of cycles. But there is another dimension to it. While 
low budgets and sensationalist discourses guide Klein to look for cycles framed in those terms, 
reports of large budgets, auteur filmmakers, and certain kinds of didacticism can frame prestige 
pictures as not-cycles.  
The satirical comedy Tropic Thunder (2008, dir. Ben Stiller) cynically and bluntly points 
out that although the Academy awards movies about mentally disabled people with extraordinary 
gifts, actors who “go full retard” go home empty handed.43 Tropic Thunder’s radical move is not 
criticizing Academy hypocrisy regarding the mentally disabled. Rather, in asserting that the 
Academy rewards specific forms of filmic representations of the mentally disabled, the film 
implies that certain genres—such as the Vietnam combat film the characters are shooting—are 
Oscar-worthy and others are not. While it is conventional wisdom that certain genres such as 
                                               
43 See, for example, Oscar nominees Sean Penn (I Am Sam, 2001, dir. Jessie Nelson), Robin Williams (The Fisher 
King, 1991, dir. Terry Gilliam), and Billy Bob Thornton (Sling Blade). 
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comedy, horror, and science fiction do not win in the major categories, the notion of genericity 
(with its implication of commercial appeal and formal imitation) is anathema to Hollywood’s 
branding of prestige pictures as ars gratia artis. And if they must be assigned a genre, it is 
usually the vague and vaguely sophisticated designation “drama.”44     
This is a particularly unsettling demonstration of the mystifying function of drama as 
catch-all for high-art, self-important Oscar bait. Application of a more nuanced approach to 
genres and cycles recognizes the diversity of imitable semantic and syntactic axes. Moreover, it 
allows us to interrogate the discourses that disavow the generic operations at work, which in turn 
reinscribe the hierarchical cultural politics of taste. Prestige is part of marketing, and it is also 
part of framing. A historiographic methodology that demands consideration of the function of 
schemata—like genres or cycles or historical periods—as defined in terms of their present utility 
for the critic may be more successful at recognizing and adapting discourses that reify art, 
culture, taste, or history.   
 
Genre as Rhetorical Frame 
In this section I will propose that film genres are functions of rhetorical conditions. Genres only 
exist insofar as they are used, that is, defined by shared use among a user group. Genre thus 
indexes the rhetorical social activity of multiple, overlapping groups of users and their discourse 
about films. Interpretation is necessary but insufficient for genre; those interpretations must be 
conveyed as a social act to other users. A genre is a shared framing based upon similar (but 
probably not identical) configurations of attributes. Genres are flexible or protean because the 
                                               
44 I shall discuss the evaluative dimension of genre distinctions more thoroughly in the next chapter.  
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rhetorical conditions under which they are employed vary. They serve the differing purposes of 
differing user groups under differing circumstances.  
First, I would advance the skeptical question, how do we know genres exist? Altman, 
Gunning, Tudor, and others have demonstrated how unreliable both historical and textualist 
explanations are. Without appealing to a metaphysical realist conception—viz. genres as abstract 
Platonic ideals—all we can say, without trying to define genres, is that they are used. This 
skeptical attitude would direct us to look to how genres are used, by whom, and for what 
purpose. They are invoked explicitly in a range of discourses manifest in historical and 
contemporary texts, written and circulated among a variety of overlapping user groups. Before 
they are expressed, genres are essentially category schemata, mental structures used strictly for 
interpretation. But genres are inherently social and serve many social purposes beyond personal 
interpretation.45  
There are approaches to genre-as-use, such as that of literary theorist Thomas O. Beebee, 
who, like Janice Radway and Will Wright, groups texts according to the uses their content is put 
to, such as escapism or empowerment or ideological interpellation. This is a conception Beebee 
describes as “genre as use-value” (Beebee 3-7).46 Another literary approach to genre would be 
that of Adena Rosemarin, who emphasizes the reciprocal dynamic between text and genre as 
ongoing constructions of critical activity. For Rosemarin, genre is not a class but a classifying 
statement, invocation of genre is not a neutral description but a performative speech act, one that 
explicates the text through propositions about internal and external similarities (Rosemarin 46). 
                                               
45 Though conventional genres are mental structures, this is not to say that they specifically are innate in a Kantian 
way. Bordwell describes genres as a type of category schema, the distinguishing character of which appears to be 
that genre is received by the viewer marked as such by external social discourses. I will address the question of 
received genres as meta-genres in Chapter 3.     
46 See Radway, Reading the Romance and Wright, Six-Guns and Society  
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The reciprocity she locates between text and genre and the pragmatic ends they serve is 
fundamental to any genre use—including and especially as schemata—and is thus fundamental 
to constructing meaning even at the most basic referential level.  
Rosemarin has been criticized for a overemphasizing the critic—and a very particular 
kind of critic—at the expense of the writer. (Devitt 170). Moreover, and perhaps more 
consequentially for us, she seems to posit a peculiarly abstract sense of critical activity. Beebee 
claims that   
Rosemarin’s exclusive concern with the critic presupposes a completely atomistic world 
devoid of social forces and conventions, a world in which writers write their texts 
oblivious to readers and their generic expectations, and readers read these texts, 
apparently oblivious to genre distinctions, even though such distinctions stare them in the 
face every time they go to the bookstore, the supermarket, or the library. Only critics are 
left to worry about genre. (Beebee 254) 
    
Beebee’s critique is provocative, but I might make two objections. First, the extent to which 
genres are normalized, in which they function as day-to-day instrumental schemata and don’t 
break down, they likely aren’t a worry to readers or viewers. Genres function well—or well 
enough—for an audience who has no major stake in their consistency, and who, unlike 
institutional critics, have little to no interest in defining or building systematic analyses upon 
those genres that stare them in the face. In the case of this kind of use, genres are doxic in a 
Bourdieusian sense and thus operate largely unnoticed.47  
                                               
47 I shall expand on this question of day-to-day use and explore generic contestations in popular discourses in 
Chapter 3.  
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Second, if we expand the scope of critical activity from isolated analysis to the 
fundamentally social practice of producing written critical arguments about genre, then we see 
this movement from interpretation to framing. Where Rosemarin may be less explicitly 
concerned with social forces and conventions than Beebee is, her theoretical writing is no less 
fundamentally social than his. Her arguments, published in academic books, imply an audience. 
This is similar to Altman’s objection to Todorov’s critique of Frye; the critic is both inescapably 
historical and inescapably social.  
Moreover, for Bordwell, rhetorical concerns are inherent in institutional criticism. 
“Although their theoretical commitments differ, [symptomatic and explicatory] approaches 
utilize similar inferential moves and persuasive devices” because “criticism is shaped by the 
institutions that house it, and the practices by which institutions guide the act of interpretation are 
constant across critical schools” (Bordwell xiii). Even the object of study is contingent upon 
these institutional rhetorical concerns,  
"the speaker," writes Aristotle, "must frame his proofs and arguments 
with the help of common knowledge and accepted opinions." Rhetorical argument is 
adjusted to the audience's preconceptions, even if the rhetor aims to change some of 
them. If the critic's audience will not assume that a home movie or an educational 
documentary or a "slasher" film is an appropriate object of interpretation, the critic must 
generate arguments for discussing such despised genres. (Bordwell 206) 
Bordwell emphasizes the motivational role of critical rhetoric but misses the performative 
function of those arguments in defining and redefining those genres. The question isn’t only one 
of the value of those genres—which I shall discuss further in chapter 3—but of their ontology. 
That is, rhetoric shapes not only the arguments about the genres, but the genres themselves. What 
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films belong to a genre, its history, its defining characteristics—all of these dimensions are 
intrinsically bound up in the rhetorical operations of critical interpretation and are subject to its 
changing exigences.      
By defining genre relative to its functional use for the critic we can think of it first in 
terms of private interpretation and then, insofar as these interpretations are expressed, in terms of 
public argumentation. This is a move from comprehension to social action, or from genre as 
schema to genre as frame. This emphasis on the utility of genre in social contexts is the principle 
that will allow us to mobilize a reconstructed concept of genre toward broader discursive 
applicability. Our synthesis of Altman and Bordwell democratizes Rosemarin’s critic by showing 
how inferential schemata are integral to all meaning construction, not just that of academic 
critics, and especially insofar as a viewer adopts a critical reading position, like that of Altman’s 
film producers. 
  
Genre as Framing 
Recall that in Film/Genre, Altman describes how film reviewers in the early studio era identified 
stylistic or structural similarities among contemporaneous films, which were usually expressed in 
negative reviews. When systematic imitation among producers had exhausted fresh material, 
critics pounced on the latest weakest example as “another gangster picture” or “another musical.”  
The films might closely resemble one another, and this was due to producers’ calculated attempts 
to replicate the significant elements of past successes. But it was the critical discourse of 
reviewers and general acceptance of the categories in popular use among other reviewers and 
audiences that constituted them as genres. Once readers understood what reviewers meant by 
“gangster picture” as opposed to “urban crime melodrama,” the genre was up and running.  
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This genrefying discourse is not limited to reviews of first-run pictures. For example, 
Altman examines a mid-1950s press packet aimed at exhibitors, which unsurprisingly brands its 
new creature feature The Creature from the Black Lagoon (1954 dir. Jack Arnold) as a science-
fiction film. However, the document also re-brands studio backlists of gothic horror films—
including Dracula (1931 dir. Tod Browning), Frankenstein (1931 dir. James Whale), The Wolf 
Man (1941 dir. George Waggner), etc.—as science fiction as well, thus regenrefying the films in 
order to capitalize on a hot industry trend (Altman 78-9). The ultimate purpose here is to find an 
audience for the studio back catalogue in the face of flagging interest and to wring further 
revenue out of an older property. The immediate purpose, however, is to provide a model 
exhibitors can imitate, one which frames these films for an audience in terms of an appeal to 
current popular tastes. And audience has to be understood not only as film audience but as a 
rhetorical audience.   
While many of us might be inclined to accept Frankenstein as science fiction from a 
structural or historical position, Dracula and Hunchback of Notre Dame (1939 dir. William 
Dieterle) are harder sells. But as Gunning points out in his comparison of the Biograph and 
Blockbuster categories, the differences in classification point to a pragmatic industrial approach. 
The films are grouped in such a manner as to be “very clear in their purposes and 
communication, effectively allowing potential buyers to range through a gamut of interests 
without concerning themselves about strict logical principles” (Gunning 55). Gunning does not, 
however, consider how those interests are consolidated and reified, how genre and audience are 
constructed, through precisely these rhetorical appeals.48   
                                               
48 I will discuss in more detail audience construction through fan discourse and through digital streaming algorithms 
in Chapters 3 and 4, respectively 
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Rhetorical Conditions 
 Bal and Bryson’s advocacy for the term ‘framing’ turns largely upon its inherent 
acknowledgement of the active, productive role of the critics in defining the nature and scope of 
the object of study. As a general principle, framing can seem a little abstract, and, without further 
qualification, could lend itself to a critique similar to the one Beebee levels at Rosemarin 
regarding the putative isolation and potential caprice of the framer. On the other hand, full 
consideration of the totality of social forces under which a critic writes is an overwhelming if not 
impossible task. The context of a critic’s framing practices is still a context, and it is subject to 
the same problems of extension as the text she examines. How do we justifiably rein in the 
extension of a critic’s context in order to usefully examine her genrefying activity? How do we 
frame framing? 
I have used the phrase “rhetorical conditions” a few times already, but it is only now 
following these questions of framing and critical rhetoric that I can explain what I mean and why 
it is necessary to introduce this term to film genre studies. The problem of “context” has already 
been discussed, and “situation” has a specific technical meaning in rhetoric that has been the 
subject of debate in rhetorical genre studies and must be applied precisely. “Rhetorical 
conditions” here is meant to convey a general sense of the variable textual and power relations 
among rhetors (speakers and writers) and audiences (listeners, readers, viewers), and the social 
structures that inform their own relations to filmic texts and paratexts in a given instance. 
Methodologically, and the way I use it most often, the term ought to be understood in the sense 
of weather conditions, localized and variable, and which may have a broad scope, such as in the 
case of mass media advertising, or a narrower one, such as among niche fan communities. The 
relations one has toward a film, a genre, a paratext about a film, and/or writing about a genre in a 
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given instance are all to one degree or another qualified by one’s rhetorical position as rhetor or 
audience and the exigences, appeals, and dynamic constructions that describe the relation. I hope 
also that the phrase will convey a theoretical sense of rhetorical relations as a prerequisite for 
interpretive schemata to become film genres; that discourse about films—and its purposes and 
participants—are what create, maintain, and transform film genres.49          
 
Genre Users 
Who are the genre users? In the broadest sense, we all are, insofar as we, as senders and/or 
receivers, use the classical genres and other category schemata like “Spike Lee joint” or “Oscar 
bait” or “direct-to-video” in communicative exchanges with other users. I employ the term 
“users” for a number of reasons. First, it keeps the pragmatic dimension of genre—its “use”—in 
the picture and maintains the association with subjects actively constructing and reconstructing 
genres. Second, “user groups” is general enough to capture range of possible relations among 
people who use genre for different kinds of social activities. Contrast this with “discourse 
communities,” defined by John Swales as “sociorhetorical networks that form in order to work 
towards sets of common goals” (Devitt 37).  The term that has been criticized as naïve and 
idealistic, while failing to capture the dynamism and fluidity of flesh-and-blood communities, 
whose members may move in and out of and among one or more groups (Devitt 36-8). While 
some have tried to refine the term, Amy Devitt contends that 
                                               
49 Anis Bawarshi has his own sense of the phrase “rhetorical conditions,” which is specifically geared toward the 
concerns of rhetorical genre studies (RGS) in the field of rhetoric and composition. See the introduction to 
Bawarshi. 
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the concept of discourse community privileges discourse above other group activities, 
motives and purposes; and it disguises the social collectivity that shapes the very nature 
of the group and of its discourse [...] As a result, it emphasizes too heavily the role of 
discourse in constructing groups and not enough the role of groups in constructing 
discourse. (Devitt 39) 
Common kinds of speech or writing, Devitt concludes, “are significant to the extent that they 
reveal underlying commonalities of identity or values [....] Communities are thus better defined 
by their common goals, values, or identities than by their common discourse” (39).50 Because, in 
establishing a theoretical framework, I am aiming for general applicability, and because 
(recalling the skeptical question that began this section) we can at least say that genres are used, 
genre users and genre user groups are sufficiently precise for the time being. 
 While everyone uses film genres in some way, not all people or institutions use them in 
the same way. One theoretical shortcoming of certain kinds of structural genre theory and 
criticism is the failure to recognize that within a single industry or even within a single company, 
different groups operate with different, even conflicting goals.51 This is characteristic of 
approaches that locate the genrefying power in the industry and filmic paratexts, what Steve 
Neale calls “inter-textual relay,” or the “discourses of publicity, promotion, and reception that 
surround Hollywood’s films, and includes both trade and press reviews” (Neale 2-3). Altman has 
                                               
50 Devitt goes on to suggest a breakdown of user groups into communities, collectives, and networks, defined not by 
their forms of expression but by these values and goals and distinguished from one another by the nature of their 
concrete interactions. (42-6) I shall discuss these group divisions further in subsequent chapters, and especially in 
Chapter 4. 
51 In reassessing his older “Semantic/Syntactic” essay, Altman observes that  
While the article acknowledged a genre’s ability simultaneously to satisfy differing needs,  
which I attributed to two collective singulars (the ‘audience’ and ‘Hollywood’), I never awakened to the 
fact that genres have multiple and conflicting audiences, that Hollywood itself harbors many divergent 
interests, and that these multiple genre practitioners use genres and generic terminology in differing and 
potentially contradictory ways. (208)  
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shown that the interests and practices of film producers, distributors, exhibitors, and reviewers 
are not identical, nor are they static, and their various discursive framing practices—memos, 
posters, trailers, reviews—indicate both a fluid set of institutional user groups as well as a 
variegated and protean rhetorical public audience.    
 Altman provides illuminating examples of promotional materials, but among the simpler 
examples of the variety is that of how genres are framed in film reviews.52 Mark Jancovich, in 
“Genre and the Audience” and “A Real Shocker,” extends the Bourdieusian analysis of 
paracinematic fan communities advanced by Jeffrey Sconce to an explicit focus on film genres 
and how genre functions as a medium of cultural distinctions among user groups.53 In the former 
piece, Jancovich examines film reviews of and critical responses to The Silence of the Lambs 
(1991, dir. Jonathan Demme), especially in publications like The New Yorker, The Wall Street 
Journal, and The Nation, periodicals aimed at middle-class, educated readers. He shows how the 
film’s genre designation—whether or not it is labelled a horror film in a particular review—is 
bound up in the aesthetic, moral, and political value judgments a given reviewer makes about the 
film and the horror genre in general, as well as the class-oriented taste formation a given 
publication both reflects and contributes to.  
In the latter article Jancovich focuses on genre fan discourse within niche publications 
like Fangoria or Fear. In letters to the editor Jancovich finds genre functioning as a medium for 
establishing and expressing subcultural capital within a discourse community. The authenticity 
of a particular text is of paramount concern in these disputes, and Jancovich finds abundant 
                                               
52 See, for example, Altman 55-9, 63, 78-9. 
53 See Sconce “‘Trashing’ the Academy.” Jancovich critiques Sconce’s concept of paracinema and its application in 
a later article. See Jancovich, “Cult Fictions.”  
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argument about whether a film like Alien (1979, dir. Ridley Scott) belongs to the horror genre, or 
whether it’s really a science fiction film. These intra-communal contestations turn on disparate 
readings as well as different ideas about what constitutes an authentic genre film—what the 
essence of the genre is or ought to be. For example, the slick production value of Alien 
disqualifies it as ‘authentic’ horror for some readers, for whom the horror’s transgressive nature 
dictates that a film ought to offend aesthetic as well as moral values.   
Both of Jancovich’s examples use a sociological framework to understand how different 
but potentially overlapping user groups frame a film and genre. Importantly, these framings are 
not strictly denotative, but entail normative claims and evaluative judgments about the moral, 
political, and/or aesthetic worth of a given film or genre. This evaluative dimension of genre and 
the presuppositions that inform it will be the subject of the next chapter. For now, note how the 
values and identities of the group dovetail with how the film is framed. And which genre a film 
is said to belong to depends on whether 1) a film violates or exemplifies those values and 2) 
whether the genre in toto is believed to violate or exemplify those values. The social goals and 
values of a user group inform the rhetorical framing of the film and thus also frame its genre.  
These films are more plausibly contestable because they are both studio productions that 
straddle received genres; horror and science fiction for Alien, horror, detective, thriller, and/or 
serial killer for The Silence of the Lambs. Other films may seem more self-evidently to belong to 
a specific genre. But we must remind ourselves that neither the text nor the director, nor the 
advertisements, reviewers, or scholars has the power to discover or fix a film’s genre. In some 
cases, there are no other plausible contenders because the iconography appears self-evident. In 
other cases, a film may be so little known that there are no stakes or no point in genrefying the 
film because it just isn’t discussed much. And in some other cases, such as that of Alien and 
75 
Altman’s example of the woman’s film, the controversy may be restricted to a smaller, more 
insulated user group. In all cases, however, the genre arises not from the text, or even from its 
use in an abstract sense, but from how actual users frame concrete texts for specific user groups 
via specific kinds of writing genres for specific social purposes. This would lead us to ask not 
whether a genre exists, but for whom it exists. Not whether a film is a horror film or a sci-fi, but 
what user or group goals it serves to frame it one way rather than the other.         
Before moving on to an extended example, I would like to mention three concerns 
regarding Altman’s approach. First, his working definition of the scope of a genre wavers, 
depending on where the term is applied. I posit the general claim that the conditions for and 
definition of a filmic genre are as follows: an expressed configuration of some common textual 
and/or extratextual attributes applied to a film relative to a body of films that is meaningful and 
useful for some group. This definition entails no requirements for capacity of the genre or size of 
the group. Its internal consistency or precision vary with the degree to which these are necessary 
to communicate meaningfully with group members and achieve social goals. Broad industry 
acceptance or widespread cultural recognition are not prerequisites: in principle the participants 
in an amateur film club or graduate seminar can produce their own working genres no less 
effectively than studio publicity departments, video store chains, or the entertainment press. This 
is because genres are defined by the group and the purposes they serve for it.  
Second, Altman’s historical scope disposes him to available evidence of past genrefying 
rhetoric, which is largely institutional. Absent are recorded configurations and genres produced 
by fans in the past. This methodological limitation as much as anything, I think, is responsible 
for the top-down character of many conventional conceptualizations of genre. This “production-
driven definition,” Altman acknowledges, “needs to be matched by a reception-driven definition 
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recognizing that genres do not exist until they become necessary to a lateral communication 
process, that is until they serve a constellated community” (162). But lateral communication and 
constellated communities, by Altman’s own definitions, are inherently imaginary, since they 
involve imagining oneself as part of a group that shares interest and enjoyment in certain kinds 
of films but without any direct interaction with other members (161-2). Jancovich’s attention to 
fan discourse in letters to the editor of niche publications is valuable methodologically because it 
points us toward concrete textual evidence of bottom-up and lateral communications, which 
Altman conceives of as indirect and ‘imagined’ (162).54 Though Altman recognizes the potential 
of the web to facilitate direct communication among genre fans, he is writing before the so-called 
digital revolution. Targeted marketing and exhibition, niche web publications, and increased 
connectivity among users mean that fan communities and user groups generally are more 
fragmented but also less imaginary. Multi-platform interactivity and social media not only allow 
precisely that kind of direct, localized communication Altman anticipated, but they also preserve 
abundant concrete instances of rhetorical genrefication as evidence for the researcher. 
Finally, Altman’s critiques of conventional genre theory and criticism are thorough and 
devastating, but this does not mean that we ought to dismiss or discard these approaches 
altogether. Though they may not be well-grounded theoretically, they still serve as useful and 
often influential models of criticism and therefore of genrefication. If, as I suggested in my 
introduction, the proper task of genre theory is to describe the processes by which genres come 
into being and what their nature is, then the proper object of study for genre theory is not the 
films themselves, but the discourses that produce and transform and sustain genres, as well as the 
                                               
54 I shall address Jancovich’s concerns with Altman’s model and will advance a more thorough critique of my own 
in the next chapter. 
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purposes those discourses serve for user groups of varying sizes and compositions. The goal of 
pragmatic genre theory should not be to demolish conventional genre theories and criticism, but 
to deconstruct them: to identify their schematic logic and rhetorical moves and from there to 
study which realms of popular discourse they resonate in, which social groups they serve, and to 
what ends. This approach is not about supplanting genrefying practices, like those of traditional 
genre theory, but analyzing and situating them and understanding their rhetorical and social 
functions. The final section of this chapter will provide an example of this approach. 
 
Torture Porn and “Spectacle Horror”               
In a 2011 journal article titled “Spectacle Horror and Hostel: Why Torture Porn Does Not 
Exist,” Adam Lowenstein takes aim at the term ‘torture porn.’ Coined in a 2006 New York 
Magazine review essay on Hostel (2005, dir. Eli Roth), the term was initially applied by film 
critic David Edelstein to films like that are characterized by cruel gorey violence, identifiable 
characters, and mainstream exhibition. Lowenstein seizes on the question of identification as the 
primary mode of engagement with a film. He argues that identification with a character, while a 
conventional way of viewing Hollywood films, is ill-suited for the visceral cinematic mode of 
Hostel and similar films. Moreover, the clear value judgment implicit in the term forecloses the 
possibility of moral critique within the film. Lowenstein instead suggests the term ‘spectacle 
horror,’ which he associates with Tom Gunning’s notion of the cinema of attractions. As an 
attraction, Hostel and other ‘spectacle horror’ films involve “the staging of spectacularly explicit 
horror for purposes of audience admiration, provocation, and sensory adventure as much as 
shock or terror, but without necessarily breaking ties with narrative development or historical 
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allegory” (Lowenstein 42). For Lowenstein, having worked in literary trauma studies, 
identification is less important than embodied engagement, as the latter allows us to 
acknowledge the impossibility of witnessing history—say, the torture at Abu Ghraib—while still 
feeling history as a visceral experience. Thus Hostel’s spectacular theatricality potentially 
conveys a more complex political critique than a conventional Hollywood realist mode would 
afford. Without contesting Lowenstein’s analysis of the film itself or his advocacy of spectacle 
as a mode of filmmaking and method of critical spectatorship, I would point to a couple of issues 
specific to genre theory that his article raises. 
The first is his titular claim that the genre ‘torture porn’ does not exist, a claim he repeats 
as part of his thesis. This is in a sense an empirical question, and is easily but productively 
refuted. Lowenstein argues from a textualist position, but, as we have seen, there isn’t ground to 
claim that any genres can be justified strictly on textual qualities. On the other hand, from the 
perspective of a pragmatic genre theory, genres exist insofar as they are used, and the evidence 
of a genre’s existence comes from discourse about films, not the films themselves. In a 2013 
book, Steve Jones reports that the term ‘torture porn’ appears in English-language articles over 
200 times per year between 2008 and 2011, and 308 times in 2009 alone. Quick Lexis Nexis and 
Google searches show several results from as recently as October 2017, mostly in reviews of 
Jigsaw (2017, dirs. Michael Spierig, and Peter Spierig), the latest in the Saw franchise (2004-
present). In short, the genre persists, whether Lowenstein and other critics like it or not.  
But just because the term persists, does that mean that the genre does? Considering genre 
pragmatically, yes, because the phrase ‘torture porn’ both signifies the shifting corpus of films 
and indexes the organizing principles by which relevant textual similarities are reconstituted 
every time the label is invoked. The body of films changes because the rhetorical exigence the 
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genre is called upon to respond to also changes. For instance, though torture porn is now 
commonly described as a subgenre of horror, Edelstein’s review cites Irreversible (2002, dir. 
Gaspar Noé), The Passion of the Christ (2004, dir. Mel Gibson), and, more obliquely, Reservoir 
Dogs (1992, dir. Quentin Tarantino) along with Hostel, The Devil’s Rejects (2005, dir. Rob 
Zombie), and Wolf Creek (2005, dir. Greg McLean). Lowenstein argues that the grouping of 
these apparently generically and tonally disparate films betrays the imprecision and inadequacy 
of the term (43). I would argue instead such a grouping illustrates emergent genrefication in 
action and moreover points to its users’ own rhetorical interests.    
The question of torture porn’s generic rhetoricity is the second issue Lowenstein’s article 
raises. It’s not that Lowenstein has no case, simply that he overstates it. Without explicitly 
backing down from his polemical titular claim about the non-existence of torture porn, 
Lowenstein does end up advancing the softer argument that the term is not useful for academic 
practices (43). He makes a persuasive case that the term torture porn lends itself to a less useful 
analytical frame, and that its pejorative connotations potentially belie sophisticated strategies of 
representation and complex political and moral themes (51). Hence, the generic label limits the 
extent of scholarly inquiry into this body of films by undercutting its institutional acceptability as 
a  worthwhile field of study. This does not mean, however, that the term is not useful for other 
users with other purposes. 
Lowenstein’s goals and methods are a function of his user group, that is, academic film 
scholars—especially those engaged in textual analysis— and we might provisionally discern 
separate user groups according to the readership of the two publications: Lowenstein’s audience 
reads Critical Quarterly, Edelstein’s reads New York Magazine. The former is an academic, 
refereed humanities journal and the latter is a popular-press news and culture magazine. Each 
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writer responds to a different rhetorical situation: establishing ethos, constructing audience, and 
making appeals in different ways. This is not to say that academic film scholars are a wholly 
distinct group—clearly Lowenstein has read Edelstein. But that is the point. Lowenstein belongs 
both to the group of horror cinema scholars and he belongs to a broader audience for popular 
film criticism and thinkpieces.  
Lowenstein disputes Edelstein’s claims using methods specific to Lowenstein’s own 
genre user group in a helpfully contrastive way. As a journalistic film critic, Edelstein cannot 
write a seventeen-page essay that cites eighteen separate scholarly sources and then wait months 
and months for peer review and revisions. He has short deadlines. And certainly most of 
Edelstein’s audience does not have the formal training in film history and theory to be able to 
assess the kinds of arguments, evidence, concepts, and methods that Lowenstein brings to bear. 
Instead, Edelstein relies on pathetic appeals to disgust and befuddlement, his own ethos as a 
“horror maven,” and nods to the authority of writers Will Self and Stephen King and scholar 
Carol Clover (which, incidentally, further bolsters his credibility by showing some familiarity 
with academic horror studies). Now, this is not to say that Lowenstein doesn’t have to establish 
his own ethos: that his heavy uses of Mary Ann Doane and Tom Gunning do not contribute to 
the strength of his appeals; that the connections he draws to historical execution films and the 
traumas of Operation Iraqi Freedom don’t demonstrate his awareness of film history and concern 
with current politics; or that his own adroit textual analysis does not inspire trust in his 
conclusions.55  But the aims of the two pieces of writing are very different. Edelstein seeks to 
raise public concerns about a what he sees as a violent, sadistic trend in early twenty-first century 
popular film by way of reviewing a recent example. Lowenstein aims to further advance a 
                                               
55 For a discussion on the rhetorical construction of academic arguments, see Bordwell Chapter 9.  
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particular specialized mode of critical textual analysis among film scholars and to draw attention 
to the aesthetic and political importance of horror cinema and his concept of the “allegorical 
moment,” a project he has been pursuing at least since his 2005 book, Shocking Representation           
What this all comes down to is the a question of the usefulness of the term ‘torture porn’ 
for each writer and for his respective audience. Torture porn does exist, and it is distinct from 
spectacle horror—if that term eventually gains traction—because each genre is employed toward 
a different end. Though torture porn has come to refer more specifically to the kinds of horror 
films Lowenstein would like to redeem in 2011, Edelstein uses it broadly in 2006 because it suits 
his general point about cruel and excessive graphic violence in contemporary cinema. Edelstein’s 
is a self-consciously performative grouping that later scholars like Jones would study and 
employ constatively, as if the designation were a neutral description of a self-evident body of 
concrete texts. This last point is striking as among the more peculiar features of Lowenstein’s 
argument.  
Jones never questions torture porn’s existence, but instead adopts a more conventional 
genre criticism position by clarifying the genre’s textual features. Lowenstein, by contrast, 
denies one genre exists on textual grounds while self-consciously trying the create another. He 
and Edelstein are each aware that they are involved in a performative grouping, in an act of 
genrefication, but they each still argue as if the texts were self-evident and independent of the 
critic. This imaginary Archimedean distance between the critic and the text is a pre-condition for 
any textualist use of genre. Jones takes the genre as given and tries to outline its salient features, 
going so far as to suggest that while only forty-five films released theatrically between 2006 and 
2013 had been labelled “torture porn,” many direct-to-video releases had been neglected by 
critics, the implication being that the texts determine the genre and not the critical discourse, 
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nevermind Jones’ own critical discourse (14). Lowenstein, on the other hand, takes the textual 
features as given but hitherto misunderstood. Though Jones, like Lowenstein, seeks to describe 
the genre as if it were independent of his own analysis, he does not also try to self-consciously 
will a new genre into existence in the way Lowenstein does.  
This unusual case lays bare the contortions required of genre criticism that recognizes the 
utility of genres without acknowledging the reflexivity that use implies. Furthermore, it 
illustrates the point that genre is rhetorically situated among user groups, which may be 
provisionally discerned according to the writing genres they participate in, especially in the case 
of specialized, paywall-blocked publications like academic journals. These groups may have 
different priorities and goals and thus find certain framings more or less useful than others, 
depending upon the purposes those framings are constructed to serve. Despite its connotations, 
torture porn remains a useful and even celebrated genre among some scholars and fans. But 
Lowenstein’s efforts are not wholly unreasonable or unprecedented. As in the case of  the 
woman’s film and film noir, user groups like film scholars can plausibly try to coin their own 
genres—in Lowenstein’s case, “spectacle-”  and “atmospheric horror”—and may or not be 
successful, depending on the terms exposure and demonstrable utility among the user group. 
And, as Jancovich has shown, though user groups may overlap, it doesn’t mean that consensus is 
involved in a particular generic framing. Conflict can arise between opposing framings, 
depending upon the orientation of users to other groups and their goals. 
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Chapter Conclusion  
In this chapter I have laid out the theoretical foundations for a radically pragmatic approach to 
film genre theory, one which addresses the pitfalls of textualist definitions while still recognizing 
genre users’ engagement with the text. By locating genre in discourse about films rather than in 
the films themselves, we can account for the historically and socially situated nature of those 
genres, their forms and uses. In the next chapter I will discuss the evaluative dimension of genre: 
what values are associated with a given genre for a given group? How do the denotative 
mechanics of interpretation and framing come to be imbued with variable connotations? To 
answer this, as well as the question of how received genres inform interpretation and framing, I 
will introduce the concept of meta-genre. Unlike genres, which require the explicit invocation 
and framing of one or more concrete films, meta-genres are multi-valent, syncretic accretions, 
the sum total of semantic, syntactic, and extratextual attributes plus the axiological or evaluative 
valences of a given genre as understood by a given user based on her experience of films and 
filmic paratexts. I will revisit Jancovich to explore a synthesis of his Bourdieusian approach with 
the pragmatic model I have advanced, suggesting that meta-generic connotations allow named 
meta-genres and genrefied films to serve as vehicles for rhetorical and social distinction.        
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Chapter 3: Meta-Genre and Social Action 
 
Genre and Social Action 
Mark Jancovich opens his article “A Real Shocker: Authenticity, Genre, and the Struggle for 
Distinction” by briefly recapping the turn from traditional genre theory to historical genre study, 
noting that by the late 1990s genre scholars had all but given up on defining genres, and directed 
their attention instead toward how genres have been understood in the past. Though Andrew 
Tudor’s identification of the empiricist dilemma led him to conclude that “genre is what we 
collectively believe it to be,” Jancovich’s research into fan and critical activity prompts a critique 
of Tudor’s pluralist approach. Through attention to the arguments and negotiations among fans, 
Jancovich shows that, even if genre theorists have abandoned the project of defining individual 
genres, fans have not; there is no collective agreement about genre definitions, hence genre 
cannot be “what we collectively believe it to be.” (Jancovich “A Real Shocker” 23). 
Jancovich contends that while Altman had already made this point about negotiated 
definitions, Altman still does not devote attention to the concrete classifications of flesh-and-
blood fans as social acts of distinction or, for that matter, as acts of social distinction (24). That is 
to say, Altman largely neglects specific instances of genrefication among fans and the localized 
social factors that motivate and inform them—how classification and other generic discourse 
shapes and is shaped by individual fans’ milieux and their struggles for status among certain 
kinds of social groups. As I mentioned in the last chapter, this is a theoretical and methodological 
issue for Altman that leads to a larger gap in his work, although I would qualify this critique by 
raising two points.  
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First, Altman’s book is a work of poststructuralist genre theory that seeks to define genre 
philosophically by appeal to historical use; he is more interested in defining big-G Genre than 
individual genres. While Altman grounds his theory in instances of historical use, his goal is an 
account of how genre per se operates as a textual and historical system. Jancovich’s fans, on the 
other hand, are more concerned with acts of concrete classification than with the abstract 
historical and discursive processes that render those classifications meaningful. And Jancovich 
himself is interested less in a systematic description of genre in this sense than in examining how 
its fluid variability informs sociological relations.   
Second, Altman’s broader historical focus privileges institutional discourses as engines of 
genrefication. One reason for this is that he has to respond to ideological genre theorists and 
show that, without contesting the broad audience and cultural influence of mass communications 
media, it is intra- and inter-institutional conflict rather than collusion that is responsible for 
genrefication. This approach directs us to the different kinds of institutional discourses, their 
different purposes, even the calculated polysemy of their generic significations.56 The other 
reason has to do with the availability of evidence; little written evidence of fan genrefication 
survives from the classical studio era and before, whence Altman dates the emergence of film 
genres, and certainly not so much as to compete effectively with the genrefying practices of mass 
media.57 Jancovich notes that this kind of lack of evidence has led historical reception studies 
                                               
56 For instance, Altman discusses the competing interests among studios and the generic multivalence of a studio-era 
movie poster. By incorporating images and phrases that (e.g.) evoke adventure and comedy and romance, a poster 
“downplays direct generic references in favor of coded appeals to multiple categories of viewers,” thus appealing to 
the widest possible audience (Altman 54-9).  
57 Altman does discuss genre-film spectatorship as a kind of “lateral communication” among fans, who imagine 
themselves as part of a community of viewers who enjoy similar “genre excesses”. This account describes a kind of 
localized reading practice that dovetails more closely with what I am calling meta-genre.  Direct (i.e. non-lateral) 
communication among genre fans is far more widespread in the digital era, and the resulting rhetorical genrefication 
tends to reinscribe and remystify conventional generic boundaries, as Jancovich points out (“A Real Shocker” 23). I 
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more broadly to over-rely on published film reviews as trace evidence of audience reception, 
contrary to the methodologies of scholars like Janet Staiger. Jancovich, following Ien Ang and 
Robert C. Allen and Douglas Gomery, sees reviews as bringing the evaluative methods and 
criteria of a particular taste formation to bear on a film and framing it for a particular reading 
audience (Jancovich “Genre and the Audience” 36-7). This perspective is of course in line with 
Altman’s conception of generic critical discourse as performative and situated rather than 
constative and broadly representative. Hence, the issue is not so much that Altman misconstrues 
film reviews as definitive as that he does not paint a fuller picture of genrefication at both 
institutional and non-institutional levels. In this way, Jancovich’s work helps to flesh out 
Altman’s account by attending to genrefying discourses among various groups as well as 
identifying the social processes and stakes involved.             
Jancovich has done extensive work in pursuing questions of how genre manifests among 
users and what social functions it serves. For Jancovich genre distinctions are social distinctions 
in the full Bourdieusian sense of the word: fans, scholars, and reviewers define genres not 
positively but in opposition to other genres, and these distinctions are not based on neutral 
descriptions but rather are informed by cultural tastes and values indicative of one’s social 
positioning. For example, in “A Real Shocker” he demonstrates how defining and policing 
generic boundaries is instrumental in acquiring and exercising subcultural capital among 
members of fan communities. In “Pale Shadows” he shows how academic historiographies frame 
bodies of cinematic horror differentially and hierarchically.58 And in “Genre and the Audience,” 
                                               
will discuss some theoretical and methodological problems with Altman’s model of primary and secondary 
discursivity in Chapter 4. See Altman Chs. 9-10. 
58 Specifically, “most accounts [of horror cinema history] privilege the 1930s so that the character of the 1940s can 
only be a matter of inferiority rather than difference, corruption rather than transformation” (“Pale Shadows” 17).  In 
a similar vein, Steffen Hantke has examined the “rhetoric of crisis” in academic horror studies, which seems always 
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Jancovich examines the rhetorical moves of film reviewers in framing The Silence of the Lambs 
as ‘Gothic’ or ‘terror,’ labels which “are not constructed as the Other to legitimate culture (as 
they have been in other contexts) but rather are associated with legitimate culture through a 
series of distinctions in which 'horror' is constructed as their own Other” (Jancovich 43).  
This principle of generic social distinction extends to the putatively radical tastes and 
‘counter-aesthetic’ of so-called paracinematic cult fans, or those audiences identified by Jeffrey 
Sconce who celebrate ‘trash cinema’ in opposition to both the commercial Hollywood 
mainstream and the institutionally legitimated canon of avant-garde and art film.59 Though 
Sconce, too, incorporates a Bourdieusian framework, he nevertheless seems at times to celebrate 
the paracinematic sensibility. Jancovich argues that, by virtue of its ironic and anti-illusionist 
attention to the form of trash cinema and the strident flexing of cultural capital in its discourses, 
“paracinema is at least as concerned to assert its superiority over those whom it conceives of as 
the degraded victims of mainstream commercial culture as it is concerned to provide a challenge 
to the academy and the art cinema,” and consequently “paracinema is a species of bourgeois 
aesthetics, not a challenge to it” (Jancovich “Cult Fictions” 311-12). 
The common theme here is that genrefication, like other social actions, is embedded in 
and expresses the complex social relations of its agents. Genre serves as a medium through 
                                               
to point back to a privileged canon. Matt Hills has shown how the Friday the 13th franchise (1980-2009) has served 
as “para-paracinema”: too trashy to be considered among the legitimate canon of quality horror films, but too 
mainstream to be authentic trash cinema, and constantly coupled with Halloween as that film’s less respectable 
Other. Finally, Jones argues that horror films since the early 2000s have been framed largely in opposition to torture 
porn. See Hantke, Hills, and Jones.    
59 Examples of trash cinema include “'badfilm', splatterpunk, 'mondo' films, sword and sandal epics, Elvis flicks, 
government hygiene films, Japanese monster movies, beach-party musicals, and just about every other historical 
manifestation of exploitation cinema from juvenile delinquency documentaries to soft-core pornography” (Sconce 
372). I will discuss paracinema as challenging the distinction between artistic and rhetorical genres in the 
Conclusion. 
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which conflicts among different social groups are played out, such that “the definition of genre 
becomes, like the definition of the literary canon, both the site and the stake of contention as 
these groups compete for the legitimacy of their definition in order to demonstrate the legitimacy 
of their claim to cultural authority” (“Genre and the Audience” 43). This approach has much to 
recommend it, especially in terms of accounting both for personal motivations for arguing about 
genre and for the broader social arena in which these arguments may take place, as well. The 
value of a given film or genre is, in Barbara Hernstein Smith’s terms, “contingent (that is, a 
changing function of multiple variables) rather than subjective (that is, personally whimsical, 
locked into the consciousness of individual subjects and/or without interest or value for other 
people)” (Smith 11). Jancovich, by way of Bourdieu and of Sarah Thornton—whose concept of 
“subcultural capital” is crucial to his work—provides a sense of what those variables and their 
broader implications might be: viz., the acquisition and exercise of cultural and subcultural 
capital among user groups of varying size and composition.60  
Jancovich provides a bridge from the mechanics of inferential interpretation and the 
discursive transformations of genre labels—i.e., my synthesis of Bordwell and Altman—to an 
account of the conflicting values between and among different discourse groups and the 
associated taste formations that frame and indeed suffuse acts of genrefication. This added 
dimension brings into relief the motivations and sociological stakes of generic discourse within, 
without, and among industrial, academic, and journalistic institutions. “Motivations” here should 
not be understood in any kind of furtive or disingenuous sense, as if users deliberately 
miscategorize films to suit an agenda; such a suspicion would have to entail that there is a “right” 
genre to which a given film objectively belongs. As we shall see in the examples of popular 
                                               
60 See Bourdieu and Thornton 
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discourse around 28 Days Later below, “motivations” would be better thought of in the sense of 
purposes or rhetorical exigences. Indeed, to understand genre in the multivalent, pragmatic sense 
offered here we would need to accept that genre is defined by its rhetorical use: for one or more 
groups of genre users, toward some purpose. Jancovich shows us that social functions of this 
use-value implies a social use-value, that the standpoint and values of a user or group of users 
informs the reading position and inferential strategies, as well as how the user frames the film in 
communicative acts. However, two open problems remain. 
First is that Jancovich’s sociological focus provides no interlocutor between brute 
referential interpretation and the social realm of conflict and contingent values. It is as if a text’s 
genre and a genre’s value are self-evident—not to all users or even uniformly among certain 
groups of users, but to some readers contingent upon their social milieux, which is where 
Jancovich’s attention is primarily directed. If the value of a given genre varies from group to 
group, then genre functions as a matrix for and instrument of social conflicts, rather than being 
itself simply a localized instance of social conflict. Second, and related, while Jancovich attends 
to different “mediations” of generic discourse, his definition of genre’s structural relationship to 
those forms of mediation remains unsystematic. He cites film reviews and letters to the editor of 
fan magazines that index or host the social actions, but he doesn’t recognize that these user texts 
instantiate rhetorical genres or “genres of writing,” which reflect their own regularized 
discursive formations that construct writer and audience in particular ways depending upon the 
social action they are called upon to meet.  
I will address these two issues in this and the following chapter, respectively. I will first 
introduce to film genre theory what I am calling meta-genre, a concept that integrates both 
interpretive and evaluative dimensions of genrefication. Meta-genre can account for users’ 
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performative work of invoking a genre without citing a film while also locating genre—as the 
mutually constitutive act of classifying a specific film—within the realm of public discourse and 
rhetorical communication genres. Second, in Chapter 4 I will more fully discuss rhetorical genres 
and the theoretical complications as well as the methodological possibilities they introduce to 
filmic genre theory. The rhetorical construction of writer and audience further complicates the 
textual and social dynamics at work in genrefication, but the regularized nature of rhetorical 
genres and the body of concepts and methods available via rhetorical genre studies offers a way 
of unifying the broadly contingent realm of meta-generic interpretation and framing with 
rhetorical genrefication as a concrete and relatively stabilized social action. 
 
Meta-Genres 
I have defined film genre in terms of the explicit rhetorical classification of a film or 
body of specific films. But what about general statements such as ‘I don’t like musicals’ or 
‘Horror films reflect the anxieties of the time’? Surely these are meaningful declarations, even if 
by themselves they don’t actually genrefy anything. The term ‘musicals’ or ‘horror films’ cues 
the audience (listener or reader) to access her or his own particularized experience of films, 
paratexts, and associated attributes and substantize the statement based on their own 
understanding of what those terms signify. The rhetor (speaker or writer) might go on to cite a 
specific film or films, and then that would be an instance of genrefication, of genre as process: 
speech-acts that both help to set the parameters of the discussion and that define the genre for 
that rhetorical situation. But prior to invoking concrete films as examples or objects of analysis, 
the genre label signifies a range of possible associations not yet organized through a text. The 
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speaker might narrow the range through modifiers like ‘backstage’ or ‘Freed’ or ‘Bollywood,’ 
and the extent to which this is effective depends on the audience’s familiarity with the corpuses 
and attributes associated with each kind of musical, or that these modifiers effectively signify 
distinct kinds of musicals for that audience.   
These generic terms are not simply denotative, but carry evaluative valences—judgments 
and invitations to judgment—according to which certain groups and certain viewers construct 
social distinctions. Jancovich describes the broader hierarchical structure. 
First, there is the distinction that is often constructed by those who wish to distinguish 
themselves from the consumers of genre films. Hence there is the distinction between 
mainstream cinema, which is defined as a genre cinema, and art-cinema, which is 
somehow seen as a cinema which is anti-genre: a cinema which is either free from genre 
or else subverts the genres of mainstream culture. A similar strategy is also employed at 
more legitimate and middlebrow levels in which supposedly ‘non-generic’ genres such as 
the ‘drama’ are used to distinguish specific classes of films from ‘generic’ genres such as 
westerns, romances, [science fiction], or horror. (Jancovich “A Real Shocker” 26).  
Recall the examples of Get Out and The Martian and the Oscars’ would-be ‘Popular Film’ 
category from the Introduction, and recall the othering function of genre in constituting serious, 
‘non-generic genres.’  I also discussed examples of non-generic genres in the last chapter and 
noted how even some scholars like Klein accept the non-genericity of legitimate Hollywood 
dramas. Among the lower, “generic genres” are further hierarchies, further distinctions. For 
instance, Linda Williams points to the low cultural value of melodrama (“weepies”), “gross-out” 
horror, and pornography in particular. Unlike art cinema or high commercial drama, cast as 
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intellectually or spiritually edifying and appreciable from an aesthetic distance, these excessive, 
sensational “body genres”  are feminized and feminizing because they provoke involuntary 
embodied, emotional responses in a pacified viewer. (4). Even within one genre, such as horror, 
are distinctions among fans and scholars regarding the authenticity or artistry of certain bodies of 
horror films, which may align with certain periods, such as the 1930s or 1970s; certain studios or 
filmmakers, such as Universal or H.G. Lewis; and certain distribution and exhibition structures, 
such as grindhouse versus multiplex.61      
To help bring together both the denotative and connotative dimensions of a genre—that 
is, its definition and value—I propose the concept of meta-genres: generalized performative 
utterances about film genres that are dislocated from concrete textual examples. Meta-genres 
contain the sum total of possible semantic, syntactic, extra-textual, and evaluative attributes a 
given viewer associates with a genre designation. When we speak of “westerns” or “torture 
porn” or “art cinema” generally without direct, explicit reference to specific films, we are using a 
meta-genre.  
My formulation of meta-genre is adapted from rhetoric and composition and specifically 
rhetorical genre studies (RGS). In that field, meta-genre refers to “‘atmospheres of wordings and 
activities, demonstrated precedents or sequestered expectations that surround a genre and 
indicate how readers and writers should appropriately take it up" (Giltrow 195). Meta-genres, as 
their name suggests, are genres about genres. They are instrumental and normative, which is to 
                                               
61 For a discussion of the canonization and differential construction of 1930s studio horror and 1970s independent 
horror, see Jancovich (“Pale Shadows”) and Hantke, respectively.   
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say they direct the form and value of genre use in social action, its “uptake.”62 These may 
include explicit proscriptions or more subtle normative guidelines for the use of rhetorical or 
written genres.   
For our purposes, we might think of meta-genres as informing our interpretations and 
guiding our classifications of films as part of broader rhetorical acts. In interpretation meta-
genres inform inferential meaning construction by providing potential structured catalogues of 
semantic/syntactic attributes, semantic fields, and schemata. They help to configure adaptive 
systems of meaning against the non-integrated “noise” of atomistic textual data. That is to say, 
they help sort and order the experienced film into relevant textual systems—e.g. West Side 
Story’s (1961, dir. Jerome Robbins and Robert Wise) rhythmic editing or White Heat’s (1949, 
dir. Raoul Walsh) climactic shootout—while filtering out attributes like three-point lighting or 
the appearance of a bit-player like Bruno VeSota. The former pair may suggest something about 
stylistically or thematically integrated textual or generic systems, while the latter pair might be 
too commonplace to be meaningful or just generally unnoteworthy for most viewers.63 Of 
course, what is or is not noticed and considered noteworthy depends on the viewer, her interests, 
her past experience of related films, and what she attends to and how closely when watching a 
given film. But knowing Robert Wise’s past as a film editor or having seen (or read about) 
                                               
62 “Uptake” is another RGS concept that refers to the actualization of one rhetorical genre through its use in another 
in a social action (See Bawarshi and Reiff 83-4).  I will have much more to say about uptake and the relations 
between film genres and rhetorical genres in Chapter 3. 
63 Beebee borrows this opposition between noise and systems from Ross Chambers’ application of communication 
theory to ideological literary study. Systems of meaning emerge from the background of “noise” —i.e., non-
categories, non-systems, the totality of disconnected data that constitute categories and systems negatively and from 
without. For Beebee, genre, like ideology, configures systems in this way. (Beebee 17). I shall return to the systems 
and noise opposition in Chapter 4’s discussion of Netflix’s recommendation system.   
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climactic shootouts in other gangster films help orient the viewer’s interpretation of those films 
by providing extra- or intertextual frames of reference.  
Meta-genres also serve as a rhetorical shorthand for those discourses and values through 
framing, or by pointing to common filmic and extra-filmic attributes and valuations believed to 
be shared among a user group.64 For example, ‘independent’ and ‘low-budget’ may well have a 
denotative overlap, but have very different connotations: the former suggests artistic integrity 
and the freedom to experiment and/or transgress in filmic form and content. The latter suggests 
low production value and a shabby, poorly executed product. However, as in interpretation, how 
each of these is valued depends on the user group for whom the phrase is being framed. While 
“low-budget” may be pejorative for most users, among Sconce’s paracinematic communities the 
gritty connotations of “low-budget” might be more highly valued than the pretentious and self-
important connotations of “independent.” Similarly, as I noted in Chapter 2, the pejorative 
connotations of the meta-genre “torture porn” limits the academic study of associated films, such 
that Adam Lowenstein seeks to rename and reconstitute the genre under the less disreputable 
phrase “spectacle horror.”65      
In these two functions we see much of the work that has traditionally been attributed to 
genres: informing expectations denotatively and connotatively. But the distinction between genre 
and meta-genre is crucial. Genre, pragmatically defined, is the public use of interpretive 
schemata in framing a film for some communicative purpose—such that that genre is always 
already subject to reconstitution through its application to a concrete film and that this 
                                               
64 Or imposed on a user group. The normative evaluative function of meta-genre—what Jones identifies as 
“rhetorical interpellation” (30)—is part of the reciprocal construction of rhetor and audience that is inherent in any 
rhetorical situation in which genre or meta-genre is invoked. This mutual construction will be discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 3.   
65 See Lowenstein (“Spectacle Horror”). 
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reconstitution is available to some broader social group for affirmation, revision, or denial. In a 
sense genre must be spoken, and it must cite a specific film or films. Meta-genres need not meet 
such strict criteria. They are floating signifiers that lack broad denotative power because of their 
superabundance of potential referents, and their precise application may be localized among a 
user group and perhaps in some cases even idiosyncratic to a given user. Because they represent 
the idea of a genre as understood by a given user, and an idea informed by the her unique set of 
experiences, meta-genres can and indeed must tolerate apparently contradictory or incomplete 
denotative attributes. Even two hypothetical viewers who have seen the same films will not 
necessarily have noticed and attended to the same attributes or encountered the same paratexts, 
and as a result their understanding of a meta-genre would differ. Moreover, meta-genres entail 
certain evaluative valences, associations with aesthetic and/or moral values that, like denotative 
attributes, are contingent upon a given user’s exposure to and experience of cinema and related 
genrefying discourses.  
To summarize, meta-genres inform private interpretation by providing a catalogue of 
attributes such as visual and auditory elements, character types, emotional tone, production 
value, or period and conditions of production on which to found a classification. Similarly, they 
inform value judgments on a particular film by associating with a given meta-genre certain 
axiological prejudices (in the strict sense of the term) regarding artistic or moral virtues—or lack 
thereof. This, for example, is why Jancovich’s reviewers wrestled with genrefying The Silence of 
the Lambs (“Genre and the Audience” 39-43). Both the film’s aesthetic quality and its perceived 
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feminist politics contradicted the prejudgments associated with the horror meta-genre as 
understood by those users at that time.66 
 
“At that time” is a crucial qualifier. Meta-genre is an accretion of attributes, associations, 
and judgments that inform the interpretive schemata that the user employs going forward. One’s 
understanding of a meta-genre changes with time, but is not necessarily adaptive because it is 
essentially an aggregated catalogue of experiences that can tolerate inconsistencies without 
perturbation. We don’t need to square everything we hear about a kind of film with our personal 
experience of it, or even recognize potential incongruities, unless we have some compelling 
                                               
66 Note that genericity in a popular sense and quality are often differentially related even outside film. “‘Science 
fiction’ and ‘literature’ are not mutually exclusive terms. I propounded this as a heresy in 1952, and it is still so 
regarded, not only by hostile critics, but by many of s.f.’s defenders. The proposition ‘If it’s s.f., it isn’t literature’ is 
self-proving: ‘But this looks good.’ ‘Well then it’s not s.f.’ And around we go again” (Knight 274).  
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reason to do so. Hence, one’s conception of a meta-genre is not only shaped by the actual films 
one has seen but also and perhaps more importantly by what one has heard or read or inferred 
from paratexts and other discourse about films explicitly or obliquely grouped under a given 
generic label. Meta-genres thus have none of the precision or order or universal applicability that 
traditional genre study has sought in its definitions, but they have the flexibility to locate a user’s 
generic interpretation and judgment in a network of historical and discursive contingencies.   
To try to get a sense of what meta-generic prejudgments might have vexed reviewers of 
The Silence of the Lambs, we can frame it relative to the recent history of the genre those 
reviewers were so anxious to distinguish it from. The pejorative connotations of popular horror, 
especially those that violate multiple axiological norms, not only legitimate those norms 
negatively, they also exert an anchoring effect as is a function of meta-genre’s normative 
dimension. Meta-genre directs users to look for its associated rules, not its exceptions, to attend 
to and confirm those characteristic elements that organize the text in a particular way and affirm 
the social relations in which it is employed. As a result, these connotations become harder to 
dispel and require less textual evidence to support while inconsistencies and counterexamples 
become easier to elide. The quantity of films offered and the egregiousness of the violations 
associated with them color the meta-genre such that the rule can hold despite demonstrable 
exceptions, which can be explained away or ignored, depending on the rhetorical conditions 
under which the meta-genre is used. So to frame The Silence of the Lambs, we need to 
understand not what genre it really belongs to, but what connotations and associations might 
have constituted and anchored the horror meta-genre leading up to that films’ release.        
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The Slasher Meta-Genre 
The Silence of the Lambs premiered on Valentine’s Day, 1991, after over a decade of 
horror cinema dominated by the slasher films. By the end of the 1980s slasher films had become 
regular fixtures in multiplexes and video stores and had, in James Kendrick’s words, “lodged 
themselves into the cultural unconscious, where they continue to exert their influence over the 
horror genre while being regularly reinvented via parodies, remakes, and new sequels” (310). 
Kendrick writes in present tense in 2014, but even by 1991 slasher sequels had proliferated to the 
extent that three prominent franchises had been firmly established; these include four Michael 
Myers Halloween films, five Nightmare on Elm Street films, and eight Friday the 13th films.67 
By itself this association of slasher films with sequels—inherently derivative—distances the 
genre from the values of quality cinema, but their conditions of production and content are also 
important factors in their pejorative evaluation .  
Horror in general flourished throughout the 1980s, but it did so largely outside the 
legitimating sphere of the major studios. Kendrick figures that of the over 700 horror films 
released theatrically in that decade, fewer than 80 involved the major studios, which 
tended to lean toward productions that had some air of respectability, usually via the 
involvement of an important filmmaker like Stanley Kubrick (The Shining [1980]) or 
Steven Spielberg (Poltergeist [1982]), or a known literary figure such as Stephen King, 
                                               
67 This list doesn’t count one-off pictures or the lesser-known properties that were also deep into franchises by 1991, 
including Prom Night, Sleepaway Camp, and Slumber Party Massacre (three films each) and Silent Night, Deadly 
Night (four films). It could be argued that the anchoring effect was perhaps stronger in 1991 than in 2014, since the 
intervening years saw the recuperation of the genre through more polished, less edgy, and more conspicuously self-
aware slasher homages and remakes that were less likely to shock parents who had themselves been the audience for 
the early slasher films.    
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whose works supplied material for more than fifteen films between 1980 and 1989 alone. 
(Kendrick 311)68 
By the mid-1980s, the box office had begun drying up for slasher films, and (even) lower 
budgets and direct-to-video distribution added to the popular impression that the films in general 
were not only derivative but poorly made, as well, circulating in the relatively unregulated sphere 
of home video among the schlock and pornography. The evidently lower production values of 
indie slasher horror in this period contrasted with the large budgets, big stars, and/or expensive 
special effects of the studio-affiliated, critically acclaimed fantastic horror cinema such as The 
Shining and Poltergeist, but also The Thing (1982, dir. John Carpenter, produced and distributed 
by Universal) and The Fly (1986, dir. David Cronenberg, distributed by Twentieth Century 
Fox).69 
Perhaps most notable, though not the only significant factor, was the content of slasher 
horror films. As early as 1983, scholars like Robin Wood, John McCarty, Vera Dika, and Carol 
Clover began noting the emergence of an apparently distinct genre that appeared to borrow from 
past thrillers like Psycho (1960, dir. Alfred Hitchcock) and exploitation films like The Texas 
Chain Saw Massacre (1974, dir. Tobe Hooper), and had apparently coalesced into a set formula 
(Kendrick 317). Informed by structuralist genre theory, these critics sought to distill the texts 
                                               
68 N.B. The scholarship cited in my extended example sections is no less subject to a pragmatic critique. Like Steve 
Jones’ attempt to enumerate the torture porn titles released (14), Kendrick’s numbers ought not to be accepted 
without question, since what does or does not count as a horror film is precisely the question under discussion. We 
can probably consider his numbers roughly accurate, however, since the criterion of genre is not textual precision 
but practical agreeability, and, for our purposes here, the ratio of studio-produced to independent films popularly 
considered horror (about 1:9) illustrates the broader point that horror cinema in the 1980s was largely an indie 
concern.     
69 Significantly, Friday the 13th (1980, dir. Sean S. Cunningham) was a notorious slasher that was also associated 
with a major studio after Paramount picked it up for distribution. Shannon Skelton’s ongoing research into horror 
pressbooks has found that the film’s promotional materials played up the film as a psychological thriller, wholly 
avoiding the label “horror” and promoting Tom Savini’s name over Sean S. Cunningham’s, probably due to 
Cunningham’s work in sexploitation films.    
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down to their essential formal and thematic elements. In the cases of Dika and Clover, they 
largely withheld evaluative judgment of the films, aiming instead for a textualist description of 
the generic formula, which could then be analyzed for its deep structure and cultural 
implications.  
This is Altman’s Critic’s Game, a retrospective construction that is either synchronic or 
teleological and produced from a critical Archimedean point (Altman 38). The problem with this 
approach should by now be clear to the reader: it requires the critic A) employ a selection 
process that runs afoul of the empiricist dilemma; B) creatively reframe textual elements and 
prior popular discourses; C) construct anachronisms in service of a stable structure; and D) 
assume the independence of the textual object and genre from the critic’s own discourse. Even 
later critics like Nowell and Kendrick take this textualist approach, pointing out inconsistencies 
and contradictions in the generic corpuses as described by popular press and academic critics 
alike, as if a precise classification were possible or useful. As we saw in Chapter 2’s discussion 
of Lowenstein and Edelstein, textualist corrections are rather beside the point, since they miss the 
social and rhetorical function that grouping the texts serves. Those textualist moves also serve a 
rhetorical purpose for the scholar who employs them, and in principle she is not any more 
positively right than other writers who frame the films differently for their own rhetorical ends—
textualist framing strategies are just more acceptable and more useful for an academic user 
group. Genres cannot exist apart from how they are used among various groups, and the slasher 
genre was formed and used perhaps most widely in emphatic axiological judgments. Popular 
press reviewers routinely savaged the genre even as they were constituting it, or constituted it in 
order to savage it. 
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For example, in late 1980 Gene Siskel and Roger Ebert dedicated an entire thirty-minute 
episode of their public television review show Sneak Previews to condemning what they saw as 
an emerging genre. The episode, entitled “Extreme Violence Directed at Women” (aired 23 Oct 
1980), takes aim at low-budget independent horror films from 1978 through 1980, some of 
which might not be considered slasher films today, but which Ebert repeatedly calls “women in 
danger pictures.”70 The critics unanimously condemn the named films’ graphic and often 
sexualized depictions of violence toward women, especially assertive and independent female 
characters, framed in POV shots that Ebert suggests encourage the viewer to identify with the 
killer. The critics build upon their highly questionable premise that “all movies tend to argue in 
favor of the behavior that they show,” and Siskel speculates that these films’ apparent misogyny 
and evident popularity are symptomatic of a backlash against the women’s movement, while 
Ebert likens the films’ audiences to “vicarious sex criminals.”71  
                                               
70 The hosts name When a Stranger Calls (1979, dir. Fred Walton); Prom Night (1980, dir. Paul Lynch); Don’t Go 
in the House (1980, dir. Joseph Ellison); The Howling (1981, dir. Joe Dante); Terror Train (1980, dir. Roger 
Spottiswoode); The Boogey Man (1980, dir. Ulli Lommel); He Knows You’re Alone (1980, dir. Armand 
Mastroianni); Motel Hell (1980, dir. Kevin Conner); Phobia (1980, dir. John Huston); Mother’s Day (1980, dir. 
Charles Kaufman); Schizoid (1980, dir. David Paulsen); The Silent Scream (1979, dir. Denny Harris); I Spit on Your 
Grave (1978, dir. Meir Zarchi); and Friday the 13th.  
Some of these choices are curious, since Friday the 13th in particular undercuts the critics’ already shaky 
generalizations regarding the films’ content, including male killers, voyeuristic use of POV shots, scenes of rape, 
and disproportionate number of female victims (Kendrick 316-17). Siskel would have known all this, since that 
previous May he had written an infamous review in which he gave away the film’s twist ending, and which he 
discussed with Fangoria magazine the following year. Moreover, The Howling would not be released until April of 
1981, and would receive favorable reviews from both critics in their respective columns. (see Ebert and Siskel 
“Taste Will Tell…”)    
71 It is worth noting that these kinds of judgments about horror film and fans persist. One reader echoes Siskel and 
Ebert’s condemnation in a comment on the digital version of Edelstein’s “Torture Porn” article:  
I feel that the torture-porn genre is created by diseased minds, catering to other desensitized, 
disordered, or possibly masochistic minds. 
How can swallowing the massive doses of sadism in these movies (and thinking nothing of it) be 
considered harmless entertainment? (User ChloeBlue) 
The comment dates to December 2011, over five years after the article was first published, and over thirty years 
after Siskel and Ebert’s Sneak Previews episode aired. I will discuss the dissemination of these discourses via digital 
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The two emphasize that they are not opposed to all horror films, and they remind their 
audience that they both liked Halloween (1978, dir. John Carpenter), a film they nevertheless 
identify as having inspired the current crop of inferior imitators. 
Ebert: The first movie of this whole series of women-in-danger films was 
obviously Halloween [... which] captured an enormous audience, did 
millions of dollars worth of business. And then the sleaze merchants who 
came along looked at that movie and tried to put their finger on what it 
was about it that was so successful. And they said ‘women being chased 
by a killer, that’s it. Let’s go out and hire us some more women and some 
more killers and make us some money.’ 
Siskel: That’s why they call these things exploitations films—these rotten ones—
because they exploit one element and make it sort of sick. 
Ebert has hit on what Altman calls the Producer’s Game, in which film producers attempt to 
identify and replicate the key elements of their own or their rivals’ successful films, which 
accounts for particular similarities among subsequent films (39-42). In this case, it might be a 
general structure (e.g. “stalk and slash” or “body count”), setting (wilderness, suburbia, high 
school or college), formal technique (POV ‘stalking’ shots, violent set pieces), costuming and 
                                               
remediation in Chapter 4. For discussion of similar critical tropes leveled against torture porn and the comparisons 
between slasher films and torture porn, see Jones ch. 1.  
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props (mask, weapon), holiday/calendar motif,72 or star (Jamie Lee Curtis).73 Note first that 
Siskel associates this kind of imitation with disreputable exploitation cinema, though as Altman 
shows—and as I demonstrated in the last chapter—this kind of imitation is typical of commercial 
filmmaking in general. But the particular similarities in toto do not amount to a genre on their 
own. Again, we must think back to the genrefying process identified by Altman, in which genres 
are constellated and promulgated through critical discourse, of which the Sneak Previews 
episode is a prominent example—not as a foundational, definitive text, but as a recognizable 
marker in the process.   
Siskel and Ebert’s evaluation is familiar, even if their descriptions, labels, and examples 
seem incongruous or strange. Richard Nowell explains this in textualist terms, arguing that the 
emergence of a new genre was evident, even if, as late as 1982, there was no single label for 
what was otherwise a clearly coalescing body of films. Nowell’s examples warrant a longer 
quotation. 
Alongside terms like ‘horror’, ‘thriller’, and ‘mystery’, which Jancovich shows have 
often been used interchangeably by reviewers to describe films now commonly thought 
of as ‘horror movies,’ countless sobriquets spotlighted the combination of young people 
and blade-wielding killers that industry personnel noted as distinguishing the film-type. 
Ed Blank wrote in the Pittsburgh Press of ‘slash-your-local teenager features;’ the Los 
                                               
72 E.g. Halloween inspired Friday the 13th, Prom Night, Mother’s Day, New Year’s Evil (1980, dir. Emmett 
Alston),  Graduation Day (1981, dir. Herb Freed), My Bloody Valentine (1981, dir. George Mihalka), April Fool’s 
Day (1986, dir. Fred Walton),  as well as a range of Christmas-themed slashers, including To All A Good Night 
(1980, dir. David Hess), Christmas Evil (1980, dir. Lewis Jackson), and Silent Night, Deadly Night. 
73 After Halloween, Curtis starred in The Fog (1980, dir. Carpenter), Prom Night, Terror Train, Road Games (1981, 
dir. Richard Franklin), and reprised her role as Laurie Strode in Halloween II (1981, dir. Richard Rosenthal), 
Halloween H20: 20 Years Later (1998, dir. Steve Miner), Halloween: Resurrection (2002, dir. Rosenthal), and the 
reboot Halloween (2018, dir. David Gordon Green). 
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Angeles Times’ Linda Gross discussed the ‘young-folk-getting-killed-genre;’ and, at the 
New York Times, Aljean Harmetz examined the ‘homicidal maniac-pursues-attractive-
teen-agers’ sweepstakes. But Washington Post employees were the most gleeful 
participants, with Tom Shales commenting on ‘endangered teen-ager movies,’ Joseph 
McLellan speaking of ‘the ‘kill-the-teenagers’ cycle,’ and Judith Martin taking aim at 
‘the teen-age Blood Film.’ Not to be outdone by these epithets, Gene Siskel of the 
Chicago Tribune described Happy Birthday to Me (1981) as a ‘typical “teen-age girl 
takes violent revenge on kids who have been mean to her” flick’ (Nowell 18-19). 
Nowell and Kendrick each see these as steps toward the full recognition of a genre, but this is a 
teleological presupposition that builds backward from a contemporary (and academically 
situated) understanding of slasher films. Moreover, Nowell and Kendrick assume a 
correspondence between the concrete, factual cinematic attributes and the rhetorical 
generalizations of reviewers, which can be demonstrably true or false in a given case. Instead of 
looking at the concurrences among critical assessments as they build toward the genre we (or 
some of us) recognize today, it would behoove us to attend to the disjuncts among reviews, or 
where they seem to be on the wrong track, and to think about the aims of each of these pieces on 
their own terms, rather than as more or less accurate classifications relative to an inchoate genre.  
For instance, Siskel and Ebert’s early condemnation of what would become known as 
slasher films leans heavily on depictions of rape as evidence of the films’ collective depravity, 
though, as Kendrick points out, rape is extremely rare in slasher films as understood today 
(Kendrick 317). The reviewers’ inclusion of I Spit on Your Grave among their examples appears, 
through family resemblance, to associate the bulk of the films with rape and therefore with a 
more egregiously sexualized, gendered violence, which is the general theme of their 
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presentation. For Kendrick, Siskel and Ebert’s inclusion of I Spit on Your Grave—along with 
The Howling—indicates that, by 1980, “a thorough understanding of the slasher film’s 
parameters was not yet fully in place” (317). But this is the same error Lowenstein commits 
when he accuses Edelstein of misclassifying torture porn 26 years later. Neither Edelstein in 
2006 nor Siskel and Ebert in 1980 are interested in classification as a positivist project; film 
reviewers do not discover genres through comparative analysis, they construct them through and 
for the purposes of argumentation. The reviewers are not concerned with grouping films 
according to iconographic or structural similarities, or in making fine analytical distinctions, 
except where it strengthens their ethos: just as Edelstein assures his readers he is a “horror 
maven,” Siskel and Ebert go out of their way to praise Halloween’s craft and ethical 
responsibility. All three frame their distinctions in terms of artistic paucity and moral turpitude 
because they are above all preoccupied with warning moviegoers about what they see as a 
distasteful and even dangerous new cinematic trend, and their grouping is instrumental in this 
rhetorical purpose.      
It should be noted as well that despite their conventionally disinterested posture, 
academics, too, have participated in the formation of the slasher genre. From as early as 1983 to 
as late as 2006, scholars have echoed popular terms like “teenie kill-pics,” “stalker films,” 
“slasher movies,” and “teen slasher films” (Nowell 17).74 In so doing, they have adopted the 
language and evaluative valences of the meta-genre as aggregated by contemptuous reviewers. 
                                               
74 While Nowell attributes “the slasher film” to Clover’s 1992 book, the Oxford English Dictionary dates this term’s 
first use in this sense to a 1982 Forbes review of Friday the 13th, Part III (1982, dir. Steve Miner), though James 
Kendrick identifies film titles and reviews referring to characters as “slashers” as far back as the 1930s (316). 
Significantly, in the mid- to late-1970s—before the Forbes review—“slasher” was used interchangeably with “snuff 
films,” and this appears to be the first use of the term to label a class of films. Hence, we might surmise that the 
pejorative connotations of “slasher” in the early 1980s were comparable to and perhaps worse than “torture porn” in 
the late 2000s. See Kendrick and OED “slasher.”    
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The single most influential academic voice has undoubtedly been that of Carol J. Clover, who—
in her 1987 article “Her Body, Himself” and subsequent 1992 book, Men, Women, and 
Chainsaws—not only solidifies the now-common term “slasher,” but also adds the term “final 
girl” to academic and popular lexicon. Clover argues that slasher films play out a much more 
sophisticated gender politics than has been allowed by crusading reviewers or structuralist 
academics, one that embraces the performativity of gender in both the characters and the 
adolescent viewer, such that the killer, final girl, and viewer all embody or identify with different 
fluid gender positions at different points throughout the narrative.75 Clover’s sympathetic if not 
exactly celebratory take on the teen slasher film has exerted a profound influence on scholarly 
and popular perceptions of the meta-genre, although her arguments are not without objections. 
Nowell has criticized Clover on textual grounds, claiming that her “assimilation of the 
two distinct film types that Robin Wood, four years earlier, had called the ‘teenie kill-pic’ and 
the ‘violence against women film’ [formed] a critical category that [...] did not exist on celluloid 
in the years before her piece was published” (17). Moreover, for Nowell, Clover’s influence 
brought to public awareness what otherwise might have been a limited academic debate and gave 
misleading impressions of what the genre was really like. “Appearing in what was widely 
received as groundbreaking film scholarship, Clover’s definition provided an immediate 
reference point for academic and popular writers [...] who, by restating its key tenets, 
proliferated, gave credence to, and reinforced misconceptions of teen slasher content” (Nowell 
17). It may seem peculiar that Nowell accepts the accounts of scholars like Wood and Dika and 
of numerous contemporaneous popular reviewers but not of Clover. However, this is because 
Nowell’s textualist approach assumes that those sources have more or less correctly identified 
                                               
75 See Clover (Men, Women, and Chainsaws). 
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and organized independent textual data into their proper genre. We ought to consider instead that 
all parties were actively forming the meta-genre itself as they go. Clover re-frames the genre in 
her work—just as Siskel and Ebert, Dika, Nowell, and Kendrick all have—by selectively 
grouping films and textual attributes in service of a rhetorical point, whether that point has to do 
with the degeneracy of exploitation horror, its deep structure, its industrial conditions, or its 
filmic history and genealogy. In a way, the reviewers’ playful word salads cited above are more 
precise and transparent than the terms “slasher” or “teen slasher” have become, because generic 
labels like “homicidal-maniac-pursues-attractive-teen-agers” clearly indicate the rhetorical 
purpose they are meant to serve in evaluating a body of films: they are to be seen as violent, 
puerile, formulaic, tasteless, and they are not to be taken seriously. 
Regardless of the scholarly disagreements among later critics, illustrative as they are, we 
can productively frame Jancovich’s critics’ reception of The Silence of the Lambs in terms of the 
evaluative valences that the horror meta-genre had acquired by the end of the 1980s, especially 
given the fuzzy distinctions between slasher and serial-killer films. We might suppose that after a 
decade of pejorative discourses surrounding “homicidal maniacs” and “extreme violence directed 
at women,” any horror film that didn’t feature ghosts, werewolves, aliens, or bravura fantasy 
special effects might be confused or conflated with slasher movies as a meta-genre and its 
associated artistic and moral deficiencies. Hence, a well-crafted studio production that 
exemplifies classical Hollywood structure, stars an Academy-Award winner, and explores 
feminist themes but which also features a homicidal stalker, scenes of graphic violence and 
mutilation directed at women, subjective POV shots, and a “final girl” could understandably 
perturb reviewers’ classificatory schemata and challenge them to square the contradictions 
between denotative and evaluative attributes. This is an effect of the accretion of slasher 
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genrefication within the horror meta-genre and its anchoring of horror interpretation and framing 
in the years leading up to the film’s release. The question then becomes whether (and how) the 
horror meta-genre might be adapted to accommodate quality attributes from a picture like The 
Silence of the Lambs—which some scholars seem happy to do76—or whether the connotations of 
horror are irreconcilable with the film’s conventional merits, as Jancovich finds among his 
reviewers.        
 
Meta-Genre and Popular Discourse: 28 Days Later 
I have thus far focused entirely on the critical discourses of professional film reviewers 
and academic critics. But as I asserted in Chapter 2, my theory of rhetorical genrefication applies 
to rhetorical genre use in general, and meta-genre is a crucial feature, since it informs 
interpretation and judgement and orients rhetorical framing among user groups while accreting 
attributes and associations though public use. In this section I will explore the role of meta-genre 
in the framing of 28 Days Later (2002, dir. Danny Boyle) at different points in time and under 
different rhetorical conditions. This particular film serves as a productive example since its genre 
was and has remained contested, even as the meta-genre it is most often associated with—i.e. 
zombie films—has itself undergone a radical change in the years since the film’s release. 
28 Days Later has proven to be a transitional film. Its apocalyptic setting and hordes of 
violent, mindless, contagious humanoid monsters make it easily assimilable to the zombie meta-
genre. However, its “infected”—not dead—monsters do not shamble clumsily but sprint toward 
their victims, shrieking and snarling rather than moaning. Though the narrative structure of 
                                               
76 See Clover (Men, Women, and Chainsaws), Crane, and Jancovich (“Genre and the Audience”).  
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‘flight-siege-flight’ and the drama of the barricaded survival space reflect the influence of 
zombie films in the Romero tradition, the living, viral infected challenge the symbolic power of a 
contranymic ‘living dead’ figure.77 Peter Dendle has argued that the rabid, running infected of 28 
Days Later—followed by those from Dawn of Dead (2004, dir. Zach Snyder), 28 Weeks Later 
(2005, dir. Juan Carlos Fresnadillo), and those from video games like Left 4 Dead (2008, 
Valve)—represent an evolution in the zombie genre, a new permutation that reflects the speed 
and ferocity and violence of a media-saturated, post-9/11 culture.78 But the question of whether 
or not Boyle’s infected are or are not zombies—and therefore whether 28 Days Later is a zombie 
film—gets to the heart of genrefication as historically, socially, and rhetorically situated. 
 
Filmmaker Discourse 
In 2003 director Danny Boyle and screenwriter Alex Garland sat down with Filmmaker 
magazine’s Kim Newman for an interview about their new film. First we should note that this 
should be considered part of the press junket for the film; Boyle and Garland are out to promote 
the film’s theatrical release. Newman is a film critic, horror and science fiction novelist, and 
author of Nightmare Movies: A Critical History of the Horror Film and the BFI Companion to 
Horror. But in his capacity as interviewer, he is representing a publication that bills itself as “the 
magazine of independent film.” Each party has a degree of rhetorical authority already 
established by virtue of his institutional position, as filmmaker or interviewer. 
                                               
77 For a Derridean take on the undecidability of the living dead figure, see Leverette. For more on the zombie 
narrative structure in the Romero tradition, see Swanson.    
78 There are significant issues with Dendle’s history—in particular his tendency to elide texts that don’t suit his 
thematized periodization—but they are beyond the scope of this discussion. In any case, the soundness of his 
arguments are less important here than the systematicity and rhetorical authority of his framing. See Dendle.  
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Over the course of the brief interview, Newman and the filmmakers dance around the 
question of the film’s genre, offering “horror,” “science fiction,” “apocalypse,” “action films,” 
and “British films,” each of which supports various points about the film’s structure, style, or 
budget. Though the term “zombie” pops up a couple times, both interviewer and interviewees do 
their best to distance the film from zombie cinema and to associate it with science fiction, 
independent film, and cinematic political commentary in general. Newman’s introductory 
paragraph describes it this way: 
This is a terrific s-f/horror hybrid, evoking American and Italian zombie movies but also 
a very British end-of-the-world tradition that takes in War of the Worlds, The Day of the 
Triffids and Doctor Who. Shot on digital video by Dogme specialist Anthony Dod 
Mantle, who gives the devastated cityscapes security-cam-look realism, 28 Days Later 
grips from the first, with its understandably extreme performances, its terrifyingly swift 
monster attacks and its underlying melancholy. A box office success in England, it may 
just be the best British science-fiction/horror film since Death Line in 1972 (“The 
Diseased World” ¶ 2). 
Newman introduces the film and immediately frames it evaluatively. Acknowledging the stylistic 
similarities, he cites but immediately undercuts the association with “American and Italian 
zombie films” through the legitimating association with British literary science fiction. Newman 
adds further polish by invoking the Danish art cinema movement Dogme 95 as a way to explain 
the choice of an SD “security-cam-look realism” and cue indie cinephiles, while also nodding to 
its accessibility via reference to the film’s box office success.  
111 
For their part, Boyle and Garland unequivocally deny that they have made a zombie film, 
telling with Newman that it is, rather, an apocalypse film (¶ 27-8). This creates something of a 
tough spot, as the film features numerous, rather specific nods to Dawn of the Dead (1978, dir. 
George A. Romero) and Day of the Dead (1985, dir. Romero), forcing Boyle and Garland to 
acknowledge Romero’s influence, especially given Newman’s credentials as a horror critic (¶ 12, 
14).79 But even in this acknowledgement the filmmakers hedge. By citing Romero but not 
zombies explicitly, they effectively connect 28 Days Later to an independent, politically radical 
filmmaker while sidestepping the genre of horror films for which he is most often noted. 
Romero’s tendency to construct thinly-veiled political allusions have helped to associate his 
films with a body of canonical horror that has been legitimated by virtue of its social 
commentary.80 For instance, one of Romero’s stylistic strategies that evidently inspired Boyle 
and Garland is a use of visual allusions to historical photos.81 Boyle and Garland make this 
strategy explicit, referring to photojournalistic images from Rwanda, Northern Ireland, Bosnia, 
and Cambodia as inspiring certain visual elements in their film (¶ 19-21). Though they explicitly 
cite both Romero as a filmmaker and his most celebrated zombie film (Dawn of the Dead), 
Boyle and Garland nevertheless deny that 28 Days Later is a zombie film (¶ 26-8). 
                                               
79  I.e., the scene in which the protagonists stop at a gas station for fuel and Jim (Cillian Murphy) kills an infected 
child is almost beat-for-beat like a similar scene in Dawn of the Dead. And the second half of the film, in which the 
heroes are trapped with a sinister military commander and his lecherous soldiers, mirrors the general premise of Day 
of the Dead. 
80 For commentary on Night of the Living Dead (1968, dir. Romero) in this vein, see Hervey, Lowenstein (“Living 
Dead”), and Wood (“An Introduction to the American Horror Film”). For commentary on Dawn of the Dead, see 
Bishop (“The Idle Proletariat”) and Wood (ibid.) . For an overview of Wood’s et al. ideological approach to 1970s 
horror and some of its critics, see Hutchings.   
81 E.g., historical lynching photos during the end credits of Night of the Living Dead and the self-immolating 
Buddhist monk in The Crazies (1973). See Lowenstein (“Living Dead”). 
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This might seem disingenuous. Surely, the filmmakers are distancing themselves from 
that genre, even though they know 28 Days Later is really a zombie film.82 Perhaps, but perhaps 
not. Absolutely there is a question of the relative value accorded to zombie films versus other 
genres, but those values need to be situated relative to the films available at a given time. To 
think our way through this, we need to understand what generic frames of reference—what meta-
genre—would be most immediately available to Boyle and Garland in 2003 when the interview 
was conducted as well as what rhetorical conditions obtain as they genrefy their own film in this 
instance.   
Other than Dawn of the Dead, the only zombie film cited by name in the interview is 
Resident Evil (2002, dir. Paul W. S. Anderson), a digital effects-heavy action-horror film based 
on a Capcom video game and made with a budget over four times that of 28 Days Later.83 
According to zombie film historian Jamie Russell, Capcom and production company Constantin 
Film had approached Romero to pen a script, which he had worked on through 1998 and 1999, 
but he was ultimately dropped from the project, to the dismay of zombie fans (131). Russell 
notes that 
Romero, who had once railed against “The McDonaldization of America,” seemed to 
have been sidelined by the corporate forces now running the movie business. Big 
companies like Capcom and [distributor] Sony didn’t really have a place for a radical, 
                                               
82 My use case is from 2003, but, as I mentioned in the introduction, this preemptive generic framing persists as a 
key strategy in a film’s promotional discourse and in directorial interviews in particular. For instance, Mark Bernard 
observes that Hereditary (2018) director Ari Aster hesitates to describe his film as horror, opting for instead for 
“family drama” or “domestic melodrama” (“Cult Conversations” ¶ 12). While 28 Days Later’s framing reflects the 
generic course of zombie films at the turn of the 21st century, as I argue below, Hereditary’s framing ought to be 
understood relative to the recent critical subcategories of “art house-” or “elevated-” or “post-horror” of the 2010s 
(e.g. The Bababook [2014 dir. Jennifer Kent], The Witch [2015, dir. Robert Eggers], and Get Out [2017 dir. Jordan 
Peele]). See Bernard “Cult Conversations,” especially ¶ 14-18.   
83 Resident Evil’s $33 million budget is still relatively modest, but considerably higher than 28 Days Later’s $8 
million (BoxOfficeMojo). 
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indie filmmaker from Pittsburgh like Romero [....] There was a suspicion that Romero’s 
old-school approach was too gory and that the Resident Evil movie was not going to be a 
rough and ready genre classic but a mainstream popcorn movie. It was indicative to some 
of the general trend in American horror as the golden age of the 1970s faded and a new, 
corporate sensibility took over. (131)            
As genre fans had feared, Resident Evil focuses far less on atmosphere, splatter, and ghouls than 
action set pieces and CGI monsters. As a result it succeeded in appealing to the broadest possible 
audience, pulling in nearly $103 million worldwide and launching a billion-dollar franchise.  
In their interview, Garland in particular gets testy about comparisons to Resident Evil (¶ 
14), and Boyle recalls that they “were very worried about people thinking it was a zombie 
movie,” adding “I think if you’re a zombie fan, you’ll be disappointed” (¶ 28).84 We shouldn’t 
necessarily think of Boyle’s comment here as reflecting any kind of genuine concern for the 
interest of zombie fans; Resident Evil’s box office returns cannot be denied, but Boyle and 
Garland can denigrate its audience according to their tastes. We might suppose that, rather than 
being embarrassed at having made a zombie movie, even if it is a good one, Boyle and Garland 
sincerely believe that 28 Days Later is not a zombie movie at all, despite its acknowledged 
                                               
84 Even years into the zombie renaissance, upon the release of Colson Whitehead’s acclaimed novel Zone One, 
literary critics were still anxious to distinguish Whitehead’s zombie novel from the rest of the genre (Swanson 379-
80). One strategy of distinction involved characterizing zombie fans themselves negatively. Consider Glen Duncan’s 
New York Times review:  
Colson Whitehead is a literary novelist, but his latest book, “Zone One,” [sic] features zombies, which 
means horror fans and gore gourmands will soon have him on their radar. He has my sympathy. I can see 
the disgruntled reviews on Amazon already: “I don’t get it. This book’s supposed to be about zombies, but 
the author spends pages and pages talking about all this other stuff I’m not interested in.” Broad-spectrum 
marketing will attract readers for whom having to look up “cathected” or “brisant” isn’t just an irritant but a 
moral affront. These readers will huff and writhe and swear their way through (if they make it through) and 
feel betrayed and outraged and migrained. But unless they’re entirely beyond the beguilements of art they 
will also feel fruitfully disturbed, because “Zone One” will have forced them, whether they signed up for it 
or not, to see the strangeness of the familiar and the familiarity of the strange. (Duncan 2011)    
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influences. For these filmmakers in 2003, Resident Evil, with all its vapid spectacle and blatant 
commercial cross-promotion, is characteristic of the zombie genre, and one effective way of 
asserting the aesthetic and political qualities of 28 Days Later is to distinguish it from zombie 
films in general. But rather than question why Boyle and Garland wouldn’t think of 28 Days 
Later as a zombie film, perhaps we should question why we might. And once again, we need to 
understand the aggregative function of meta-genre.   
Resident Evil’s source material is the video game of the same name, developed by Shinji 
Mikami for Capcom and released in 1996 for the Sony PlayStation. The game’s style and 
atmosphere pay homage to the zombie films of Romero and Lucio Fulci, and its success spawned 
a game franchise and inspired a whole series of other survival horror games. Moreover, Russell 
argues, the success of the Resident Evil game “reinvigorated zombie cinema in the late 1990s and 
paved the way for the zombie renaissance that occured in the 2000s. It was the first sign of the 
zombie’s impending mutation into a crossmedia monster—a creature so adaptable it could jump 
from movies to games to comics and novels with ease” (Russell 127-8).85 Resident Evil had 
primed a generation for an explosion of zombie-related cultural phenomena.   
From the early 2000s on and as of this writing, zombie-themed content has suffused TV 
shows, novels, comic books, fan conventions, console and mobile video games, web videos, 
restaurants, beers, apparel, toys, board games, live-action role playing and survival simulations, 
and athletic and community events and organizations (e.g. “zombie walks” and Zombie Squad). 
In the introduction to the second (2014) edition to his Book of the Dead, Russell claims that more 
feature-length zombie films were released in the eight years between 2005 and 2013 than in the 
                                               
85 The so-called zombie renaissance has received considerable attention from scholars, but it is beyond the scope of 
this project to rehearse or critique their analyses and explanations. See Bishop (American Zombie Gothic) and 
Dendle.    
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seven decades prior (6). Produced by countries around the world, many of these films embrace 
both the form and content of Romeroesque zombies, using the shambling figures as vehicles for 
social commentary—in some cases as wry satire and in others as brutal allegory. Zombies would 
eventually gain some respectability in mainstream popular culture, especially through critically 
acclaimed television shows and novels like The Walking Dead (2010-2018, AMC) and like Max 
Brooks’ 2006 World War Z and Colson Whitehead’s 2011 Zone One. However, this zombie 
renaissance was still nascent when 28 Days Later was released in 2002; zombies then were still, 
in Russell’s words, “the great unwashed of horror cinema, low-rent and disreputable” (6). 
Boyle and Garland’s frame of reference for the zombie genre in 2003, then, is limited to: 
1) decades of low-budget, marginal cinema—Poverty Row, drive-in, exploitation, and direct-to-
video releases; 2) one horror auteur, Romero, whose commitment to radical social politics 
already distinguishes him from other zombie filmmakers; and 3) a recent shallow, insipid action 
blockbuster from which Romero had been fired. That Romero hadn’t been able to get a zombie 
movie made as director in the seventeen years since Day of the Dead;86 that 1990s zombie 
cinema was dominated by no-budget, shot-on-video, amateur productions (Russell 120-4); that 
zombies re-emerged first through a medium, video games, not associated with serious art; and 
that the most recent notable zombie film was itself a video game adaptation loaded with CGI and 
a juvenile action sensibility—all these factors hurt the legitimacy of the zombie genre and, by 
contrast, suggest that 28 Days Later was indeed something different.  
 The low cultural value associated with zombie films at the end of the 20th century is one 
of the markers that define the meta-genre at that point. As with The Silence of the Lambs and 
                                               
86 Romero did write and executive produce the 1990 remake of Night of the Living Dead (dir. Tom Savini), which 
was a modest commercial and critical success. Nevertheless, it would not be until after the success of Resident Evil 
in 2002 that he would secure funding for his fourth Dead film, Land of the Dead (2006) (Russell 133). 
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slasher films, 28 Days Later’s production quality, thematic depth, and evident political 
engagement serve to distinguish it from a disreputable genre because these kinds of evaluative 
attributes are central to meta-genre. For some, 28 Days Later could not be a zombie film in 2003 
because it is too good, too thoughtful, too earnest. This is one way of explaining Boyle and 
Garland’s insistence on distinguishing their film from zombie cinema. We still might suspect that 
they are aware of and sensitive to the similarities the films bear, and it is perhaps a wise 
rhetorical move to distance 28 Days Later from such similar films, especially when describing it 
to the readers of a publication that bills itself as “the magazine of independent film.” But we 
cannot say that the film positively belongs to the zombie genre then or now, because, despite 
whatever textual similarities it shares with the zombie meta-genre, genre is always contingent 
upon the rhetorical conditions under which it is invoked.  
Boyle and Garland are to some extent aware that they are genrefying the film in the sense 
that they are clearly framing it for an audience, but it is important to note here that their framing 
is differential, that “genre is a system of differences without positive terms” (Beebee 256). 
Hence, to identify 28 Days Later as science fiction or apocalypse is already to identify it 
implicitly as not-horror, or as not-zombie, by virtue of their structural opposition. But since 
genre in my formulation is less an abstract system of semiological relations than a performative 
utterance, this phrase still holds true but with an added dimension of rhetorical purpose and of 
active if indirect denial. This structure of negation is not only denotative but evaluative as well, 
as Bourdieu avers:  
Tastes (i.e. manifested preferences) are the practical affirmation of an inevitable 
difference [...] when they have to be justified, they are asserted purely negatively, by the 
refusal of other tastes. In matters of taste, more than anywhere else, all determination is 
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negation; and tastes are perhaps first and foremost distastes, disgust provoked by horror 
or visceral intolerance of the tastes of others. (49)  
The stakes of this kind of adamant distinction involve the exercise of cultural capital through the 
re-legitimation of certain kinds of art forms and the maintenance of the authority of certain 
subjects and institutions to arbitrate on matters of art. This example would involve the authority 
of indie filmmakers (and authors) like Boyle and Garland and the authority of institutional critics 
and publications, like Newman and Filmmaker Magazine. But in this case, it is not enough to 
call 28 Days Later a science fiction or apocalypse film.  
The textual attributes it shares with the zombie meta-genre require that 28 Days Later be 
explicitly designated ‘not a zombie film,’ because the pejorative connotations that term entails at 
that point in time raise the stakes by risking association with a particularly low genre. In other 
words, the lower the associated meta-genre, and the greater the textual similarity, the higher the 
risk of undesirable genrefication; it is imperative to distinguish the film explicitly. Hence, 
Newman, Boyle, and Garland point to specific stylistic and thematic attributes to direct their 
readers’ interpretations away from the similarities with zombie films and toward those stylistic 
and thematic attributes the zombie meta-genre is supposed to lack. Years later, however, the 
conditions have changed, and we shall see now how fans consider the film. 
 
Reddit and Fan Discourse    
We shall continue with 28 Days Later, but this time I will not be discussing the 
genrefying discourses of critics and scholars and filmmakers. Their authority, while not 
unassailable, is nevertheless to some degree guaranteed by the very institutional milieux and 
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rhetorical genres in and through which they operate and which constitute them as critics and 
scholars and filmmakers. Instead, I will be discussing fan discourse and the radically different 
rhetorical conditions under which fans have to construct their arguments and build appeals in 
arguing over the genre of a particular film.  
The document here is an /r/AskReddit thread, which, on the one hand, provides a 
relatively neutral ground in terms of user authority—relative, specifically, to institutional critics 
and scholars. On the other hand, however, Reddit also has its own system of ranking responses 
based on users’ upvoting or downvoting, and thus is less neutral than might appear. While it is 
not a truly equal intersubjective space, Reddit does give us a more transparent sense of the 
necessity of users to consider and appeal to their audience, who, while anonymous and 
depersonalized, can still interact with one another. To reiterate and add to my earlier point, this 
section is not an ethnographic case study and is not particularly concerned with postdemographic 
digital research methods.87 Rather, it is meant to illustrate how the principle of rhetorical 
genrefication extends beyond traditional institutional media and its variations and is active in the 
discourses of everyday users.  
More specifically, this section is meant to illustrate the role of meta-genre in 
interpretation and framing zombie films and 28 Days Later in particular. Recall that the zombie 
meta-genre contains the sum total of connotative and denotative attributes associated with a 
particular kind of film as available to a given user. This element is intimately connected with the 
rhetorical conditions under which the film is framed. While Boyle and Garland are chary of 
naming specific films—except for Resident Evil as a negative example—as filmmakers they 
                                               
87 For an overview of postdemographics and social media research methods, See Rogers ch.7. 
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enjoy the apparent authority to frame their own film, especially as sanctioned by the mediation of 
a professional critic, Kim Newman, and as published in a film magazine. For Redditors, the 
rhetorical conditions necessitate different framing strategies, those built on logos rather than 
ethos. That is to say, because they lack institutionally defined authority, they must rely on 
different appeals and build their arguments on textual and intertextual evidence. If 28 Days Later 
were broadly accepted as a zombie film—like, say, Dawn of the Dead (1978)—there wouldn’t be 
much to talk about or much reason to talk about it because the film’s genre would appear self-
evident to the user group. But since there is disagreement and enough subcultural capital at stake 
to make contestation worthwhile, users are obliged to build their arguments on persuasive 
evidence. The relative anonymity makes it imperative to ‘show your work,’ so to speak, and 
reveals how meta-genre serves to inform genre as genrefication, that is, as negotiation and 
rhetorical appeal among a user group.                  
On May 24, 2011, user IamShartacus posted a question to /r/AskReddit and began a 
thread that generated 125 user comments.88 The humorous references to a good-natured 
disagreement between romantic partners sets the initial exigence, and the thread is dotted with 
nods to that initial question, including the occasional sexist remark.89 For the most part the 
discussion turns on the definition of a zombie and whether the monsters in 28 Days Later—the 
“infected”—are or are not zombies, and the thread is fairly evenly split on the question.  
                                               
88 The full thread can be found in the Appendix.  
89 E.g. “I'm pretty sure she should be making sandwiches for you to eat while watching 28DL rather than being in 
the living room watching 28DL” (User MaoChan) 
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The author of the original post (OP) acknowledges that “Infected humans don’t die” and 
that there is “little evidence that the 28DL ‘zombies’ are eating their victims,” concluding that “I 
recognize that 28DL falls outside the traditional Romero canon because of these facts, but I still 
believe that it is a zombie movie in spirit.” Subsequent commenters stick fairly close to the 
framework provided in the OP—viz. whether the infected share observable characteristics with 
zombies as popularly understood, whether the film shares a similar structure with other zombie 
films, and whether the film addresses similar social themes as other zombie films. Some users 
suggest different taxa of zombies who may or may not be alive, may or may not eat human flesh, 
and may or may not be controlled by a virus or voodoo.90 Others agree with the OP and make a 
special case for the film, claiming that, though the infected are definitely not zombies—because 
                                               
90 Users leevs11, nickname, misplacedme, and TheyCalledMeMad. 
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of the aforementioned characteristics—they would consider 28 Days Later a zombie film.91 Still 
others deny the authority of the standard definition, pointing to misplaced notions of canonicity 
and generic stability.92 And some commenters point to structural and figurative conventions to 
suggest that the infected perform the same functions as zombies in their own narrative contexts.93 
Throughout the thread users cite specific textual attributes characteristic of zombies and, 
to a lesser extent, other zombie films to qualify and/or support their claims one way or the other. 
First, the OP suggests that the “antagonists are hordes of bloodthirsty, mindless humanoids 
whose disease is spread through biting,” adding—without contesting—the author’s fiancée’s 
criteria that zombies are anthropophagic and dead. Other users add to and elaborate on these 
criteria, beginning subthreads on, for example, whether zombies can starve or not—and whether 
the infected starve or not—since having a metabolism would indicate that one was actually alive 
and therefore not a zombie since zombies must be dead. Some point to etiology and etymology, 
suggesting that the word’s origin in “voodoo” indicates that any person, living or dead, 
controlled by magic could be a zombie. This is a specific counter to the claim that since the 
infected are living, they cannot be zombies, and therefore 28 Days Later is not a zombie film. 
Other users appeal to the film’s structure by way of analogy. 
Die hard is an action movie about a police officer who has to stop terrorists using guns 
and explosives. Mission impossible is about a secret agent who has to stop terrorists at 
first by using stealth operations, and then guns and explosives. Both are basically the 
same action movie formula, just variations thereof. I consider 28 Days Later to be a 
                                               
91 Users Advancedphish, M_Me_Meteo. Nethius, ChickMD, itchylot, and goxilo. 
92 Response to TheyCalledMeMad (username deleted), bolxrex, jclives, and TheCloned. 
93 Users HSOK, science_diction, and lolmonger. 
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zombie movie because it is very obviously made in the same formula of a zombie movie. 
(user HSOK, sic) 
This appeal to structure appears in a handful of claims that agree with the OP’s assertion that the 
film is a zombie movie in spirit. While some others agree about the structure, or concede it has 
the “heart” or “spirit” of a zombie film, even though the infected aren’t really zombies, a few 
commenters appeal to themes and implicit meaning.   
It’s more of a zombie movie than half the zombie movies you mentioned in your post. 
There's a reason zombie movies gained huge popularity in the 70s. They were created as 
allegories to race riots and what many people believed would be the end of civilization or 
democracy. That's why they move in mobs. That's why everyone they attack gets 
"infected."  
[....] 
Zombies, when done in the classic style, are allegory. (user science_diction) 
 
For user science_diction, a given film’s politics and its commitment to social commentary are 
better indicators of its generic status than the particulars of the monsters it uses as vehicles for 
that commentary. So while the OP and many comments draw on the attributes of the monster, 
some users attend more closely to narrative and theme as the more significant, definitive 
attributes, even if, like science_diction, they hedge through qualifications like “when done in the 
classic style.”  
It should be noted when considering the semantic characteristics of the monster versus 
the syntactic narrative and thematic structures, the inclusion of one to the exclusion of the other 
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would entail exclusions of otherwise intuitive cases, including and especially classical-era films 
like White Zombie (1932, dir. Victor Halperin) and I Walked with a Zombie (1943, dir. Jacques 
Tourneur). But the consolidation of the ‘dead, slow, flesh-eating’ zombies of the Romero 
tradition against the infected of 28 Days Later serves to elide inconsistencies and contradictions 
among those same films, even those of the Romero canon, thus reconstituting the genre 
negatively. Hence, the various assessments of 28 Days Later and its textual attributes turn largely 
upon criteria that are dislocated from the concrete films: users have a conception of a what a 
zombie film looks like and does that may or may not wholly agree with actual films or with more 
than one.  
This is not to say that no users appeal to specific films. Indeed, many users cite specific 
films, just as the OP does.94 Like Boyle and Garland, some also use auteurs as shorthand for a 
particular kind of zombie, citing Romero, Val Lewton, Lucio Fulci, and Walking Dead creator 
Robert Kirkman, but few acknowledge more than one, perhaps because their monsters and 
themes diverge so greatly. Even Romero is contested in his authority: although user lesmalan 
claims “Romero's zombies are the only zombies, we literally CANNOT advance this 
conversation otherwise,” user TheCloned takes an opposite view:  
I know r/zombies would downvote me to hell if they heard me say this, but as one 
zombiephile to another, you need to stop putting Romero on a pedestal. [....] 
                                               
94 In total, these include Shaun of the Dead (2004, dir. Edgar Wright), Zombieland (2009, dir. Ruben Fleischer), I 
Sell the Dead (2008, dir. Glen McQuaid), Weekend at Bernie’s II (1993, dir. Robert Klane), Stardust (2007, dir. 
Matthew Vaughn),  the graphic novel and TV series The Walking Dead, Return of the Living Dead (1985, dir. Dan 
O’Bannon), Outbreak (1995, dir. Wolfgang Peterson), the game Resident Evil, 28 Weeks Later, The Serpent and the 
Rainbow (1988, dir. Wes Craven), 1408 (2007, dir. Mikael Håfström), I Walked with a Zombie, Dawn of the Dead 
(1978), and Night of the Living Dead (1968). 
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Sure, he created the modern zombie and whole culture of zombies. But have you seen his 
recent work? It's absolute shit. The culture has gotten away from [him], it evolved past 
him and he couldn't adapt. I personally don't think Romero is a good authority on 
zombies anymore.  
Yes, 28 Days Later was a zombie movie, as long as you're not constricting yourself to 
Romero's zombies. (user TheCloned) 
This user doesn’t offer an example of what other criteria define zombies in the absence of 
Romero’s authority and perhaps doesn’t need to. Along with Romero, TheCloned defies the 
authority of the fans on the /r/zombies subreddit. User beastduels appeals to the collective 
authority of the niche fans, “Try starting a poll in r/zombies and i'm sure >80% will say not 
zombies [sic],” but others are wary of that subreddit group and of “hardcore zombie 
fundamentalists” in general.95 
 One particular response captures some of the frustration of other users at the rigid 
definitions and exclusions advanced by some of these hardcore fans. 
Yes, of course it is a zombie movie. People act like there is some consensus about what a 
"zombie" is, but that's complete bullshit. Some zombies are dead, reanimated corpses. 
Some zombies are living creatures infected with a pathogen. Some zombies are mind-
controlled people, forced to obey their master (with drugs, diseases, voodoo, etc). 
Hell, the original zombie myth didn't include them being undead, they were living slaves. 
                                               
95 “Hardcore zombie fundamentalists irritate me because they act like there is some defined standard that needs to 
be rigidly adhered to in order to qualify zombies as ‘real’ zombies. 28DL was a zombie movie as much as any other 
zombie movie. One of the few good zombie ‘action’ movies (versus the typical zombie horror movies). (user 
deleted, response to user TheyCalledMeMad) 
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There are zombie infections, there are zombie-like infections, and they're the same damn 
thing. (user TheyCalledMeMad sic) 
While acknowledging the lack of consensus, this user gestures toward two of the popular 
approaches for including films: taxonomy and generic evolution. The taxonomic approach, 
implicitly subgeneric, allows for a diversity of zombie types within one genre while still 
maintaining some ordered sets of conventions. It sets voodoo, undead, and viral zombies side by 
side as different species of zombie that populate different subgenres of zombie films. As I 
suggested in my introduction, for pragmatic genre theory subgenre makes no sense as a concept, 
since it presupposes genre as a stable class of films that can be subdivided according to evident 
distinctions. Here, however, we can see how appeals to subgenre or hybrid genres are useful 
critically and rhetorically because they allow the user to acknowledge inconsistencies and 
contradictions and to reconcile them without sacrificing the sense of a coherent genre as 
organizing principle. Similarly, generic evolution imagines those differences as functions of the 
change of artistic conventions and thematic concerns over time. 
 This acknowledgement of referential differences among presumably intuitive instances of 
zombie films could threaten the coherence of the genre without an explanation and/as a 
stabilizing factor. That might be appeal to acknowledged similarities and influences among 
artists (Koven 5).96 Or it might have to do with the dynamic tension inherent in genre 
conventions—as both “accepted standards” of representation and experimental “dramatic 
                                               
96 Mikel J. Koven proposes “filone,”—roughly, the patterns and directions of influence among filmmakers working 
in the same industry and traditions—as an alternative to “genre” for explaining the coherence and variability among 
Italian gialli (5-10). As with other textualist and auteurist conceptions, however, Koven’s concept does not properly 
foreground the social uses those films and their groupings are put to. While filone might be a useful concept for 
historical poetics, Koven’s configurations of textual attributes, auteurs, and production histories are just as 
contingent on his own interpretive and framing practices. See Koven Ch. 1. 
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method”—as they express a period’s structure of feeling (R. Williams 32-3).97 One user’s 
response along these lines is particularly interesting. 
By definition not a single modern day zombie movie has zombies in it. 
Zombies have their roots in voodoo mysticism. Traditionally zombies are mindless, but 
living, humans under the control of a witchdoctor who unquestioningly / 
unthinkingly perform the tasks given to them. 
Romero changed everything. Zombies became the undead risen from the grave or the 
recently slain who's only purpose was to eat the flesh of the living. Being bitten 
by a zombie didn't turn you into a zombie. Being dead turned you into a zombie. 
Modern zombie revival changed everything. Zombies became infectious pseudo-dead 
unrelenting monsters. 
Kirkman changed everything. The Walking Dead brought the "whatever the fuck you 
want it to be" back in to fiction. 
If you need to draw a distinction between zombies and the rage filled infected from 28 
Days Later then you are over thinking everything. Zombie movies are meant to show us 
what humanity is capable of when we actively ignore our brains and pursue our tasks 
mindlessly. They are meant to show us how fragile our grand civilization is as we ignore 
                                               
97 Though Raymond Williams’ description of and attitude toward “structure of feeling” as a concept changed 
throughout his career, his earliest articulation of the term in 1954’s “Film and the Dramatic Tradition,” according to 
John Higgins, represents Williams’ challenge to the economic determinism of orthodox Marxist literary criticism 
(38). The concept is meant to describe the total experience of a work of art—reflective of social consciousness of the 
period—in which the material life, social organization, and dominant ideas are all represented but in which none is 
necessarily determinant. (Higgins 38). 
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everything & eachother spiraling into the future on the back of progress. Hang on to your 
humanity for the (brain)dead already walk among us.  
The infected is just a hipster word for zombie. Deal with it. (user bolxrex, sic) 
User bolxrex is not the only commenter to highlight the change in zombie conventions over time, 
and even more allude to the zombie figure’s voodoo origins. But bolxrex’s post brings together 
several threads. First, it acknowledges the inconsistency of semantic and syntactic elements in 
the zombie meta-genre and attempts to explain them through appeal to a partially auteurist 
genealogy and generic evolution. Second, it unifies the body films through a proposition 
regarding the theme of loss of humanity. Third, it makes a direct, second-person address to an 
unspecified reader or group of readers: perhaps to the author of the OP, IAmShartacus, in 
particular but certainly with the awareness that it can be read by all the other Redditors. In its 
annoyed tone and dismissal of the “hipster” fashionability of the term “infected,” as well as in 
demonstrating familiarity with auteurs and genre history, the post constructs a rhetor who has an 
authoritative knowledge of the genre and locates it not in the trivial matter of monster mechanics 
but in the graver, more urgent themes those films address. In other words, while the other 
posters—so constructed—quibble over the surface accidents of various zombie films, xbolxrex 
has identified the deeper essential properties of the genre and their relevance for the world 
beyond the film.98 While some construct the genre around shared referential meanings (in 
Bordwell’s sense), others like xbolrex frame the genre in terms of the implicit meanings that 
                                               
98 For an academic treatment along these lines, see Kevin Boon’s “Ontological Anxiety Made Flesh,” which sets out 
to define the zombie in terms of consciousness. Boon does not take lack of consciousness as given, but attempts to 
trace similarities among zombie texts throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries and across literature and 
film. Rather than elide differences among diverse zombie texts, Boon instead posits a classificatory schema of seven 
zombie types. Boon’s zombie sine qua non is a disjunct between conscious identity and embodiment; zombies must 
“summon the ontological anxiety associated with the human survival instinct and the life/death, self/other binary” to 
be zombies proper (37). 
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require more attention and skill to construct, but which allow the viewer to accommodate 
stylistic and formal variations while preserving the sense of a unified genre. In this way xbolxrex 
reproduces the logic of conventional academic genre criticism while also framing that criticism 
for the present rhetorical situation.  
In contrast to the Boyle and Garland interview, there is a strongly dialogic dynamic to the 
genrefication of 28 Days Later in the r/AskReddit thread. The Redditors cannot assume the 
authority of filmmakers or a professional film critic. Those who are so interested have to work to 
establish their ethos and the legitimacy of their claims by demonstrating their erudition and 
subcultural capital as zombie fans even as they construct their arguments. By the nature of the 
forum, the respondents self-select, and none characterizes the zombie genre as a whole 
negatively. Indeed, many who deny that 28 Days Later is a zombie film do so after expressing 
their appreciation for both the film and genre. Whereas Boyle and Garland’s zombie meta-genre 
in 2003 was apparently based on decades of low-budget schlock and a recent blockbuster, the 
self-selecting Redditors eight years later have a larger body of more legitimate texts to draw 
from, including 28 Days Later and Romero’s return with Land of the Dead (2005), Diary of the 
Dead (2007), and Survival of the Dead (2009). Moreover, the zombie renaissance in popular 
culture precipitated a struggle for authenticity, in which viewers who already know and already 
appreciate the corpus of pre-renaissance zombie films can gain and exercise their subcultural 
capital by defining and policing the boundaries of the genre and subordinating those newcomer 
fans who only recently caught on via later mainstream, often “hybridized” texts.99 Hence, the 
                                               
99 Cf. Jancovich (“A Real Shocker”) 
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borders and value of the genre—and of contiguous genres—are constantly in flux insofar as there 
is occasion and stakes to argue about them among a user group. 
 
Conclusion 
 In pursuing the implications of a radically pragmatic genre theory, we have seen that we 
need to attend more closely to instances of genre use and try to reconstruct what principles make 
those uses meaningful and what purposes they serve. I have argued that Bordwell’s constructivist 
theory of interpretation provides a more granular account of the kinds of reading practices that 
constitute genre-as-process. Moreover, Jancovich’s Bourdieusian framework describes what 
kinds of social uses those interpretations might be put to. There appeared, however, to be a gap 
between strictly denotative constructivist arguments and connotative dimensions of genre-as-
distinction, between the abstract hypothetical viewer and the viewer as member of a social group. 
I have contributed meta-genre, a concept that bridges these dimensions of genre by informing a 
user’s interpretive and framing practices. A floating signifier, meta-genre doesn’t genrefy a 
specific film, but instead invokes the set of textual and extra-textual denotative and connotative 
attributes that a given user associates with a particular kind of film. Meta-genres carry these 
associations into rhetorical situations, but are always imprecise because two users’ experiences 
of a given kind of film—and thus its denotative and connotative attributes—vary historically, 
culturally, and subculturally. Meta-genre is thus distinct from genre—pragmatically defined as 
genrefication via rhetorical, performative speech acts—by virtue of the interpretive and 
rhetorical functions it serves in acts of genrefication. These functions, confused or conflated, 
have been traditionally ascribed to genre and have thus mistakenly granted all manner of social 
powers to variegated and protean constellations of texts and their attributes. As a result, every act 
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of genre criticism has to reinvent the wheel, so to speak, framing the denotative and connotative 
parameters of the meta-genre under discussion, but appealing to textual and intertextual 
characteristics as static and self-evident generic stabilizers.       
In the next chapter, we will explore how these framings are articulated in regularized 
social discourse—that is, in rhetorical genres like film reviews, journal articles, or online 
message boards, and how film genre is put into social action through its integration or uptake 
into rhetorical genres. I will discuss both the methodological benefits and theoretical 
complications of approaching film genre this way: first, because rhetorical genres are defined by 
the kinds of social actions and activities they serve, they are not tied to textual form but they are 
relatively stable because of their institutional uses they serve. As a result, genrefication can be 
studied as part of recurring social activities among specific kinds of user groups who employ 
specific kinds of rhetorical genres that meet the needs of that group. Hence, where film genres 
are identified with the speech-acts that articulate them and are thus in some sense singular, the 
rhetorical situations and genres those speech-acts participate in are regularized, and this 
regularity allows us to apply generalized research methods to localized problems in genre study. 
Second, as rhetorical genre studies shows us, the uptake of film genre into a rhetorical genre 
introduces complications regarding the parties involved, e.g., how the rhetor and audience 
construct one another as social subjects through their relative positions in the rhetorical situation. 
We have already touched on the rhetorical dimension of film genrefication in a couple of 
examples. In Chapter 4 I will lay out a set of basic concepts and methods imported from 
Rhetorical Genre Studies, and I will show how the rhetorical dimension of genrefication can add 
to the study of film genre in the age of digital streaming.           
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Chapter 4: Rhetorical Genre and Film Genre Uptake 
 
In this chapter I will turn to a methodology for studying the kinds of discourse that 
genrefy films and disseminate and transform meta-genres. First, I will introduce some key 
concepts from Rhetorical Genre Studies that help to orient and organize the genrefying texts and 
the social groups who use them. Next, I will briefly revisit some of the use cases from Chapters 2 
and 3 to show how some of these terms and concepts can enrich and complicate discussions of 
generic texts and user groups. Finally, I will devote a good deal of the chapter to discussing 
Netflix and the challenges that its digital recommendation system poses to conventional genre 
criticism and theory. I will show that a pragmatic film genre theory, coupled with a rhetorical 
understanding of genrefication can go a long way toward accounting for the relationship between 
Netflix’s algorithmically variable “microgenres” and the social dynamic between the streaming 
service and its customers. Before moving on to a methodology for and non-traditional 
applications of an approach to rhetorical genrefication, it may be helpful to recap its theoretical 
foundations. 
 Genres cannot be coherently defined through appeal to textual features or historical use. 
Instead, film genre ought to be understood as genrefication, or the social act of framing a 
concrete text relative to others such that a configuration of textual and extra-textual similarities 
appears to present itself. Genrefication involves the active reconfiguration and reconstitution of 
named meta-genres while accommodating, ignoring, or explaining away recalcitrant textual data 
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that do not fit received models.100 In this way, the mechanics of generic inclusion and exclusion 
are performative and adaptive. Which textual attributes belong to which received genre is guided 
by meta-genre, which I have defined as the totality of textual and extra-textual attributes plus the 
evaluative qualities that a given user associates with a particular genre label. Meta-generic labels 
circulate through paratexts and are shared among users, but their precise denotative and 
connotative substance is contingent upon the experiences of each historically and culturally 
situated user. The invocation of a meta-generic label will likely evoke some common but not 
identical associations. The more similar the experiences and values of the two users—likely as a 
result of social and cultural positioning—the more similar the evocations are likely to be. 
Without wading too deeply into semiotic terminology, we could say that the meta-generic 
representamen “horror film” would produce similar interpretants in the minds of two users who 
already had similar experiences of horror cinema so labelled. However, that correspondence is 
radically contingent upon the users’ respective experiences and not upon independent textual 
structures or some transcendent “horror-ness.” Hence, the sign encompasses a range of 
associations that bear varying degrees of similarity along different axes and that may or not be 
precise enough, depending on the use it is being put to.101  
I have also demonstrated that uses of genre and meta-genre are rhetorically situated, that 
they are grounded in social communicative acts. Indeed, genre is and can only be a social 
communicative act, a classifying statement about texts rather than a class of texts. Interpretive 
                                               
100 Appeals to subgenre, genre hybridity, and generic periodization and evolution are common strategies of 
accommodating perturbations without having to abandon a textualist conception of genre. For an earlier critique of 
generic hybridity, see Staiger.   
101 There is potential for a fuller systemazation of this approach under the rubric of Peircean semiotic and 
phenomenological models, and this represents another direction that this project can take.. Suffice it to say, this 
endeavor is beyond the scope of an already complex and heavily synthesized theoretical overhaul.  
133 
category schemata become genres when they are framed for someone else, and this grouping 
may make more or less sense to that someone else, depending on how the classification is 
justified or framed and to what degree the users share a mutual frame of reference. These 
communicative acts are also inherently rhetorical. They involve appealing to the experiences, 
preconceptions, biases, values, reason, and/or emotions of one’s audience such that 1) the 
classification makes sense and 2) the classification can be useful. This rhetorical dimension 
opens up the issue of what genre is for. That is, why would one classify texts, not in a general 
sense, but in particular instances? What does a genre do for the individuals and groups who use 
it? We have seen in earlier chapters how the uses genre is put to varies broadly, but that its use is 
nevertheless inextricable from the social and rhetorical purposes it serves. Therefore, rather than 
reflecting independent, empirical relations among texts that are revealed through neutral 
discourse, genres are actively constructed and expressed by users to other users as part of 
situated social activity. Hence, genre is a function of rhetorical conditions. But since social 
activities, rhetorical situations, and user groups are so varied, it would seem that genre study 
would be hopelessly particularized. How do we study genre and genre use?    
In the last chapter I suggested that Jancovich’s attention to “mediations” of film genre—
e.g. film reviews, letters to the editor—was on the right track insofar as he is looking to writing 
about texts rather than the texts themselves. Moreover, Jancovich recognizes that not only genre 
definition but cultural authority is at stake in these mediations.102  However, he lacks a 
systematic account of the structural relationships between film genre and those mediations as a 
                                               
102 Jancovich writes that “any review, or any other act of criticism, is in itself ‘an affirmation of its own legitimacy,’ 
a claim by a reviewer of his or her own entitlement to participate in the process by which cultural value is defined 
and distinguished, and thus to take part not only in a legitimate discourse about the film, but also in the production 
of its cultural value” (“Genre and the Audience” 37).  
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kind of writing, namely, how typified kinds of writing and the social groups that employ them 
are mutually constitutive. Already we have explored several such kinds of mediation: academic 
articles and books and popular press film reviews in Chapter 2, magazine interviews and internet 
message boards in Chapter 3. Rather than mediate genre or genre use, I have argued that these 
instances of writing effectively are genre. More precisely, they exemplify instances of 
genrefication, of the adaptive configuration of meta-generic attributes in correspondence with the 
experience of a concrete film text and framed rhetorically for some social group. Having 
established the theoretical principles of film genre and meta-genre in adaptive interpretation and 
framing, and having emphasized the inherently rhetorical and (therefore) social nature of 
framing, we turn now to the nature of those mediations and their own rhetorical genericity.  
This chapter moves us from theory to methodology, to a set of concepts and methods for 
studying film genre as rhetorical genrefication. But this move is recursive. That is, the rhetorical 
concepts and principles I introduce here will direct us to turn back to specific kinds of 
genrefication and to think about how the form and modality and of their expression directs us to 
the middle-level power dynamics inherent in their very rhetoricity. The introduction of rhetorical 
genre as a concept not only centers and orders paratexts as the foci of attention, it also requires 
we re-theorize those paratexts as loci of textual and sociological production and transformation.   
What do I mean by middle-level? No crude quantification can really describe the middle-
level here, since user groups vary widely and shift in size and composition, so the term should be 
understood relative to micro-level and macro-level approaches. Film genre has been studied at 
the macro-level for some time, as illustrated by ideological genre criticism. The broadly political 
and ideological significance attributed to genre texts and to (meta-)genres is framed in terms of 
top-down sociological systems and weltanschauungen that can conflate the contradictory and 
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competitive interests and practices of various institutional parties (Altman 72). 
Methodologically, smoothing over the various intra- and inter-institutional tensions and disjuncts 
requires eliding important textual and rhetorical differences among industrial and publicity 
paratexts and other non-filmic generic discourses. Such discourses are framed in terms of how 
they promote correct ideological readings among audiences, thereby complementing and 
reinforcing broader hegemonic cultural discourses. Concepts like “inter-textual relay” assume 
that the discourses unproblematically stand for themselves, based either on their content or the 
institutional milieux that generate them, and that genrefying discourses are stable and more or 
less unified. This macro-level approach is ultimately a study of social forces and how they are 
articulated through genre, which is relegated to a tool of ideology.  
By contrast, studying rhetorical genrefication at a micro-level might involve identifying 
the rhetorical conditions of an instance of genrefication and examining the functions it serves, as 
indeed we did in Chapters 2 and 3. This atomistic approach swings too far the other way, 
however. While it helps us to illustrate the nuances of rhetorical genrefication in principle, it 
lacks general applicability and a sense of the interconnections and conflicts among user groups 
as part of the social world. Methodologically, such a piecemeal approach would be ad hoc and 
tedious and probably not very useful beyond a localized study. Hence, we need a middle-level 
approach that will recognize and can account for the complex social relations among institutions 
and user groups as well as the instability of both filmic texts and their paratexts but with a 
flexible, generalizable methodology. 
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Rhetorical Genre Studies: Some Key Concepts 
I have mentioned Rhetorical Genre Studies (RGS) once or twice already, and I have 
hinted at the utility of RGS concepts for a pragmatic film genre theory. Before moving on, it is 
important to position my use of RGS for this project. The study of rhetorical genre is a rich, 
dynamic field with its own disciplinary conventions and concerns. Rhetorical Genre Studies and 
Theory developed out of applied linguistics, education, communication, and rhetoric and 
composition studies, and its objects of study are the genres of non-literary, non-fiction writing 
and other modes of communication understood as recurring social actions.103 Much recent RGS 
scholarship focuses on teaching writing, and many of its concepts and examples deal with 
pedagogical methods and ethics. However, as we shall see, many of those concepts are 
generalizable to genres of writing per se, and I have borrowed and adapted those that will best 
serve this project. I do not propose to represent the complexities of past or present disciplinary 
controversies or to provide a general overview of the field. Instead this chapter will introduce a 
few core concepts in order to argue that pragmatic genre theory should understand instances of 
genrefication as inherently rhetorical and situated within rhetorical genres and the user groups 
and purposes they serve.  
In a seminal article Carolyn Miller defines rhetorical genre as social action, or “a 
conventional category of discourse based in large-scale typification of a rhetorical action [that] 
acquires meaning from situation and from the social context in which that situation arose” (163). 
                                               
103 How one distinguishes between rhetorical genres and literary or artistic genres in general is a tricky question. For 
example, while the fiction film is an artistic genre and writing about films is typically rhetorical, what about 
documentaries about films? What about an aphoristic historiography,, like Usai’s Death of Cinema? I will expand on 
these questions and try to answer them in the Conclusion. For now, though, we will have to provisionally imagine 
filmic and rhetorical genres as clear and distinct. 
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While Miller’s insight about the social dimension of rhetorical genres remains influential, we 
shall see shortly that later scholars like Devitt and even Miller herself will push back against the 
preoccupation with lexical discourse as the only kind of relevant rhetorical activity and will 
question the kind of situational determinism Miller’s early definition implies. For now it is 
important to understand that while an instance of writing entails formal, historical, and 
intertextual dimensions, its genre is defined by the social groups and purposes it serves. Rigorous 
discernment among rhetorical genres is thus crucial, both as a matter of analytical precision and 
because the rhetorical situation varies according to the users and purposes of each genre, as do 
their corresponding power relations. Audience in any rhetorical situation is always to some 
degree a construct of the rhetorical process (Devitt 31). This rhetorical construction is reciprocal 
but not symmetrical; the interests of the rhetor, speaker or writer, and the ability of the audience 
to push back or construct itself vary broadly depending upon the situation.104 Already we have 
seen this in the use cases from Chapters 2 and 3, even where rhetoricity was not the main focus 
of the example. The authority of a studio executive or the ethos of a reviewer; the audience as 
employees, consumers, cinephiles, or fellow scholars; and the activities of writing, financing, 
producing, marketing, reviewing, discussing, awarding, analyzing, historicizing, or 
deconstructing a film are all rhetorical issues, and the extent to which they employ film genres—
directly or obliquely—is the extent to which they performatively reconstruct those film genres 
via rhetorical genre. 
It is important to note that in principle there is no reason to exclude non-lexical systems 
of communication from this methodology. Indeed, even within the study of film genre, image-
                                               
104 This power relation and its social implications mark this kind of rhetorical construction as different from the 
implied reader or ideal reader concept employed by literary critics. See Ong.  
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based communication like posters and trailers actively genrefy films as well. In some cases, 
imitation establishes a recognizable audio and/or visual code that evokes a particular genre 
without invoking it. Movie poster and trailer codes and conventions are so broadly recognizable 
as to enable satire and parody of the paratexts themselves, especially on social networks.105 
However, prior to the MPAA rating system and especially among the major studio releases, 
promotional material might be less unified and more polyvalent. As Altman points out, and as I 
shall discuss further below, those modalities of signification trade in polysemy; the lack of 
explicit invocation of a genre label is a rhetorical strategy, aimed at piquing the various interests 
of a wide audience. Further study of visual genrefying rhetoric in filmic paratexts is one direction 
inquiries in the area of rhetorical genrefication could go. For now, we will focus on lexical 
rhetorical genrefication since 1) this is an outline of a methodology toward a method for 
studying rhetorical genrefication, and linguistic genrefying practices serve as clearer examples; 
and 2) because while generic ambiguity may serve some institutional ends, the critical modes of 
argumentation we have seen in past chapters’ use cases require greater precision and, even in the 
case of audiovisual genres, still rely on speech and writing in delineating topic and audience.      
My use case for this chapter will focus on industrial discursive use of film genres by 
Netflix in its streaming algorithm. I will first recap some work by Schatz, Altman, and Gunning 
demonstrating: 1) the variety of genres inside and outside of industrial use, 2) the difference of 
genres between different time periods, and 3) the industrial regenrefication of films. These 
examples will help clarify how Netflix’s digital recommendation system (RS)—which 
                                               
105 There are a few genres of fan-manipulated trailers on YouTube in which users will recut and add new voiceover 
and music to film footage, reimagining Jaws (1975, dir. Spielberg) and The Shining as uplifting family movies, or 
Mrs. Doubtfire (1993, dir. Chris Columbus) and Mary Poppins (1964, dir. Robert Stevenson) as horror films. For an 
extended discussion of fake and fan trailers in terms of anticipation and hype, see K. A. Williams.     
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reconfigures106 textual elements to match curated “microgenres” to precise user tastes—engages 
in the same pragmatic regenrefication that has characterized industrial filmic genre use through 
its history, if now on a scale at once broader in terms of number of titles and more focused on 
individual consumers. The Netflix case will also demonstrate how rhetorical “uptake” functions 
in the digital realm, whereby classical film genres, along with other genrefied schemata, are 
taken up into the social act of recommendation qua rhetorical genre. Moreover, framing the 
Netflix RS rhetorically will underscore the asymmetrical construction of Netflix and its users, as 
well as how the other genres in its genre system (such as user agreements) and genre set (such as 
the Netflix Tech Blog) function to maintain and elide this asymmetry. 
 
Rhetorical Genres and Rhetorical Genre Theory 
Much RGS focuses on institutional settings as dynamic contexts and may incorporate 
ideological implications in its analyses. Examples of such genres include student papers, lab 
reports, business memos, grocery lists, or the State of the Union Address. Anis Bawarshi and 
Mary Jo Reiff broaden the definition from Miller’s to include “forms of cultural knowledge that 
conceptually frame and mediate how we understand and typically act within various situations” 
(4). A rhetorical approach, simply put, looks at how addresser and addressee relate to one 
another in a given concrete situation; how exigencies, purposes, forms of address, and other 
rhetorical genres shape the genre and situation; and how genre and situation shape one another. 
Hence, Devitt defines genre in less inert terms, as “a reciprocal dynamic within which 
                                               
106 N.B. Though “configuration” has a range technical definitions specific to computer science and programming, I 
use the term here exclusively in the broader sense of ordering or arrangement, especially with the connotation of 
impermanence and potential, even imminent reordering. 
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individuals’ actions construct and are constructed by recurring context of situation, context of 
culture, and context of genre” (Devitt 31). This description requires some unpacking  
First, one must understand the “reciprocal dynamic” between situation and genre. 
Traditionally, rhetorical genres have been defined by the pre-existing situation to which they 
respond. “Rhetorical situation” denotes  
a complex of persons, events, objects, and relations presenting an actual or potential 
exigence [....] Any exigence is an imperfection marked by urgency; it is a defect, an 
obstacle, something waiting to be done, a thing which is other than it should be [....] An 
exigence is rhetorical when it is capable of positive modification and when positive 
modification requires discourse or can be assisted by discourse. (Bitzer in Devitt 16-17 
emphasis original)  
Rhetorical situation here is defined by the problem, gap, or task—the exigence—that can be 
remedied or at least addressed discursively. Rhetorical genres are thus defined as typified forms 
of discourse that respond to repeated or ongoing situations and exigences. For example, the need 
to assess student learning over various periods of time calls for quizzes, writing assignments, 
projects, and/or term papers. Likewise, the need for production crews to keep raw footage 
organized for editors calls for camera reports. Hence instances of rhetorical genre are identified 
and understood in terms of the recurrent situations that call for them.   
 Devitt takes issue with this earlier approach to rhetorical genres that sees genre as a 
“unidirectional response to context of situation” (18). Such an approach constrains the dynamism 
and flexibility of rhetorical genres while privileging exigence and situation as prior to and 
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determinative of genre. Devitt—like Culler, Bal and Bryson, and, in a way, Tudor—recognizes 
that a context does not unproblematically define a text or a recurring textual form (19).107 
Instead, context must be continually reconstructed by readers and writers. Following from 
Miller’s insight, Devitt avers that genre and situation are reciprocal, and recurrence itself is an 
ongoing construction based on users’ perception: 
If genre is based on recurrence at all, it must be a recurrence perceived by the individuals 
who use genres. [....] A writer or reader recognizes recurrence because she or he 
recognizes an existing genre. But for existing genres to exist at all, people must have 
perceived similarities among disparate situations. Paradoxically, then, people recognize 
recurring situations because they know genres, yet genres exist only because people have 
acted as though situations have recurred. (Devitt 21) 
No two textual instances of a rhetorical genre are identical, and neither are the material 
conditions of any two rhetorical situations. Indeed, from the radical constructivist perspective 
discussed in Chapter 2, even the material conditions of an apparent situation are inaccessible in 
themselves, and have to be constructed based on perceived regularities of experience and 
assimilated into existing schemes, which are marked by and addressed via genres.108 Situations 
must be framed, in the sense I have been using, as if they are similar enough to be treated 
similarly for the user’s present purposes. Genre and situation each function as the other’s marker 
                                               
107“The very notion of context ‘surrounding’ genre gives it a separation from discourse and yet a physical 
materiality that reinforces a container model of meaning, with artificially separated text and context” (Devitt 19). 
108 Cf. Redfern section 3 
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and organizing principle—through genre users construct situation and through situation, genre 
(Devitt 25).  
How, in light of this rejection of conventional notions of the context of situation, does 
Devitt justify her definition of rhetorical genre as “a reciprocal dynamic within which 
individuals’ actions construct and are constructed by recurring context of situation, context of 
culture, and context of genre” (18)? The sticking point here is “context,” the problems of which 
were discussed at length in Chapter 1. For the sake of precision and consistency, I have thus far 
tried to avoid the term “context,” opting instead for the more implicitly dynamic and reflexive 
gerund “framing.” However, the differing semantics ought not to obscure the analogous thinking 
of Culler and Devitt. Devitt recognizes the connotations of independent objectivity—its 
“incipient positivism” (Culler xiv)—and both implicitly and explicitly rejects “context” in that 
sense.109 The contexts of situation, culture, and genres each have “both a material and 
constructed reality, for what makes them ‘contexts’ is the extent to which people give them 
significance” (Devitt 29). Hence, though she uses the common term, Devitt’s concept of context 
acknowledges and attempts to avoid the pitfalls identified by Culler and Bal and Bryson by 
keeping the framing activities of the user in play. With this subtle understanding of context in 
mind, let us move on to culture and genres. 
 
Context of Culture 
Devitt argues that rhetorical genres must be understood not only in terms of situational 
contexts, but in cultural and generic contexts as well. This former, macro-level perspective has 
                                               
109 See note 12. 
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been hitherto absent in scholarship on rhetorical genres, perhaps because it introduces so many 
contested variables. Devitt asserts the need for a broader understanding of the role of culture in 
genre use, but she also no doubt recognizes the risk of getting bogged down in defining 
“culture,” which Raymond Williams famously calls “one of the two or three most complicated 
words in the English language” (Keywords 87). Context of culture, Devitt suggests, encompasses 
the broad sense of “a shared set of material contexts and learned behaviors, values, beliefs, and 
templates,” while emphasizing that she is “arguing for culture as more than an interpretive 
context for genre but as an element in the dynamic construction of genre” (25). By including in 
her definition of rhetorical genre a consideration of how culture dynamically interacts with the 
micro-level mechanics of genre, Devitt believes that we can expand the scope of genre study and 
gain a fuller picture of how ideology and material conditions partially construct genres while 
being themselves reconstructed or reproduced by genre users (26-7).  
For our purposes, Jancovich’s and Sconce’s studies of fan magazines would serve as 
examples of Devitt’s articulation of genre and culture. While both scholars attend to film genre 
as a medium of social distinction, implicit in their arguments is Devitt’s principle of rhetorical 
and cultural reciprocity—how social groups and cultural values inform not just the language or 
classifications of films, but the “mediations” or, more precisely, the rhetorical genres through 
which those classifications are expressed. Publications like Fangoria and The Wall Street 
Journal and Critical Quarterly and their respective readers are mutually constitutive: who reads 
Critical Quarterly? Humanities scholars. What do humanities scholars do? Among other things, 
they read journals like Critical Quarterly. In the case of a niche publication like Fangoria, as 
Jancovich suggests, reading the magazine helps to constitute authentic rather than casual horror 
fandom, and thus serves as point of subcultural distinction within a user group. In both cases, the 
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publication and the readership construct one another in terms of the range of values, interests, 
and activities that distinguish humanities scholars or horror fans as a social group.  
 
User Groups 
Before moving on to “context of genre,” it is important to note that Devitt advances a 
precise model of such user groups. I touched on this issue in Chapter 2, but it merits some more 
detail because rhetorical genres and the groups who use them are intimately related. Devitt 
argues that to understand rhetorical genres in terms of their utility for social groups requires that 
we make careful distinctions among different kinds of user groups and their internal and external 
relations. While the idea of “discourse communities” had usefully specified the vague 
abstractions of “contexts” and grounded texts in the social world, it nevertheless reductively 
defines groups strictly according to discourse, excluding other kinds of activities, motives, and 
purposes. In so doing, the concept of discourse community mystifies the processes by which 
groups produce discourse as part of those broader social activities (36-9). Instead, Devitt 
proposes three divisions of user groups defined by the frequency and intensity of their members’ 
interaction and the rhetorical genres they share.  
1. Communities, for Devitt, consist of groups who work closely together, interact 
frequently, and share common goals and activities pursued through sets and systems of 
related genres. Often these communities are easily identified through nameable 
institutional membership—such as a university department—and regular use of 
institutional genres. (42-3)  
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2. Collectives are perhaps less formal but in any case less firmly established. Examples 
include members of a hobby club or students in a seminar who meet infrequently or for a 
short period, usually with a well-defined purpose and/or a narrow range of interests and 
activities furthered by a small number of genres. (44)  
3. Finally networks are defined by infrequent or irregular communication among loosely 
connected members who might never meet in person but participate in one genre. 
Devitt’s examples include wedding invitations and email jokes (44-6). Though she is 
writing before the advent of MySpace and Facebook, Devitt captures the sporadic and ad 
hoc nature of rhetorical relations among social network users via email. However, since 
the digital revolution of the mid-2000s, digital genres have appeared, vanished, and 
transformed rapidly with the frequent emergence of new platforms and shifting user 
demographics.110  
One can belong to multiple user groups simultaneously and at multiple levels. A film scholar 
might be a part of her departmental community, a monthly film club, and a film appreciation 
Facebook group, as well as university committees, volunteer organizations, a neighborhood 
watch, an editorial board, a national charity’s listserve, a frequent shopper program, a political 
party, a book club, a dog-walking group, and so forth. The goals, purposes, and activities of each 
group are different, as are the degrees and frequency and nature of participation that constitute 
both the individual members and the group as such. Moreover, as this list suggests, membership 
                                               
110 One interesting phenomenon is the aging of Facebook users. The largest growth has been among users 55 and 
older as teenagers and young adults have been leaving for social networks with markedly different but still modular 
platforms, like Twitter, Instagram, and Snapchat. The shifting user demographics and chaotic, protean melange of 
rhetorical genres make this a fertile area for rhetorical genre research. See Sweney.    
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in these groups collectively also indicates something about the individual’s personality, an 
implication that will be explored shortly in the subsequent discussion of Netflix and taste 
profiles. 
 Each of these groups use and is constituted by what Devitt terms genre sets and genre 
systems. Genre sets are the total number of genres used by a group, and genre systems are the 
collections of genres that function together toward a group’s purposes and activities.111 The 
nature of sets and systems depends on the nature of the group—as community, collective, or 
network. Clearly defined communities, such as those with named professional affiliations, are 
likely also to employ sophisticated genre repertoires, the set of sets and systems a group uses to 
advance its specialized goals and activities. A collective focused on one or only a few activities 
will have less of a discernable repertoire but will often act through a well-defined genre system, 
while a network is usually defined by one genre interacting with the broadest context of genres. 
(Devitt 56-8). Devitt’s example of the email-chain joke as defining a social network is 
complicated considerably by the advent of the modularity, multi-modality, and various temporal 
structures of social media after the digital revolution. Devitt does recognize in 2004 that, though 
the discourse “email” appears to be understood as a single genre, the situation and register can 
vary broadly, and thus groups distinguish themselves through different classifications of email, 
implicitly constructing distinct genres (45). Now, however, a single Facebook page can 
incorporate posts; comments; replies to comments; individual and group instant messaging; 
                                               
111 A familiar example might be that of a restaurant. A rhetorical genre system among restaurant employees might 
include reservation books, wait lists, menus, recited specials, server’s notepads, kitchen tickets, called orders, dessert 
upsells, printed checks, coupons, and comment cards. These genres would all contribute toward the activity of 
serving customers and would thus constitute a genre system. The genre set would include not only these genres but 
also W2s, W4s, labor and food cost spreadsheets, equipment receipts and manuals, opening/closing checklists, 
employee schedules, health inspection window displays, employee vaccination records, pay stubs, incident report 
forms, OSHA regulation charts, CPR posters, food/alcohol handling certification cards, and liquor permits—genres 
used by the user community of employees but not all toward the same activity. 
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embedded images, videos, audio players, and GIFs; polls; event invitations and notifications; and 
multimodal advertisements, not to mention hypertext links beyond that page to other web pages, 
social networks, and documents. Facebook users, then, as a network, must navigate a dozen 
broad genres as built into the platform even before discerning whether, say, an image is a 
personal photo, a Twitter screengrab, or a dank meme. While the medium has grown more 
sophisticated and the range of interactions among digital genres more complex, intense, and even 
chaotic, the principle that different social groups and the genres they employ mutually construct 
one another still holds, even if—or perhaps especially since—those collectives have become 
more intensely ephemeral and ad hoc.         
     
Context of Genres 
The pre-existence of other genres in a genre set or system exemplifies what Devitt refers 
to as the “context of genres,” or “the already existing textual classifications and forms already 
established and being established within a given culture, the set of typified rhetorical actions 
already constructed by participants in a society” (28). Users do not assess a situation and 
construct a genre ex nihilo. Instead, their appraisal of the rhetorical situation is contingent upon 
their recognition of the rhetorical genre and vice versa. Interactions within social groups and 
experience with the rhetorical genres that constitute and serve those groups functions as a kind of 
ground for recognizing and responding to new and ongoing situations.   
For example, discriminating between a film advertisement and a film review involves 
recognizing the situation and the purposes involved. While it is certainly true that film criticism 
is an industry, and it is true that film critics participate in and reinscribe certain kinds of taste 
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formations, film criticism is not on the whole a cog in a totalizing publicity apparatus. Film 
reviewers have their own ethos to protect and are not typically shy about bad reviews. Indeed 
opinions vary enough to make aggregation sites like MetaCritic and Rotten Tomatoes possible. 
As one might guess, the scores a critic gives has less to do with the studio than with the 
publication she or he writes for and the readership that constitutes their rhetorical audience. For 
example, negative reviews from conservative publications can help create an aura of subversive 
edginess for a film and energize a cult fanbase to see and celebrate the film in their own 
publications.    
All past and present genres constitute a broader context for the use of particular genres 
because these genres interact in important ways. Thomas Beebee notes, following Saussure, that 
“genre is a system of differences without positive terms” (256). But it is crucial to recognize the 
various axes of difference among genres, or how they are different and differing. One kind of 
relation among genres we have seen is as part of a set, system, or repertoire, which we might 
image synchronically in a sort of horizontal relationship with complementary genres. These 
genres are distinct but are employed alongside one another as parts of an activity system. Some 
genres, on the other hand, are formally and situationally distinct and also do not participate in the 
same activity system; instead, they serve as a constitutive outside to that system. For example, a 
university faculty member’s genre repertoire would include a variety of formally and 
situationally distinct rhetorical genres: syllabi, CFPs, grant proposals, committee meeting 
agendas, student evaluations, recommendation letters, etc. But all of these genres function as part 
of her or his identity as an academic and member of her or his department community and other 
intersecting groups. This person may also write grocery lists, Mother’s Day cards, and Ebay 
reviews, but none of these participates in the same activity system as those she or he uses in her 
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or his role as member of an academic community. Less obvious but perhaps more consequential 
cases might be genres like blogs, tweets, poetry, collections of interviews, or essayistic writing. 
The question of whether or not these genres belong to the sphere of scholarly activity in a given 
department can be significant when it is job search or tenure review committees making that 
distinction.  
A second relation would be temporal. Users build on their prior experiences of 
antecedent genres to construct new genres to meet new situations and cultural contexts. Devitt 
points to examples of writing students who draw upon familiar genres like personal narratives or 
plot summaries when asked to write critical analyses (28). In film studies courses, students might 
also draw on online written film reviews as an antecedent genre, which would be evident in 
informal and evaluative rather than formal and analytic diction and in shorter, screen-friendly 
paragraphs. YouTube film reviewers, in turn, may be drawing on written or televised film 
reviews, video essays or Powerpoint presentations.112  
It is worth noting that Devitt’s writer-oriented understanding of antecedent genres is 
different from how the term first appeared. Kathleen Jamieson coined the term in a 1975 article 
to show that situation alone does not determine the form of a rhetorical address, but that genres 
like papal encyclicals and the State of the Union address followed from imperial Roman decrees 
and the English King’s Speech from the throne, respectively. Modern rhetorical genres bear 
textual traces of the earlier genres from which they were adapted, genres which may not be the 
most situationally efficacious, and this genetic relationship constrains the rhetor’s formal options 
                                               
112 There is a range of formal approaches to amateur and professional film reviews on YouTube, most of which 
involve direct address by one or more hosts, and feature some balance between clips or animations and footage of 
the host(s). Among the more creative is Screen Junkies’ Honest Trailers, which parodies (takes up) a film trailer—
complete with voiceover à la Don LaFontaine—in a humorous if uncharitable satirical criticism of a particular film. 
See, for example, “Honest Trailers - Fight Club.”    
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(414). Devitt, on the other hand, contends that the writer understands the situation itself in terms 
of antecedent genres; since genre and situation construct one another reciprocally, antecedent 
genres provide a frame of reference for understanding and responding to new situations (28). 
From this perspective, antecedent genres do not constrain the rhetor, they make rhetorical 
response possible by constituting situation as such. 
The third and for our purposes the most important relation is called uptake. Uptake, as 
developed by Anne Freadman from J.L. Austin’s speech-act theory, describes the ways genres 
interact with each other when one is brought into meaningful social action. Uptake is how 
rhetorical genres articulate with the social world and the pre-existing genres through which 
social activities are carried out. In Freadman’s analogy, a tennis ball becomes a shot by virtue of 
being played between players, on a tennis court, within the context of the rules of tennis. A 
physical ball does not gain the meaning of a “shot” until it moves in a way that is determined to 
be significant by a complex of other recurring social concepts and practices, such as the rules of 
tennis, the concept of a game, etc. (“Anyone for Tennis?” 43-4).113 In another example, 
Freadman discusses criminal trials and describes the genre of sentencing as taking up the genre 
of verdict. Both are part of the genre of trial, but the sentence takes up the verdict—the 
performative act of declaring guilt—into the social action of juridical administration, which may 
entail legally enforced fines, community service, incarceration, or execution, relative to the laws 
and sentencing guidelines relevant to the current situation and verdict.     
                                               
113 Early on, Freadman had described this complex as “a ceremonial, a ritualized sequence in a formalized space and 
time, enacted by fit persons to effect a specified outcome” (“Uptake” 44). In a later essay, she adopts Lyotard’s 
notion of “jurisdictions” to describe the regulatory power of those complexes of relations and explores the social 
stakes of uptake as intergeneric translation across jurisdictional boundaries. See Freadman “Uptake.”  
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One kind of uptake relationship that will be relevant for our use case can be described in 
terms of as primary and secondary genres. The former are simpler utterances tied to their 
contexts, while the latter are more complex configurations of discourses, such as a novel 
(Bakhtin, as in Bawarshi and Reiff 83). Typically, secondary genres take up primary genres, such 
as a conversation in a novel, or a lullaby in a film. However, this leaves open the question of 
whether film genres are primary or secondary. Film genre is, as I have stressed, the act of 
configuring a particularly complex constellation of textual, inter-textual, and extra-textual 
attributes for an audience. While genre is invoked in rhetorically localized instances, the meta-
generic structures that guide and inform genrefication are constituted by much broader social 
actions.  
But isn’t there an inconsistency here? If film genre only exists in its expression, and that 
expression only exists in other rhetorical genres, then the rhetorical genres would appear not to 
take up but to create film genres. Technically, we might say that film genres are produced by the 
uptake of meta-genre into rhetorical genre when applied to a concrete film. Indeed, “novel” is 
itself a literary meta-genre, one which frames works of literature under various rhetorical 
conditions.114 In any case, we have to consider not only my theoretical model of genre-qua-
genrefication but also how genres are popularly understood and used by critics—what users 
think genres are when they use them. The presupposition of an independent existence of film 
genres is a powerful rhetorical tool insofar as it gives normative, genrefying criticism the 
appearance of objective description. More generally, precise demarcations are difficult here, 
since one of the goals of this project is to untangle the various interpretive and communicative 
                                               
114Consider my remarks from Chapter 2 on Beebee and Jameson and whether “bestseller” counts as a genre (n10). 
In the Conclusion I will discuss the extension of this model to literature and other arts, as well as how one 
distinguishes between artistic and rhetorical genres. 
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functions that have been attributed to genre. So exactly how and where and when meta-genre 
transforms into genre in a given instance can be difficult to generalize.     
Genre, from a theoretical perspective, cannot be understood apart from its networks of 
users and use. In critical practice, however, the uptake of a film genre into the rhetorical genre of 
“film review” or “journal article” arrests generic discursivity and treats genre as if it were a 
static, stable, and neutral class of texts. Typically, genre serves as a organizing principle, but its 
apparent, momentary stability is produced by the very performative discourse that relies on it for 
organizational clarity and argumentative authority. As we shall see later in the chapter, Netflix’s 
digital RS first reduces film genre to meta-tag before combining it with other attributes to 
generate micro-genres in the process of taking them up into the rhetorical genre of 
“recommendation.”     
 
Rhetorical Genre, Film Criticism, and Historiography 
With these concepts from RGS in mind, we can now return briefly to the our use cases 
from the previous chapters. Klein’s book, Lowenstein’s article, Edelstein’s review, Boyle and 
Garland’s interview, and the Reddit thread are all examples of writing within a rhetorical genre. I 
selected each of them to illustrate a specific point for the chapter each appears in, but they also 
could be analyzed on their own terms qua generic writing. However, none of these chapters is a 
proper case study. Each of these examples would require at least an article-length inquiry into 
their antecedents, audiences, purposes, and uptakes. Instead, I want to indicate some directions 
that inquiry into the rhetorical genre of an example might take and to show how we can get a 
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more concrete sense of film genrefication by incorporating consideration of the rhetorical genres 
through which that genrefication is expressed. 
For example, in comparing Lowenstein and Edelstein, I stressed the rhetorical 
dimensions of their arguments without specifying that these were characteristic of the genres in 
which they are writing. Their respective register, audience, and purpose are marked as distinct 
and hence their conceptions of “torture porn” as a filmic genre (or not) vary as well. In the case 
of Lowenstein, I showed how his weaker argument that the label “torture porn” is not useful for 
scholars explicitly invokes his audience as a user group, while his method of textual analysis—
itself an uptake—and his citation of film historians Tom Gunning and Mary Ann Doane more 
obliquely circumscribes the community of scholars whose repertoires might include close 
readings and silent film histories and the peer-reviewed articles that take them up.  
The major issue arises from Lowenstein’s uptake of Edelstein’s popular-press review into 
an academic argument. Edelstein has neither the space nor the reading audience that would allow 
him to form an argument like Lowenstein’s, with its lengthy textual analysis, semi-discrete 
subsections, and referential and discursive footnotes. Edelstein’s audience likely could not access 
the kind of paywall-blocked journals Lowenstein cites anyway. Most importantly, the roles of 
rhetor and audience are radically different in each case and this is a function of the rhetorical 
genres and the social purposes they serve. Lowenstein writes for an audience of “peers,” fellow 
scholars who might conceivably have been called upon to assess his research, analysis, 
reasoning, and conclusions, and whom Lowenstein is expected to try to persuade through 
conventional academic appeals to logos.  
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Edelstein, on the other hand, writes from the position of a film critic, who, like an art 
critic, is tasked with arbitrating aesthetic and moral taste for a general audience of non-
specialists. Even in a middlebrow publication aimed at an educated audience—or perhaps 
especially in such a publication—Edelstein is expected to position himself as a trusted authority 
on film and its cultural relevance. Yet the film review-cum-essay exceeds the conventional 
subject matter of the former, and, rather than rely on pathetic indignation and repulsion (like 
Siskel and Ebert do), Edelstein nods to essayists and academics. These intertextual uptakes may 
not be a part of his whole audience’s repertoire, but the generic markers of Clover’s book and 
Self’s essay carry a cultural weight that helps to shore up Edelstein’s ethos.   
In the final use case, we will explore the uptake of film genres into industrial rhetorical 
genres. We have already seen in past chapters’ examples of how industrial exigences shape 
generic frameworks. In the 1950s, distributors pitched regenrefication of back-catalogue gothic 
horror titles to exhibitors, using promotional materials to reframe Dracula or The Wolf Man as 
science fiction in order to capitalize on the sci-fi trend (Altman 78-9). The orientation of the 
industry toward genre has traditionally been much more pragmatic (in the non-technical sense) 
than either academic or fan discourses; distributors are more concerned with framing the product 
for the audience’s tastes than with establishing and enforcing strict, logical criteria of 
categorization (Gunning 55). Within a studio user community, filmic organizing principles 
reflected the exigences of film production, and were expressed through a repertoire of rhetorical 
genres that defined the executive community and the studio hierarchy: memos, reports, and 
weekly or bi-weekly “recapitulations” (Schatz 45).  
These rhetorical genres, internal to the studio, reveal an organizational strategy that 
unsurprisingly centered on production status and star. Since stars were highly-paid studio 
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employees in the classical era, they represented a financial as well as textual dimension of the 
production, and these practical concerns governed the standardized classification and framing of 
films among the various internal studio documents (Schatz 46). While Schatz uses these 
documents to get a “freezeframe” of classical and especially pre-sound studio organization for 
historical insights, for our purposes it is enough to note that a set of rhetorical genres circulating 
among and defining a select user group constituted and regularly took up its own system of 
filmic genres keyed to the purposes and activities of that user group. For MGM executives in the 
1920s, as expressed through internal rhetorical genres, “Lon Chaney,” “Norma Shearer,” and 
“Lillian Gish” were not only stars but (meta)genres of films unto themselves, complete with plot 
structure, emotional tone, and budget range (Schatz 40-1). The star-vehicle labels are themselves 
genres, not only because they order other intra- and intertextual relations, like Foucault’s author 
function, but because they are employed by a user group in social activities, and they are 
constituted via rhetorical genres. This is not to say that “Norma Shearer” was a genre for popular 
pre-sound audiences, or at least it likely wasn’t meaningful for those audiences in the same way 
it was for MGM producers, and it’s certainly not a genre for most 21st century audiences.   
There are two important points to take away here. First is the observation, relevant to 
genre theory, that industrial discourse is less precious about filmic genres, especially non-public 
discourse. Since planning, producing, distributing, and exhibiting films are, on the whole, rather 
higher-stakes enterprises than watching or writing about them, industrial framing needs to be 
more sensitive and responsive to localized and variable rhetorical conditions. The processes of 
production, distribution, and promotion present a number of recurring exigences that institute 
and iterate the rhetorical genres through which particular pragmatic framings are expressed. 
Though Schatz and Altman concentrate primarily on studio-era practices, this principle extends 
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to digital-era streaming services, as we shall see in the next section. The second point is the 
significance of recapitulations qua rhetorical genre. For Schatz, such documents serve as 
windows into the past and a corporate structure. From the twin perspectives of radical 
constructivism and rhetorical genre theory, documents like recapitulations are more than passive 
evidence. Historians construct the past through the adaptive schemas constituted by documents 
like memos. At the same time, a rhetorical methodology directs us to consider how the 
documents constructed the corporate structure itself; the production, circulation, and reception of 
documents like recapitulations performatively reconstitutes its executive user group in service of 
the activities and purposes that concern them. Recapitulations, understood as a genre, point 
further to sets, repertoires, registers, user groups, purposes, and activities. 
                       
Netflix and Film Genre Uptake 
In early 2014 an Atlantic article began circulating through the blogosphere and 
conventional news media platforms. A contributor had determined that Netflix, the premiere 
movie distributor and upstart television (and soon film) producer, had generated over 76,000 
genres of film and television shows. The number was far beyond any familiar brick-and-mortar 
video store classifications, and it challenged commenters to name anywhere near that many 
genres.   
As it turns out, the number refers to “alt-genres” or “microgenres,” specific combinations 
of elements from a variety of movies and shows that are designed to match the personalized 
tastes of Netflix subscribers. In this light the number now makes more sense, and it is still 
impressive, but it challenges us to consider exactly how Netflix defines those genres and what 
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the implications might be for film genre theory. Classical genre theory designations that focused 
on gangster pictures, musicals, or the woman’s film overlapped very little with the aisles in 
Blockbuster labelled “Drama,” “Family,” or “Special Interest,” or, for that matter, with industrial 
genres like “Lillian Gish” and “views of notable persons.”115 They share little consistent criteria 
for determining the labels in the first place; they just served as given categories. This isn’t an 
insurmountable practical problem, however. We recognize different rhetorical situations, and can 
interpret rhetorical framings accordingly. If nothing else, the numbers of actual and potential 
film genres and video-store classifications are at least manageable. 76,000 genres seems 
unworkable analytically and unlikely to catch on in public use. So who uses that many 
microgenres and under what conditions?  
 
Netflix’s Recommender System 
Founded in 1997 as a web-based movie rental service, Netflix began shipping DVDs to 
customers for a flat monthly subscription rate in 1999. By 2007, Netflix had begun video on-
demand (VOD) streaming of films and television shows as part of its service. (Netflix Media 
Center “Company Overview”). The benefits of instant access and platform mobility of VOD was 
counterbalanced by small number of videos available to stream relative to Netflix’s DVD 
catalog116. The company’s streaming library grew, however, and in 2000 Netflix introduced 
Cinematch, a collaborative filtering recommender system (RS) that was designed to suggest 
                                               
115 See Schatz pp. 40-1 and Gunning pp. 54-4. 
116 Though updated concrete numbers are hard to come by, in 2008 Clive Thompson of The New York Times 
reported a total library of 100,000 titles, compared to the 4078 film titles available for VOD, as estimated by the 
website InstantWatcher at the time of this writing. For a more thorough history and analysis of Netflix beyond its 
RSs, see McDonald. 
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content to viewers. Cinematch functioned by soliciting active feedback from users, asking them 
to rate the titles they had rented by number of stars (1-5). These numbers were combined with 
those of viewers with similar viewing histories to predict a given viewer’s rating of a 
recommended film. This system is comparable to the RSs of web retailers like Amazon, which 
suggest products to a user based on what “Customers Also Bought”—e.g., if customers A and B 
both bought product X, and customer A also bought product Y, then the collaborative filtering 
system will suggest product Y to customer B (Cohn 6). When this kind of consumer behavior is 
multiplied by hundreds of thousands or even millions of times, then the RS is capable of 
identifying patterns and predicting some customer preferences, which has made collaborative 
filtering the most popular and widely used technique among recommender systems (Ricci et al. 
12).117  
Dissatisfied with Cinematch’s accuracy, Netflix announced the Netflix Prize in 2006: $1 
million to be awarded to the team that improved the system’s accuracy by 10%.118 The winning 
team, BellKor’s Pragmatic Chaos, used a larger number of collaborative filtering algorithms to 
reach the modest improvement goal in 2009. In the meantime, however, Netflix had been 
developing a new RS (Cohn 121).119 Netflix VP of Product Todd Yellin and a team of engineers 
began work on a new RS that would complement the older Cinematch model (Madrigal “How 
                                               
117 For an overview of collaborative filtering specifically and recommender systems generally, see Ricci et al. 
118 To facilitate the research teams, Netflix released a large amount of user data that had been “anonymized.” Two 
researchers discovered that the data encryption was faulty, and Netflix had inadvertently, perhaps negligently, 
publicized private user data that included viewing material such as LGBT-related films or TV shows, which could 
be potentially compromising for users who were not out. See Cohn ch. 2; Hallinan and Striphas pp. 9-11; and 
Petruska and Vanderhoef.    
119 For a discussion of the Netflix Prize as a cultural phenomenon, see Hallinan and Striphas. For industrial 
perspectives on the Netflix prize, see Amatriain and Basilico “NR” and “RSI” pp. 388-90. For consideration of the 
Netflix Prize relative to the company’s Big Data practices and content production, see Bellanova and Gonález 
Fuster, esp. 238-241.   
159 
Netflix Reverse Engineered Hollywood.”). While Cinematch, as a collaborative filtering 
algorithm system, based its recommendations on comparing explicit viewer feedback, Netflix’s 
newer content-filtering algorithms would generate recommendations based on similarities 
between the titles themselves (Cohn 6). A technique called singular value decomposition (SVD), 
borrowed from linear algebra, allows an algorithm to track recurrent terms in a large set of 
data.120 Some Netflix Prize teams were working along these lines, focusing on stars, sequels and 
remakes, or qualitative data drawn from Wikipedia or other sources (Cohn 120-1; Hallinan and 
Striphas 7-9; Thompson).   
Yellin and his team sought to design a system that would take advantage of the data-
gathering capabilities of the growing streaming service and more precisely personalize title 
recommendations to Netflix’s subscribers. Where Cinematch could tell what DVD titles a 
customer had rented, there was no way of knowing how much of the film or show s/he had 
watched—or whether s/he had watched it at all— and so feedback was completely dependent on 
the optional rating system. In addition to users’ ratings, queues, and search queries, the streaming 
interface allowed Netflix to gather play data about what titles a particular user selected, 
previewed or screened partially, or watched all the way through and how many times 
(Amatriain and Basilico “Recommender Systems in Industry” 398).121 This growing pool of data 
was complemented by a turn toward content and a complex method of indexing textual elements 
of the titles.  
                                               
120 For a fuller but accessible description of how SVD works, see Hallinan and Striphas pp. 7-8. 
121 Henceforth, “RSI”. 
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In June of 2012, Netflix announced its new system via its Tech Blog, describing the 
technical side of the RS and explaining the advantages it had over Cinematch (Amatriain and 
Basilico “Netflix Recommendations: Beyond the 5 Stars”).122 With the newer personalization 
system, Netflix sought to match its massive demographic and behavioral data on its customers to 
a meticulous catalogue of textual data, thus developing a precise taste profile that relies more on 
customer viewing behavior than on customer ratings.123 In other words, Netflix aimed to be able 
to say exactly what textual elements appealed to a particular customer by cataloguing and cross-
referencing the titles s/he had watched and comparing their textual similarities. This involved 
coupling SVD with a rigorous process of tagging titles’ characteristics carried out by contracted 
screeners who are “responsible for watching and analyzing movies and TV series” and who 
“deconstruct the movies and shows and describe them using objective microtags” (“Brazilian 
Tagger”).   
In September of 2012, an LA Times piece profiled a tagger and provided a look at the 
human side. Netflix contracts out about forty taggers, typically with some background in film 
studies or production. A job posting on Netflix’s company page describes the tagging position 
and is worth quoting at length:  
Successful applicants will be responsible for watching and analyzing movies and TV 
series that will be streaming on Netflix in the future. The tagger will deconstruct the 
                                               
122 Henceforth, “NR”. 
123 This textual data can be broken down into two further categories. The first is the ostensibly objective metadata, 
such as “synopsis, genres, actors, directors, subtitles, parental rating, and user reviews.” The second is tag data, or 
the “human-provided annotations on each video that describe aspects such as mood (e.g. witty, dark, goofy), 
qualities (e.g. critically-acclaimed, visually-striking, classic), and storyline (e.g. marriage, time travel, talking 
animals)” (Amatriain and Basilico “RSI” 398). The theoretical implications of this distinction will be discussed 
shortly. 
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movies and shows and describe them using objective microtags. This "tagging process" is 
the first stage of the Netflix recommendation system and works in concert with advanced 
algorithms that generate highly personalized suggestions for every one of Netflix's nearly 
60 million members, offering them an individualized set of titles matching their tastes 
[….] The role will offer flexible hours working from home and would suit those with a 
passion for movies and TV series, as evidenced by a degree in film or film history and/or 
experience directing, screening writing or filmmaking. Applicants with analysis 
experience (e.g. as a critic or work in development) would also be well suited. (“Brazilian 
Tagger”)124 
We will return to some of the implications of this role shortly, so note the way this is framed: 
“objective microtags,” “highly personalized suggestions” and “individualized set of titles 
matching their tastes,” and the requirement to have a “degree in film or film history” or formal 
“analysis experience.” For now, I want to emphasize how Netflix 1) treats textual elements as 
independent, “objective” phenomena; 2) frames its relationship rhetorically, i.e. as appealing to 
(but not as constructing) its customers’ personal tastes; and 3) incorporates the traditional 
authority of institutional discourses via formal film studies or industrial experience.      
The taggers view titles and assess them qualitatively along set parameters, describing the 
film not only in terms of its genre or country of origin, but also its degree of gore or romance and 
                                               
124 The posting also mentions some duties specific to the Brazilian position: “Other responsibilities may also include 
acting as a Brazilian cultural consultant, highlighting cultural specificities and taste preferences” (ibid.) The extent 
to which international taggers are expected to speak for their cultures merits further study which is beyond the scope 
of this paper. Nevertheless, this posting does highlight the cultural and (therefore) ideological authority granted all 
taggers under the Netflix apparatus, a point I will attend to below. 
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with adjectives such as “quirky,” “dark,” or “cerebral” (Fritz). Figure 1 below shows a 
screenshot of Madrigal’s crowd-sourced microtag spreadsheet.125   
 
Figure 1 (Madrigal "Netflix-Matrix") 
A film school graduate himself, Yellin and his team composed the so-called Netflix Quantum 
Theory document, a 36-page manual that includes over 1,000 microtags (Fritz). As a result, the 
genre options range from “familiar high-level categories like ‘Comedies’ and ‘Dramas’ to highly 
tailored slices such as ‘Imaginative Time Travel Movies from the 1980s’” (Amatriain and 
Basilico “NR”). While this textual precision—along with the streaming interface—increased 
                                               
125 It should be noted that this image is only a partial representation. First, the screenshot cut off both the “Roles” 
column, which includes tags such as “Starring” or “Directed by,” as well as 122 of the 147 rows of the “Adjectives” 
column, which includes tags such as “Race Against Time,” “Sexual Awakening,” “Chilling,” and “Jazz Greats.”  
Second, Madrigal composed this spreadsheet as a shared document, in which Netflix users added new tags as they 
encountered them. Hence, neither my screengrab here nor the spreadsheet itself should be taken as an exhaustive list 
Netflix’s tags, but is meant to provide examples of the paradigmatic range of tags and the variations possible in their 
syntactic arrangement. For the full spreadsheet, see Madrigal “Netflix-Matrix”.   
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Netflix’s recommendation rate from 60% in 2008 (Thompson) to 75% in 2012 (Fritz),126 it has 
also reimagined of the notion of genre in a counterintuitive but not unprecedented way. 
 
Netflix and Filmic Genres 
By breaking films down to their “quanta” and then using an algorithm to manage them as 
metadata and tag data, Netflix has developed what they refer to as “microgenres,” those 
appellations that range in specificity from “Horror” to “Scary Cult Mad-Scientist Movies from 
the 1970s.” In the aforementioned Atlantic piece, journalist Alexis Madrigal, working with 
media scholar Ian Bogost, determined that Netflix had generated a possible 76,897 of these 
unique combinations of microtags, or microgenres. (“How Netflix”). The microtags are arranged 
according to a specific syntax:  
Region + Adjectives + Noun Genre + Based On... + Set In... + From the... + About... + For Age X to Y  
They are also trimmed to no more than four descriptors. Some microtags are scalar: all films are 
labelled “romantic” on a scale. Some are generated by the RS algorithm as a function of certain 
combinations: “feel-good” is triggered by a combination of microtags, most importantly “happy 
ending” (Madrigal “How Netflix”). The 1,000+ microtags and nearly 77,000 microgenres, when 
combined with constant data-gathering from the nearly 60 million Netflix users, add up to an 
immense feat of information management.  
                                               
126 The “recommendation rate” represents the ratio of movies viewed based on RS recommendations as opposed to 
those a viewer selects on her own. The higher number can be partially attributed to the user’s homepage, on which 
every visible title is a recommended and ranked title, even though the scrolling action gives the impression that one 
is browsing a neutral catalog (Amatriain and Basilico, “NR”). 
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Netflix’s streaming business model demands the flexibility to configure and reconfigure 
microtags according to a given user’s taste profile, which itself is also being reconfigured 
depending on what s/he chooses to watch (more about that in a moment). We might think of 
these these configurations of microtags as “systems” that appear and disappear against a 
background of “noise” —i.e., non-categories, non-systems that constitute categories and systems 
negatively and from without (Beebee 17).127 Consequently, we have to understand that neither 
the multi-term microgenres nor the texts themselves have any sense of integrity or permanence. 
This might be best illustrated by a negative example. In arguing that Netflix constructs rather 
than describes user’s tastes, E.E. Lawrence proposes the following hypothetical:  
Confirmation bias may well play an essential role here in shoring up the user’s sense that 
Netflix has successfully identified their actual preferences rather than made an argument 
inferring certain preferences. For example, if I watch and enjoy Dog Day Afternoon as a 
token of the altgenre “Visually-striking Crime Movies from the 1970s,” I am apt to 
assume that Netflix got it right: visually-striking ‘70s crime movies are in fact the kind of 
thing I enjoy for the reasons Netflix presented to me at the outset. Yet, regardless of how 
much I enjoyed the film, Netflix’s recommendation-argument still might not be sound 
because its diagnostic premise (i.e., that I watch certain movies because they share these 
specific features) could still be inaccurate. Which is to say, I might have actually enjoyed 
any number of different things about Dog Day Afternoon. Perhaps the rawness of the 
dialogue or the hopelessness of the protagonist’s downward spiral appealed to me most. It 
                                               
127 For a discussion noise and literary canonicity and the complications of irony, see Chambers. 
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is therefore conceivable that a recommendation can actually obscure my own latent 
aesthetic justification. (Lawrence 360) 
 
The two related problems here are that 1) Lawrence isolates their example from past viewing 
behavior, and 2) they assume altgenres/microgenres pre-exist the rhetorical moment of 
recommendation rather than being ad hoc configurations of textual attributes (tags). First, unless 
a user specifically searched for and watched only Dog Day Afternoon (1975, dir. Sidney Lumet), 
with no prior viewing activity, then the film was already a recommendation built on previous 
activity and ratings. Second, the film does not only belong to “Visually-striking Crime Movies 
from the 1970s,” but also each of those terms separately, as well as to “Award-Winning,” 
“Critically Acclaimed,” and “Starring Al Pacino,” among other microgeneric terms. It is as likely 
that Lawrence was been recommended the film because they enjoyed Dead Poets Society (1989, 
dir. Peter Weir; another Best Original Screenplay winner), The Big Lebowski (1998, dir. Joel 
Coen; also critically acclaimed), or The Devil’s Advocate (1997, dir. Taylor Hackford, also 
starring Al Pacino) as it is that they watched The Godfather (1972, dir. Francis Ford Coppola) or 
Chinatown (1974, dir. Roman Polanski) or The French Connection (1971, dir. William 
Friedkin). So, while Lawrence may be right that there is a confirmation bias at work in this case, 
they underestimate the granular degree of curation that Netflix’s RS affords by decomposing the 
text into its component attributes and reconfiguring it   
Netflix constantly reconfigures boundaries between microgenres and the noise of its total 
catalogue using microtags as axes. Any single film could belong to multiple microgenres, 
because its microtags are (infinitely?) reconfigurable. The film appears in only one microgenre at 
a time and at the moment of configuration, that is, at the moment that microgenre is taken up into 
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the genre of recommendation. For example, under “Details,” Heathers (1989, dir. Michael 
Lehmann) is listed with the following genres:  
Teen Movies 
Critically-Acclaimed Movies 
Comedies 
Dark Comedies  
 
For the sake of illustration we might also imagine that, in addition to being ‘From the 
1980s’ and ‘Starring Winona Ryder/Christian Slater,’ it is probably tagged by the following 
adjectives (Madrigal “Netflix-Matrix”): 
“High School” 
“Cynical” 
“Dark” 
“Irreverent” 
“Witty” 
“Violent” 
“Campy” 
“Satire” 
“With a strong female lead” 
“Suburban-Dysfunction” 
“Small Town” 
 
Any combination of these microtags—including the filmic genres—that obeyed the microgenre 
syntax would be taken up into the recommendation. The remaining films and microtags would 
temporarily be relationally constituted as noise. A visual example might help illustrate the point. 
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Above I have taken a well-known visual puzzle and added microtags to each small 
triangle. By staring at the triangle, one can see the mid-size configurations of smallest triangles 
that compose it. By looking at four of the smallest triangles in the proper configuration, one can 
make out a mid-sized triangle that also provides a four-term microgenre, such as suburban-
dysfunction cult comedy from the 80s or a critically-acclaimed witty satire starring Winona 
Ryder.  However, one has to concentrate on the present configuration and, as a result, the other 
triangle/tags recede into the background as noise. With a slight shift in focus, the first 
microgenre triangle disappears and a new configuration emerges.  
This illustration is of course inadequate to capture how all the possible microtags 
associated with a film interact with one another (e.g., a “cynical independent comedy” is not 
possible in this rough model), but it is intended to show how microgenres and microtags interact 
as systems and noise, respectively, and how they reconfigure in various ways to describe the 
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same text. Hence, Netflix’s RS reconfigures its microgenres by evacuating filmic genres of their 
discursivity and by dispersing textual attributes among microtags, thus treating filmic genres as 
primary genres and simple, given data instead of complex cultural and textual relationships, 
while always already positioning other texts and possible genres as excluded noise. This gives 
the RS the versatility not only to match a user and a text, but also a text to multiple users. For 
example, if Person A likes witty teen comedies like, say, Clueless (1995, dir. Amy Heckerling), 
Person B likes violent satires from the 1980s like Robocop (1987, dir. Paul Verhoeven), and 
Person C likes critically acclaimed cult movies starring Winona Ryder like Beetlejuice (1988, 
dir. Tim Burton), Netflix might recommend Heathers to all three of them. This is the essence of 
Netflix’s personalization RS, and while numerous media scholars have criticized the company, 
the significance of its RS for genre has not been fully explored. 
First and foremost, Netflix’s gathering and use of customer data has been criticized on 
ideological terms. Jonathan Alan Cohn, for instance, argues that Netflix, along with other RS-
driven web technologies participate in “culture industries of choice” that “produce standardized 
shopping choices and life decisions in the form of recommendations that generally uphold the 
status quo and steer mass culture toward greater conformity” (2). Cohn argues that, despite an 
apparent ideological neutrality, RSs in general frame choice as burdensome and conformity as 
freedom.128 Netflix’s and other web-based companies’ “digital technologies use guided choices 
to shape user behavior” and “actively preclude the formation of actual communities” (8). While 
indulging in the “rhetoric” of free choice, these companies employ technologies that prompt not 
blind consumption, but specific patterns of consumption, such that “algorithmically-determined 
                                               
128 Cf. the Recommender Systems Handbook: “RSs are primarily directed toward individuals who lack the sufficient 
personal experience or competence in order to evaluate the potentially overwhelming number of alternative items 
that a website, for example, may offer” (Ricci et al. 1).  
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recommendations […] replace free choice as the primary architect of contemporary subjectivity” 
(9).129 Blake Hallinan and Ted Striphas add that the discourse around the Netflix Prize points to 
an emerging new definition of culture itself. “Algorithmic culture” entails not only the question 
of “what happens when engineers—or their algorithms—become important arbiters of culture, 
much like art, film, and literary critics?” (Hallinan and Striphas 15). It furthermore points to the 
growing use of “computational processes to sort, classify, and hierarchize people, places, objects, 
and ideas, and also habits of thought, conduct, and expression that arise in relation to those 
processes” (Hallinan and Striphas 3). Rocco Bellanova and Gloria González Fuster have 
imagined digital data as “translations of people, things, behaviors, and relations into information 
that can be stored, computed, and visualized by computers” (231). These translations are a 
second step in a system of surveillance; after data is gathered and translated (a process that is not 
automatic or neutral, but which requires extensive but largely invisible labor), it is mobilized 
toward some end. The narrative content of Netflix’s original programming, specifically House of 
Cards (2013-present), normalizes the very kind of digital surveillance that Netflix itself employs 
(234-8).     
Cohn, Hallinan and Striphas, and Bellanova and González Fuster contribute important 
insights to our current issue, but they have their limits. For example, none of the three articles 
examines Netflix’s current RS and its tagging process. Cohn only addresses Cinematch, the 
collaborative filtering algorithm which was both opaque and based on a sort of mass 
popularity/mass conformity logic. Hence Cohn does not address the separate set of issues raised 
by the personalization of Netflix’s recommendations, which the company sees as a valuable 
                                               
129 Cohn’s broader interests lie in how culture industries of choice participate in neoliberal and postfeminist 
ideologies in general, as part of an interpellative, regulatory matrix of digital discourses. See Cohn, especially 
Introduction and Ch. 2.  
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feature not offered by popularity-based RSs (Amatriain and Basilico “RSI” 394). Netflix’s 
current personalization systems, which do also employ collaborative filtering, lean heavily on 
genre—and an idiosyncratic understanding of genre at that—as part of a content-filtering 
algorithm. While Hallinan and Striphas do look to the SVD systems that Netflix has ultimately 
adopted, they do not discuss Netflix’s tagging operations and the human activities involved in 
genrefication. For Bellanova and González Fuster, the quantitative intensification of the 
circulation of data amounts to a  
qualitative shift, precisely in asserting and strengthening its circularity [which, in turn] 
affects content design—users are surveilled to know what they might want, so it can be 
reproduced—and the purposes of such tailoring: users are to be given what they want, so 
they might continue to be under surveillance, to make sure what they want can be 
produced. (240)  
Neither pair of writers considers the possibility that industrial and cultural discourses are less 
appropriated by engineers, or obviated by computers, so much as they are intensified and 
disseminated in an unprecedented manner. While I will not address Netflix’s role as content 
producer here, I will note that the process of gathering audience data to shape production 
decisions is, in principle, not new. Producers have always pored over box office returns or test 
audience responses to gauge a film’s popularity and, importantly, they also speculated which 
were the particular attributes—such as star, setting, or structure—that appealed most to 
audiences and could be incorporated into future productions.130     
                                               
130 This is Altman’s “Producer’s Game,” as I discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. See Altman 39-42. 
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Limits of Pragmatic Genre Theory   
Netflix’s RS presents several challenges to Altman’s model of pragmatic genre theory. 
Note first, however, that the idea of shifting a film’s genre to suit a given situation is not what is 
new. Altman and Gunning have shown this in historical studies, and I have argued that rhetorical 
contingency is inherent in genre. Moreover, Netflix’s expansive digital catalogue, algorithmic 
sorting, and streaming interface do not per se represent a radical break from genre as we know it. 
Indeed, Yellin’s background in academic film studies and the company’s requirement that its 
taggers have film studies or production experience suggest that the site is not run by coders 
unfamiliar with the conventions and practices of film scholarship and criticism. At issue, rather, 
is how the nature of film genre changes via its uptake into the “digital recommendation” 
rhetorical genre. How and to what extent Netflix perpetuates conventional film industry practices 
is complicated considerably given the company’s roles as producer, distributor, and exhibitor of 
film and television content. Nevertheless, because its RS operates in a manner structurally 
analogous to earlier promotional models—that is, via rhetorical genres—how films are genrefied 
is different less in kind than in degree. However, the algorithmic complexity of translation of 
film genre to data and the reconfiguration of that data to suit addressable users requires some 
retooling of pragmatic genre approaches.   
 One reason that Altman’s theory is inadequate to explain Netflix’s RS and microgenres 
is that it takes up and responds to genre histories and theories that took classical Hollywood as its 
object of study. Altman’s model is based on observations of historical industrial discourses and 
the dynamic of imitation and genrefication as an industry- and culture-wide phenomenon. Prior 
to direct-to-video, and especially during the Code era, the studios’ productions and promotions 
aimed broadly, via mass media, hoping to capture a widest possible audience. Netflix, by 
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contrast, is a single entity with a one-on-one relationship with its consumers. Neither uses genre 
in the rigid way traditionally employed by critics, scholars, and fans, but the strategies for 
stabilizing genre by these different entities are distinct and operate according to the affordances 
of the rhetorical genres in their set.       
Altman notes that, traditionally, major studio film producers have had no interest in 
associating their products with a particular genre (57). The first reason for this is that the notion 
of genre suggests imitation and imitability; here, genre works contrary to product differentiation. 
A second reason is that promotion and exhibition technologies were such that virtually every 
film and every poster was for a general audience. Studios aimed to sell as many tickets as 
possible and worked to appeal to varying tastes and demographics; explicit invocation of a genre 
might alienate some potential viewers. Altman shows that classical-era film posters avoided 
direct reference to genre, instead exploiting the rhetorical genre’s multimodal multivocality to 
suggest or allude to multiple film genres simultaneously in one paratext. Instead of invoking one 
genre explicitly, posters would use imagery and copy that evoked multiple genres, thus targeting 
fans of many separate genres without alienating fans of others.131  
Netflix, by contrast, uses other attributes beyond received genres to triangulate or whittle 
down the relevant attributes for a given fan, translating genre to data. The first challenge to 
pragmatic genre theory, then, is that Netflix in a sense evacuates genres of their discursivity in 
order to reduce them to quanta. Recall that one of the variable paradigms in the microgenre 
syntax is simply “genre,”132 or, as Madrigal puts it, “Noun Genre” (“How Netflix”). Where 
                                               
131 See Altman 54-62. 
132See column B in “Netflix-Matrix” above. 
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classical genre theory may not be able to account for, say, “Family-Friendly Horror Movies”—a 
possible microgenre—the challenge for a discursive genre theory is that “Horror” here is treated 
as a given. Indeed, Netflix includes genre among the ostensibly self-evident or uncomplicated 
attributes that go into metadata, along with “actors, directors, subtitles, parental rating, and user 
reviews.” (Amatriain and Basilico “RSI” 398).  By reducing traditional genre terms to equal 
footing with the descriptors of a particular film, the microgenre structure elides the discursive 
complexity of the genre.  
Consider our running example of the horror film and the thicket of meanings and uses 
that have constituted it. We have already looked at torture porn, slashers, and zombie movies, but 
even the broader class is unstable. Its historical definitions are murky, and its early, eventually 
canonical films often weren’t considered “horror films” at the time (usually because the genre 
didn’t yet exist).133 The most systematic attempts to define the genre formally have proven 
controversial among scholars.134 Symptomatic readings have for decades framed the genre,135 its 
so-called subgenres (e.g. slasher or zombie films)136, certain periods,137 or style of aesthetic 
strategies138 in terms of progressive or reactionary cultural politics, gender performance, 
historical trauma, and so forth. Yet we lose even this limited range of scholarly definitions and 
its array of possible meanings in the Netflix system. The RS elides the discursivity and dialogic 
richness of the contested filmic genre “horror” when its textual attributes are 1) exteriorized in 
                                               
133 See Skal, ch. 1 and 2; and Worland, ch. 1 and 2. 
134 See Carroll’s Philosophy of Horror and “Horror and Humor” for the most notorious attempts to systematize the 
genre; for examples and discussion of objections to Carroll’s formulation, see Hills (“An Event-Based Definition of 
Art-Horror”), Schneider (“Toward an Aesthetics of Cinematic Horror”), Smuts, and Solomon.   
135 See Wood, e.g. 
136 See Clover and Dendle, e.g. 
137 See Brophy, Hantke, and Pinedo, e.g.  
138 See Lowenstein (“Living Dead”) and L. Williams, e.g. 
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the adjectival descriptions and 2) put on the same footing with the genre label itself. The 
microgenre paradigms prescribe content, tone, and meaning in a manner that evacuates the genre 
as a site of semiosis and dynamic, transtextual discursivity.  
The second, related challenge that microgenres pose to pragmatic genre theory is that 
Netflix presents genres as static and not in-process. Just as treating genres as quanta elides their 
discursive complexity, it also arrests their historical dynamism. Translation calcifies genre. 
Altman demonstrates that the endless variations on popular cycles are what generate textual 
similarities and new genres. This process occurs over time and as a result of conflicting 
institutional discourses. Consider the following illustration, adapted from Altman (67). 
1. [→]Drama (noun 1) (Industry Genre) 
2.  →Comic Drama (adj.1 + noun 1) (Proprietary Cycle) 
3.   →Comedy (noun 2) (Genre) 
4.    →Romantic Comedy (adj. 2  + noun 2) (Cycle…) 
5.     →Romance (noun 3) 
6.      →Musical Romance (adj. 3  + noun 3) 
7.       →Musical (noun 4) 
 
At each even-numbered step, an adjective indicates a producer’s proprietary variation on an 
industry genre, or a cycle. By the following odd-numbered step, the number of imitations—and 
the industrial and critical discourses surrounding those texts—have stripped the proprietary 
distinctions. The previous adjective has become substantized as a noun and genre in its own 
right. This is particularly evident in the terms “musical” and “western,” which retain their 
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adjectival form. This diagram is not meant to indicate that “drama” appeared ex nihilo, nor that 
other forms of comedy never developed. A much more elaborate chart would be needed to map a 
full history of genre-as-process. The point here is that a taken-for-granted genre like the musical 
was and continues to be enmeshed in a long-term discursive process, the traces of which are 
evident in the current and historical genre designations. 
The challenge here is that Netflix implements an adjective-noun form that is synchronic 
or, at least, parasynchronic—that is, an institutionally stabilized synchronicity. In a sense, this is 
an issue of scope. Altman accounts for the ways in which multivocal discourses employ genres at 
different points of time from different institutional positions toward different ends, and there is a 
sort of organic if not linear quality to the processes of genrefication and regenrefication. What he 
doesn’t account for, however, is the genrefying practices of one massive and influential 
corporate entity interested less in the success or failure of one particular film than in the 
continued patronage of its service. In other words, pragmatic genre theory will only take us so far 
in explaining how Netflix uses filmic genres to position itself in relation not to broad audiences 
or even audiences of genre fans, but to an individual viewer.  
Thus, the final challenge to filmic genre theory is how to account for the role that genre 
plays in the institutional relationship between Netflix as an exhibitor and an individual viewer as 
mediated by a content-based RS. Altman is concerned with the viewer and genre, and he spends 
a good deal of time developing a theory of mass media communication based on genre. Even in 
private settings, viewers imagine themselves as part of a “constellated community” of genre fans, 
those who enjoy the same forms of genre excess as themselves. The community is “constellated” 
in the sense that “like a group of stars their members cohere only through repeated acts of 
imagination” (161). This imagined community coheres through “lateral communication” among 
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fans. Some communication may be direct, but since genre is defined through its use, genre 
spectatorship is defined as lateral communication in the sense that fans commune with other 
imagined fans through the corpus of texts and kinds of texts that they enjoy (162). This is a 
problem for mass media, according to Altman, because once this lateral communication of genre 
fandom is acknowledged qua a form of communication, institutionally defined genre categories 
lose their discursive authority to constellate broad communities of fans because the “inadequacy 
of existing genres becomes apparent” (162). What Altman may not have seen coming is that the 
inadequacy of existing genres would sooner become apparent to a distributor.  
In some ways this is not surprising, since distributors and exhibitors have closer contact 
with the audiences to whom they try to sell the products. As Altman and Gunning have shown, 
distributors and exhibitors by necessity approach the marketing of films pragmatically (read: 
“rhetorically”). When they are dissatisfied with institutionally defined genres and genre-framing, 
Altman points out that fans sometimes generate their own specialized genres, such as “railroad 
films” (162-3), which are products of spectator regenrefication via constellated communities. I 
will have much more to say about the  methodological inadequacy of “constellated communities” 
as a concept shortly. For now, however, note that Altman can’t account for either the narrowing 
of genres or the narrowing of audiences by a single institution to the level of personalized 
microgenres. Moreover, there is a fundamental problem with Altman’s imaging of fan 
communities that I will explore in the next section. 
We have here partial accounts. Cohn describes the broader ideological context of RSs in 
general, but doesn’t account for the internal qualities of the recommended goods and how they 
participate the construction of subjectivity. Hallinan and Striphas describe the potential for 
unprecedented technological intervention to transform our notion of culture, but they don’t 
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consider the long trajectory of genrefication and how institutional practices extend into 
algorithmic culture. Altman provides historical precedent and theoretical groundwork for 
viewing filmic genres as discursive processes in which producers, distributors, exhibitors, 
marketers, reviewers, and spectators all participate from varying critical perspectives, but there is 
no consideration—in Altman or the other two works—of how spectators as individuals interact 
with a personalized interface via a radically modified notion of genre. What is needed is some 
account of the mechanics of film and viewer construction via the microgenre.  
 
Constellated Communities v. Rhetorical Genre User Groups 
Netflix doesn’t operate in the same way as traditional film distributors and exhibitors, 
even though their pragmatic approach to genre is not unprecedented, and I shall attend to this 
question in just a moment. First, though I want to point out a set of problems with Altman’s 
concepts of “lateral communication” and “constellated communities,” problems that a rhetorical 
approach to pragmatic genre theory could address to make the whole enterprise more 
theoretically sound and methodologically practicable. The critique has to do with the inadequacy 
of “constellated communities” to capture the often contentious relations among users such as 
described by Jancovich, for example. Altman’s model is really one of schematic interpretation as 
informed by meta-genre; it does not consider the complicated rhetorical and social relations 
among flesh-and-blood fans that the operations of genrefication entail. Indeed, this section might 
well have appeared in Chapter 3, but it requires the reader understand something of RGS and 
Altman’s constellated communities for my criticism to make sense.  
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Altman’s rather nebulous understanding of community is a critical shortcoming in his 
model. His conception borrows from Benedict Anderson’s suggestion that modern nations 
emerged as “imagined communities,” articulated, consolidated, and reproduced through mass 
media and standardized national languages.139 For Altman, enjoying a genre film entails 
imagining other absent genre fans enjoying that film and others like it. The communities are 
imagined during spectatorship and constellated in the sense of being repeatedly imagined. 
Already we have muddled functions. Without actually talking to someone else about the film, the 
viewer isn’t using genre anyway. Genre is genrefication of a film, to someone, for some purpose. 
I introduced meta-genre in Chapter 3 as a way of distinguishing the various functions attributed 
to film genre, and the private processes of interpretation, evaluation, and imagination are 
certainly guided by one’s personal understanding of a given meta-genre. However, genres are 
public, and a good thing, too, since as scholars we don’t have access to the content of an 
individual’s meta-genre without them telling us about it and probably genrefying some films 
along the way. That kind of interaction among fans or users more broadly is genre, and it occurs 
via the rhetorical genres that constitute the user group. So Altman’s understanding leaves 
communities speculative and genres arbitrarily defined according to one user’s sense of a meta-
genre. As a result, Altman’s definition has limited usefulness for scholars who may require a 
better defined user group—if not a precisely defined one—to study user interactions and bottom-
up genre use. Communities cannot be defined and studied concretely through genre fandom 
understood in this way, but user groups can be more carefully delineated according to the how 
they speak for and to and about themselves. 
                                               
139 See Anderson. 
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 How and by what means genre users and fans speak about themselves are crucial 
questions if genre is to be defined by use. However, this use cannot be examined as long as 
communities (in this common sense of the word) remain imaginary. To understand what a genre 
is and what it means for a given group at a given point in time we must have discursive evidence. 
What ties constellated communities together for Altman is “lateral communication,” or the 
imagined relations among multiple viewers of the same text (171). Altman associates frontal and 
lateral communication with what he calls primary and secondary discursivity, respectively. 
Primary discursivity relates the spectator to the film; secondary discursivity relates the spectator 
to other spectators (171). The discursive relations among spectators simultaneously support the 
continued existence of an imagined genre community while also reflecting the community’s 
concerns back onto the text, thus producing a “doubly authored” genre that depends “both on the 
encoding practices of an obvious sender and on the decoding recipes of a dispersed reception 
community” (172). Altman makes very clear that lateral communication is imagined, and that the 
dispersed reception community is constellated (171-2). 
But why is secondary discursivity lateral? Why can it not be conceived of as frontal in its 
own right? Altman’s answer is not wholly satisfactory. Writing in 1998, Altman observes that  
with the rise of recording and broadcasting, coherent face-to-face genre audiences have 
increasingly been replaced by disseminated ‘audiences’ [...] As a result, texts and genres 
have labored to provide substitutes for lost ‘presence,’ primarily by making genres and 
genre texts essential to communication among members of constellated communities. 
(194) 
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Altman is talking not about the mediation of a community by digital or analog communication 
platforms but the absence of community altogether except in imagined form. On one hand, this 
abstraction of audiences to ‘audiences’ is theoretically convenient; it obviates empirical study of 
genre fandom and justifies traditional methodologies, especially examination of industrial 
discourses and speculations about an ideal spectator. To be fair, Altman does occasionally nod to 
the Internet, but he could not have foreseen the rise social media and the intensification rather 
than decline of connectivity that it would bring about. On the other hand, however, we saw in 
Chapter 2 how analog media like fan magazines already provided opportunities for interaction 
among fans via rhetorical genres like letters to the editor.140 Similarly, Matt Hills has argued that 
Altman underplays the persistent face-to-face fan phenomena of fan conventions and genre film 
festivals, especially among horror and science fiction fans (87-90).141 So even 20th-century 
analog technologies and live, in-person events give lie to the idea that genre communities were 
wholly or even mostly imagined. Moreover, as we saw at the end of Chapter 3, the radical 
connectivity afforded by post-digital-revolution social media platforms allows for less formal, 
more spontaneous, and further-flung fan interactions. Face-to-face communication has not been 
wholly obviated by mass media technologies, and in none of the three cases is the community 
imaginary. The development of mediation has in fact intensified rather than diminished actual 
fan communities. This is not to deny lateral communication among fans altogether, only to 
suggest that secondary discursivity should also be thought of in more concrete terms. Perhaps a 
viewer imagines a community at the moment of viewing, but the more dynamic, productive, and 
significant group activities—not to mention the activities that produce and reproduce genres—
                                               
140 See Jancovich, “A Real Shocker” 
141 Like Jancovich, Hills theorizes these events under the Sarah Thornton’s Bourdieusian concept of subcultural 
capital, arguing that “co-present” participation in “flesh-and-blood genre community” events often enhances status 
and defines authentic fandom. See Hills “Attending Horror Film Festivals and Communities.”    
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are observable through frontal discourse among fans and the rhetorical genres through which 
institutional and spectatorial user groups are constituted.  
One consequence of focusing on constellated communities rather than rhetorically-
constituted user groups is an omission of the power dynamics at work among these groups. 
Because Altman’s notion of imaginary fan communities isolates an ideal spectator, we get a 
picture of harmonious imagined relations among fans. This appears to be a vestige of the 
“ideological v. ritual” theoretical framework Altman sought to transcend—that is, “whether 
genres are ideological constructs delivered from above or ritual experiences confected by 
audiences” (172).142 Altman resolves this dichotomy by appeal to lateral communication and the 
doubly-authored nature of genre texts: primary discursivity is ideological, secondary discursivity 
is ritual. Part of the ritual of genre viewing is reading the community’s concerns back into the 
film/genre. But fan communities are not monolithic, and Altman’s approach, though largely 
defined by use, neglects the logic of distinction at work in genre use among audiences and fans. 
Indeed, while Altman critiques Neale for conflating the interests and activities of different 
entities in the film industry, e.g. film promotion and film criticism, Altman himself elides 
divergent fan interests and activities by abstracting genre user groups under constellated 
communities. Indeed, Altman at one point qualifies the term “community” as misleading, not 
because individual flesh-and-blood users are socioculturally diverse and often compete with one 
another for cultural and subcultural capital, but because the genrefying practices of commercial 
interests are so carefully hidden. (169).  
                                               
142 It would not be unfair to frame this in terms of Marxist versus structuralist genre theory. For a brief overview of 
the opposing theoretical perspectives, see Altman 26-8. 
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Because Altman’s communities are imagined, his account misses exactly the internal 
conflicts among fan communities that Jancovich and Hills each observe, and which I illustrated 
with the Reddit use case in Chapter 3. Indeed, only communities imagined by individual fans or 
by scholars could be quite so harmonious as Altman’s description suggests. As we saw in 
Chapter 3, Jancovich, Hills, and Sconce find groups defined essentially by conflicts related in 
some way to a meta-genre. These conflicts can be both external, by which means groups define 
their genre in opposition to other genres or the “mainstream,” and they can also be internal: some 
generic fan communities—especially in the so-called geek areas of horror, SF, fantasy, comics, 
etc.—are famous for gatekeeping, boundary policing, and struggling over authenticity and 
subcultural capital.143 So while these groups often define themselves negatively relative to the 
taste politics advanced by institutional discourses—the “ideological” conflict—concrete 
evidence of group discourse also points to fragmentation, hierarchy, in-fighting, and struggle for 
status.144      
While secondary discursivity is a valuable insight, we should also consider that 
discursivity as rhetorical. The advantages of a rhetorical approach to this problem should now be 
clear. First is that a rhetorical approach recognizes that fans communicate with one another 
through recurring frontal textual means. This communication is inherently rhetorical and entails 
such concerns as rhetor, audience, register, and their reciprocal construction. These instances of 
generic fan discourse—e.g. letters to the editor, amateur film reviews, social media posts and 
comments—both reconstitute the filmic and rhetorical genres while also reconstituting the user 
                                               
143 This is certainly not limited to cinema fans cultures. Indeed, Thornton’s work that inaugurated the study of 
“subcultural capital” focuses on dance club and rave subcultures in the UK, and Keith Kahn-Harris has applied this 
paradigm to black metal and death metal fan groups. See Thornton and Kahn-Harris.    
144 For examples of internal and external distinctions among trash cinema fan groups, Sconce.  
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group, its tastes and values. Next, these groups may be defined with more precision as 
communities, collectives, or networks, depending upon the frequency and scope of their 
activities and interactions. They are also sites of contestation where taste politics and the struggle 
for subcultural capital play out. The relationships between fan groups and the institutions that 
create popular art are complex, as are the internal relationships among group members. The 
rhetorical genres that feature institutional and fan voices has the featured benefit of bringing 
together spectator and group, text and paratext, exigence and discourse, and positioning them in 
such a way as to re-connect issues of subcultural capital and authentic fandom to social and 
intersectional identity. None of these dimensions of genre as social action is available under the 
constellated communities model.   
 
Netflix and Rhetorical Genrefication 
Netflix’s uptake of meta-generic terms illustrates a number of points I have asserted 
about film genre in Chapter 1. Indeed, the complexity and precision of its rhetorical 
genrefication—as made possible by its RS—reveal and underscore textual and rhetorical 
processes that are inherent in the concept and functions of genre. First, the functional fungibility 
of received genres with other attributes reduces genre from the panacea of textual and ideological 
relations to an interpretive schema and to one among many axes along which a text may be 
framed. Second, the multi-term structure of microgenres makes the rhetorical contingency of 
genre a feature of the system. That is, where subgenre and hybrid genre imply the insufficiency 
of genre per se—even if they are situationally functional—microgenres point to the degrees of 
generic subdivision as functions of rhetorical precision. For example, ‘horror’ is adequate for 
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Blockbuster, ‘zombie films’ is (sometimes) adequate for a Subreddit,145 ‘dark zombie comedies 
from the 2000s’ is specific enough for the taste profile of an individual user. Third, Netflix’s 
explicit focus on personalization fundamentally ties rhetor and audience to the text and how it is 
framed under specific rhetorical conditions. I have expanded on these first two points above. 
Now I want to address some of the rhetorical implications and how the RS involves the 
construction of its users via its personalization. 
To understand the significance of Netflix’s use of microgenres for film genre theory and 
criticism, it is crucial to understand that Netflix’s relationship to its customers is fundamentally 
rhetorical, and furthermore that the company is fairly straightforward about it. The 
personalization system demands that Netflix understands and constructs its audience. Netflix’s 
publicity material freely admits that every action in the streaming interface gathers information: 
beyond explicit viewer feedback, those titles selected, watched partially, or watched all the way 
through go into building the taste profile.  
Amatriain and Basilico express the company’s concern with establishing and maintaining 
trust (ethos) with customers through recommendation awareness and explanations (“RSI” 391), 
and Yellin evinces a concern with audience and kairos (i.e. opportunity and timing) when he tells 
an interviewer 
Predicting something is 3.2 stars is kind of fun if you have an engineering sensibility, but 
it would be more useful to talk about dysfunctional families and viral plagues. We 
wanted to put in more language […] We wanted to highlight our personalization because 
                                               
145 Note in Ch.2 that even on thread I discuss, fans still divide up the genre along the lines of Romero vs. non-
Romero zombies or voodoo vs. viral zombies.  
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we pride ourselves on putting the right title in front of the right person at the right time. 
(Madrigal “How Netflix”)  
The language of personalization suggests a one-way dynamic whereby Netflix gets to know the 
viewer, whose identity remains autonomous and independent from the context of the interaction. 
Yet the relationship is in fact more complex.  
While Hallinan and Striphas, Cohn, and Bellanova and González Fuster, provide some of 
the broader insights on RSs and algorithmic culture, RGS provides concepts and methods to help 
sort out the reciprocal dynamic of RS interactions and in digital “curation” in general. Where 
social media, RSs, and other digital tools are often understood as helpful services that connect 
users with their preferred media, the relationship is less than neutral. Chuck Tryon suggests that 
“it would be more precise to argue that audiences are being organized into recognizable 
demographic and taste groups that can be reached more effectively through targeted advertising 
campaigns, a process that Intel futurist Brian David Johnson refers to as ‘addressability’” (126). 
Rather than organize products according to an individual user’s unique tastes, instead users and 
products are mutually reconfigured as groups with tastes as the organizing principle. This notion 
of addressability directly connects this kind of consumable digital media to rhetoric. Tryon’s 
point goes a long way in explaining how, even as the RS alters its recommendations, it is also 
constructing the viewer in a taste profile. Just as a reader may be asked to adopt a certain reading 
persona or position in an encounter with literature, or as a politician may constitute her audience 
as “reasonable people” or “true Americans,” so RSs craft the audiences they address.  
In light of these framings, we ought to study the Netflix personalized recommendation as 
a social action genre. “Recommendation” may be taken in a couple senses here, so I want to be 
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clear. What is to be studied here is not the content or direct object of the recommendation (i.e. 
the film that is being recommended). Rather, we ought to examine the act of recommending as a 
social practice, specifically as executed by Netflix’s RS algorithms in the context of an 
interaction with a subscriber via the digital streaming interface. This is not so counterintuitive if 
one considers RS’s antecedents. Film reviews take up recommendations, as do advertisements. 
More broadly, recommendations take a number of different forms for different kinds of user 
groups. Consider the following passage from the Introduction to the Recommender Systems 
Handbook. 
The development of RSs initiated from a rather simple observation: individuals often rely 
on recommendations provided by others in making routine, daily decisions. For example, 
it is common to rely on what one’s peers recommend when selecting a book to read; 
employers count on recommendation letters in their recruiting decisions; and when 
selecting a movie to watch, individuals tend to read and rely on the movie reviews a film 
critic has written, which appear in the newspaper they read. (Ricci et al. 2) 
Note how the authors position RSs as following not only from the recommendation as an 
antecedent, but also from a variety of other rhetorical genres that take it up and their attendant 
social relations: peer to peer, educator to potential employer, critic to consumer. Each 
communicates through different formal means. More importantly, each recommendation is 
predicated on a different kind of ethos, trust or authority. Peers share similar or similar enough 
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experiences and preferences, institutional recommenders have the gravitas of their degrees and 
titles, and film critics perform their authority.146    
As a rhetorical genre, the digital recommendation can be usefully mapped out in RGS’s 
analytic terms. The situation varies in its specifics from user to user and from time to time, but is 
more generally typified. The exigence is a customer’s desire to watch something enjoyable and 
Netflix’s need to gather information about a paying customer and keep her/him on subscription. 
As a social action related to film, Netflix’s digital recommendation’s antecedent genres might 
include publicity and marketing materials, film reviews, and other mass audience addresses, as 
well as communication among genre fans, such as the kind of genuinely personalized 
recommendations among people who know each other’s tastes. The variety of genres Netflix 
employs—among them filmic genres, blogs, user agreements, viewer taste profiles, microtags, 
tagging guideline documents, microgenres (not to mention the coding and algorithms)—all 
constitute Netflix’s genre set, which it shares with users under a variety of situations (Devitt 54-
5). Most important for our purposes, though, is the mechanism of uptake.  
Now, the question of when meta-genres become genres is somewhat tricky to generalize, 
but it involves the uptake of a meta-genre into a rhetorical genre for the purposes of genrefying a 
specific film or body of films. In the case of Netflix, a genre designation is included in the meta-
data for a given item (film or TV show) as an objective attribute. Genre is already taken up into 
an internal institutional genre. But, as with the industrial uses discussed above, such a 
                                               
146 For an example of critics performing ethos, see the discussion of Edelstein and Lowenstein in Ch. 2. Note too 
that there are certainly cases in which the prestige of the publication also adds to the critic’s authority. There are also 
cases of journalistic film critics like Mark Kermode and David Bianculli, whose academic bona fides add to their 
credibility: Kermode holds a PhD in English from the University of Manchester and is referred to by fans as “the 
Good Doctor,” and Bianculli is Associate Professor of TV and Film at Rowan University, as is noted in his recurring 
reviews for NPR’s Fresh Air.  
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genrefication is not necessarily suitable for every rhetorical situation. Indeed, the main advantage 
of an RS is being able to pivot from one set of relevant attributes to another in genrefying a film 
effectively for a given user. 
This functional contingency means that, from the point of view of rhetorical 
genrefication, microgenres are genres. Whether a given title is genrefied according to that 
designation is contingent upon the specific user being addressed. A film’s received genre, in 
being treated as an uncomplicated property of a text, can be foregrounded, omitted, or shuffled 
around to suit a particular recommendation situation. Specific, conventional meta-genre 
designations may or may not be taken up into a given rhetorical interaction with a user: the 
recommended films may not be cited as westerns, musicals, or science fiction films. However, 
this doesn’t mean that the films are not genrefied at all. Rather, they are genrefied according to 
some other configuration of quanta that more closely aligns with the user’s taste profile. Again, 
from the point of view of rhetorical genrefication, the microgenre is a genre because it is 
produced according to the same principles and serves the same function as other genres: viz. the 
framing of a filmic text under given rhetorical conditions. That this rhetorical framing of the text 
also entails framing the user raises questions about the ideological implications of Netflix’s 
genre-based recommendations.  
Both filmic genre theorists and rhetorical genre studies scholars would agree that genre is 
a social process with ideological implications, if not a structure unto itself. Indeed, Thomas 
Beebee notes that “what makes genre ideological is our practice of speaking of it as a ‘thing’ 
rather than as the expression of a relationship between user and text” (18). I would add at least 
one more user, i.e., genre is the expression of a relationship among no fewer than two users and a 
text. Nevertheless, Beebee’s point is that there is always a trace of a power whenever social 
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relationships are treated as fixed, uncomplicated objects. Though Netflix is certainly neither the 
first nor the only alone industrial entity to reify received genre(s)—even as it reduces their 
significance—its RS both mystifies the social processes that produce filmic genres and 
furthermore takes them up into its rhetorical construction of its users.   
Even at first blush, Netflix’s personalization relationship with its users is clearly 
unbalanced. Netflix builds a user’s taste profile by collecting data on her or him through basic 
profile information, ratings feedback, and viewing activity. Every interaction on a Netflix 
homepage collects data, since every title that appears is in fact a recommendation whose ranking 
correlates to its horizontal and vertical position on the screen (Amatriain and Basilico “NR”).147 
Control over discourse and the collection of information is a form of power that facilitates other 
forms of power.148 In every action Netflix collects information about the subscriber while 
releasing information about itself (as a largely faceless corporation) at its own discretion. 
Bellanova and Gonález Fuster point the self-perpetuating function of data collection and 
translation, and Cohn and others have alerted us to how damaging that information can be if 
leaked.149 However, the matter is not simply one of gathering data, but of constituting subjects. 
The reciprocal constitution inherent in the rhetorical situation is not an equal one. The 
composition of addressable subjects that Tryon points to is achieved through specific means. 
Cohn describes what we might call a data feed cycle, where what appear to be neutral options are 
in fact a small slice of available titles, carefully selected and positioned or the personalized 
account. When the user selects a ranked title, it reconfigures the options around the selected titles 
                                               
147 For a fuller description of personalization and the user interface, see Amatriain and Basilico “RSI” 391-7. 
148 See Foucault, especially History of Sexuality, Pt. 2, Ch. I, “The Incitement to Discourse.” 
149 See note 118. 
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to present a new set, all of which steer the user toward an addressable taste profile (Cohn 7-8).150 
In general the recommendation genre facilitates the construction of, on the one hand, a user 
identity constituted by steered “personalized” tastes and, on the other hand, a corporate persona 
that offers products tailored to putatively a priori consumer preferences. Furthermore, Netflix 
constructs its own identity through other components in its genre system, including its corporate 
blog posts, executive interviews, and other institutional discourses that address trust and 
transparency explicitly. Hence, Netflix’s power comes not only from the brute data it collects, 
but also from how it positions itself and its users rhetorically and how these positions are 
constituted by generic uptake.        
Beebee’s work on genre and ideology can inform a structural account of the constitution 
of both microgenres and taste profiles. Beebee proposes that, since post-positivist accounts can 
no longer appeal to material reality to expose ideology, it must be gleaned from how it positions 
the material in certain configurations (18). One way ideology exercises power is by constituting 
and positioning subjects within configurations as well, such that it appears different, non-
uniform, opaque (17). Recall Altman’s metaphor of constellated communities. Astronomical 
constellations come into existence as patterns or systems only through their repeated imagining 
qua configurations among the noise of other adjacent stars. Power operates both in the 
configuration of these systems—in which the tacit exclusion of noise is a fundamental process—
and also in the disavowal of its operations through appeal to objective reality. Such an appeal is 
                                               
150 There may be a variety of reasons beyond evident taste for the options presented. For instance, profit 
maximization incentivizes Netflix to steer users toward backlist titles that are cheaper to license than new releases 
(Cohn 117).  
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patently absurd in the case of constellations—no one believes constellations are independent-
existing phenomena—it is less obviously false in the case of genres, especially where textualism 
predominates. 
Netflix’s personalization RS exemplifies precisely this operation of power through its 
shifting configurations of textual systems and noise. Perhaps the more disturbing implication is 
that the user, reduced to a taste profile, is likewise reconfigured. The system operates not by 
tailoring recommendations to an independent subject, but by tailoring text and addressable 
viewer to each other. RGT provides us with the principle of reciprocal constitution in the context 
of the rhetorical situation, and the mechanism for constitution is the recommendation. Netflix 
uses microgenres as a discursive matrix between text and viewer in order to determine viewer 
taste, both in the sense of ascertaining and in the sense of prescribing. So while Netflix positions 
the viewer as utterly dependent on the RS to navigate its 100,000 titles, it also interpellates her 
into an ideological system wherein the range of possible actual tastes is circumscribed within a 
constantly shifting structure of microgenres and noise, manifest now and again in the moment of 
recommendation. 
 
Conclusion 
RGS presents us with a method for understanding and studying instances of rhetorical 
genrefication. Moreover, it provides a methodology for locating film genre itself in the 
paratextual discourse about films. In Chapter 2, saw that film genre use is rhetorical, that films 
are genrefied performatively and for an audience. In Chapter 3, we distinguished among the 
different functions attributed to film genres and saw that the connotative functions both of 
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genrefication and meta-genre are bound up in micro-level group dynamics and broader issues of 
cultural values and taste politics. In this chapter I have argued that RGS at once addresses 
practical methodological needs and adds further nuance to a theory of genre. While I am not 
quite comfortable saying there can be no genrefication outside of rhetorical uptake, I have a 
difficult time imagining what that might look like. For the purposes of comparative textual 
analysis, historiography, discourse analysis, or other conceivable scholarly work in film and 
media, a rhetorical genre approach can help avoid the naïve prescriptivist tendencies of 
textualism while keeping analyses socially grounded and reflexive.  
 In defining genre as rhetorical genrefication, I have repeatedly described genre use as use 
by someone, for someone else, and under specific and variable conditions. This set of 
qualifications introduced a danger of particularism, which threatened the generalizable utility of 
the model. By focusing on rhetorical genres, however, we are able to orient our analysis toward 
recurrent and typified social actions, defined not by their form, nor by the constitution of it user 
group in any crude demographic sense, but by the ongoing social uses, purposes, and activities 
that those rhetorical genres participate in. In this way, rhetorical genrefication decenters appeals 
both to the text and to a sort of positivist sociological identity. The genericity of the text is 
defined according to the social and rhetorical activities it is taken up into. The composition of 
user groups is determined not according to a priori social categories but relative to demonstrable 
participation in social activities and rhetorical genres. The principle of rhetorical genrefication 
and the mechanism of uptake thus undercuts the totalizing and logocentric tendencies of 
traditional genre theory while identifying situated but typified instances of pragmatic genre use 
as sites of generic reconstitution and social negotiation. 
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Conclusion: Lingering Questions and Future Directions 
In this final chapter I will concisely recap the entire model advanced in the preceding 
pages. I will discuss the practical implications of rhetorical genrefication for genre theory, genre 
criticism, and genre pedagogy. Finally, I will address the question of whether my model simply 
shifts the burden of theoretical foundation from filmic genres to rhetorical genres and how I 
justify that distinction in the first place. In confronting these issues I will be able to point toward 
some potential applications of this model for a philosophy of art in general and for film studies in 
particular. 
 
Recap: Rhetorical Genrefication 
 Genre is not a class but a classification, a performative social act of categorization that 
implies a particular configuration of textual and extra-textual attributes into systems of 
denotative and connotative meaning, into descriptions and judgments. Genres are adaptive in an 
epistemological sense; i.e., those systems can change to assimilate or accommodate the 
introduction of new data. Genres are also adaptable in a rhetorical sense; i.e., they allow users to 
frame a film or body of films differently to suit a rhetorical need. Understanding genres-as-use 
breaks out of the textualist/realist mode of thinking by directing us to study discourse about films 
rather than the films themselves. But it also implies a radically ad hoc definition of genre, such 
that 1) genres only exist as instances of performative communication about film, leaving open 
the question of how genres help users group and interpret films; and 2) genres may seem so 
particularized as to make generalization impossible.  
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My responses to these two issues involved:  
1) Positing “meta-genre” as the sum total of textual and extra-textual attributes and 
connotations a given user associates with a generic label. When applied to a concrete 
film, the interpretive function of genre is understood as a cognitive schema, informed by 
meta-genre but not yet framed socially as a genre. The polysemic nature of generic labels 
make them versatile but in themselves undecidable. In a given exchange among users 
genre labels can serve denotative or connotative functions or both, depending on how 
receptive each party is. This receptivity to a particular generic label—its meaningfulness 
in one or another sense—is in turn contingent upon the users’ social, cultural, and 
historical positioning. Thus the criteria, boundaries, and axiological valences of a given 
meta-genre is a matter of intersubjective negotiation, radically contingent upon the degree 
of shared experiences, values, and knowledges—the frames of reference, in other 
words—of the participating users. 
2) Locating genre and meta-genre use not within singular rhetorical situations, but 
within recurrent rhetorical genres. Often these are types of commercial paratexts like 
reviews or advertisements, but they also include kinds of scholarly and fan discourse like 
books, articles, letters to the editor, or social media posts. Though instances of discourse 
are in principle non-identical and infinite, recurring social needs call for recurring forms 
of discourse, adaptable to the particularities of a given exigence but general enough to 
frame a recurring situation as such.    
The turn to rhetorical genre solves a methodological problem of how to study genre as use, but it 
also implies more directly the social and ideological functions of film genres that textualist 
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scholars had searched for in and among the films themselves. The nature of rhetorical genres is 
such that they entail user groups of different sizes and compositions engaged in different kinds of 
social activities as facilitated and partly constituted by systems of other rhetorical genres. 
Moreover, the synthesis of pragmatic genre theory and its implications with the principles of 
rhetorical genre studies suggests that film genres are radically contingent upon rhetorical uptake.  
The conflation of interpretive schemata, meta-generic labels, and concrete instances of 
genrefication has given genre a kind of mystical utility, helpful and convenient but inexplicable 
and ultimately untenable. One goal of this project has been to distinguish among these three 
functions, but doing so has left us with a gap where generic ontology ought to be. Even 
describing genres as relations among texts still begs a number of ultimately vexing questions. 
However, recognizing genre’s social functions demystifies it. Genre ought to identified with its 
role in mediating relations among multiple users and one or more texts. Genre is a mode of 
engagement with and communication among mediated and immediate social actors, not an 
independent structure unto itself. It is a matrix of performative interpretation, judgment, and 
social distinction and not a guarantor of them. Genre, then, ought to be considered as rhetorical 
genrefication, as a function of the rhetorical conditions under which a given film is discussed, by 
given set of users for a given rhetorical purpose.            
 
Genre Theory, Criticism, and Pedagogy 
 This rhetorical understanding of film genre can be seen as a logical extension of the 
pragmatic principles of genre and genrefication as laid out by Altman. Regardless of the 
intentions or training of critics and scholars, there is no special case of genre use that is not 
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performative, that is not rhetorical. This has profound practical implications for genre theory, 
criticism, and pedagogy. First, genre theory should redirect its inquiry, from focus on films to 
discourse about films as the primary object of analysis. If we want to understand how and why 
genres develop and what uses they serve, it does no good to anchor ourselves to our own textual 
analysis of the film in the hopes of revealing its true deep structure. Genre is inherently public 
and shared among users, otherwise it would simply be a schema. Even if we were able to 
uncover some hidden absolute truth about a text or corpus that its producers and reviewers and 
fans never knew, this revelation would be ipso facto irrelevant to the study of its genre. In this 
way, critical analysis and close reading strategies alone actually take us farther away from 
understanding genre. Instead, we ought to aim for a sympathetic analysis of genrefying 
discourse, bringing our acumen to bear not only on the text but also and primarily on those 
paratexts that genrefy it and trying to reconstruct the values, priorities, and moves that led the 
author to the interpretation and judgment s/he has articulated.151 This does not commit us to 
agree with the author’s conclusions, but proving her/him wrong is not particularly useful in 
coming to understand the various perspectives on a film’s genre as part of its social history. 
 While the details of a clear method would have to be worked out in application to 
concrete case studies, I can tentatively suggest what that method might look like. Sympathetic 
analysis is just the first of three steps or degrees. First, sympathetic textual/paratextual analysis—
of, say, an academic article on film genre or a film review—would investigate how the author 
interprets the film, as well as the presuppositions and values that configure the genre and 
structure the secondary text. The point is not to classify the film but to understand how and by 
                                               
151 “When we try to understand a text [...] we try to transpose ourselves into the perspective within which [the 
author] has formed his views. But this simply means that we try to understand how what he is saying could be right” 
(Gadamer 292). 
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what reasoning the genre user classifies it without pronouncing her/his classifications correct or 
not. Next, rhetorical analysis would reconstruct the audience, appeals, and purposes suggested by 
the writing’s provenance and by how the film and/or film genre was framed. Not all 
classification is based on sober comparison of textual family resemblances; what evaluative 
appeals does the author make, and how do these reveal/ construct an audience of like-minded 
users? Finally, rhetorical genre analysis would explore what ongoing social exigences were met 
by this kind of writing, which overlapping groups were involved and what their nature was, and 
what other rhetorical genres constituted the genre sets or systems involved in the groups’ related 
activities. This tiered analytical method can be applied to genrefying discourses of any sort, and 
the full century of film criticism and genrefying writing potentially provides monumental 
insights into how film genre constituted and structured the social interaction of various groups 
throughout that time. 
 Genre criticism and pedagogy are somewhat different matters. In its capacity as an 
interpretive schema and rhetorical frame, genre is absolutely inescapable and indispensable. On 
one hand, our own associations predispose us to classification of this generic sort, as does the 
need to be able to talk about more than one film at a time and to make comparisons and 
distinctions among them. On the other hand, regardless of one’s intentions, simply citing a film’s 
director is a kind of genrefication. That is, “Sergei Eisenstein” or “Maya Deren” or “Michael 
Bay” can generate associations with other films, periods, movements, nations, cultures, personal 
styles, moral judgments, influences, biographies, and so forth that might frame that film for the 
rhetorical audience, whether that audience is composed of scholars, students, or moviegoers. 
This is really a matter of the capacity of any filmic descriptor to function as a sign, and the scope 
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of its referents is limited in principle only by the past experience and cognitive activity of the 
audience.  
While I do not believe we can control this kind of semiosis, we ought at least to 
acknowledge and take responsibility for our own performative, genrefying discourse as such, 
whether in critical scholarship or teaching. We ought to recognize that we, too, are genre users 
and that our own use is rhetorical. Primarily this ought to involve a distancing from positive 
claims about a film’s genre. A more reflexive way of teaching film genre would involve stepping 
back from making one’s own textualist claims while acknowledging the textualist claims of 
scholars, critics, and advertisers as historically, socially, and rhetorically situated.  
Similarly, genre criticism ought to make explicit the implied step in its enthymeme, 
namely, that for X, Y, and Z reasons, the author agrees with or disagrees with the conventional 
genrefication of a particular film because it is useful or not useful to a particular critical project. I 
hope that the preceding chapters have illustrated just why it makes no sense to say that one can 
prove or disprove a film’s purported genre, or that a widely-used genre can be shown not really 
to exist. I have aimed to problematize genre as an independent phenomenon and uncomplicated 
premise for critical arguments. Yes, genres do function as premises, but for the sake of 
intellectual rigor and honesty we ought to mark them out as provisional premises, as rhetorically 
stabilized for the moment, with due acknowledgement to their deferred foundations and 
performative use.152 Some might argue that this approach overly complicates matters, that 
discussion of generic rhetoricity undercuts and distracts from the critical activity at hand. I would 
reply that critical arguments that rely on genre as a foundational premise are and were always 
                                               
152 See Schreyer. 
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already undertheorized and weak to exactly the degree that they take genre for granted as stable 
and uncomplicated. In any case, genre criticism can and indeed must continue to use genre as an 
ad hoc device for textual exploration, but it ought to acknowledge it as such and should adopt 
reflexive qualifications regarding the kinds of claims it makes and for whom it makes them.          
    
Rhetorical vs. Artistic Genres 
The shrewd reader will no doubt have noticed that my model turns on an opposition 
between filmic and rhetorical genres, focusing on the latter as sites of temporary stabilization and 
destabilization, configuration and reconfiguration, framing and reframing, and affirmation and 
contestation of the former. This might have given the impression that I in some way am relying 
on the stability of rhetorical genres to guarantee the functioning of filmic genres, and I promised 
to address that concern in this conclusion. More radically, one might ask how I justify the 
distinction between the two as clearly discrete categories. Certainly there are clear differences in 
mode and modality between narrative, fiction, commercial feature films and written paratexts, 
but what about video essays or documentaries about film? This issue of rhetorical and filmic 
genre distinction requires some discussion, both because it is an important theoretical “i” to dot, 
and also, more practically, because it isn’t difficult to imagine cases like documentaries or 
biopics that appear to have both artistic and rhetorical attributes. In anticipation of readers 
‘turning the theory back on itself,’ I want to devote some pages to addressing the problem, and in 
doing so I will point to this model’s broader applicability to questions in literary theory and the 
philosophy of art. 
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Theoretically, I have staked out an anti-foundationalist position against film genre, and I 
argued that its lack of stability jeopardizes critical projects that rely on genre itself as a 
foundation. But in proposing that textualist theories of genre mystify rhetorical genrefication as a 
social practice am I just deferring foundation to rhetorical genres? I would argue no, for two 
reasons. First, and most simply, rhetorical genres, as described in detail in Chapter 4, are always 
already understood as shifting, multiform, and relationally defined. Rhetorical genres constitute a 
matrix of social activity, and textual forms, situations, and user groups all dynamically shape one 
another. Subjects, texts, and institutions are all in play, but none is ultimately determinate. 
Rhetorical genres can be “stabilized for now” or “stabilized enough,” for a user group—
community, collective, or network—to pursue its activities and respond to changing exigences 
and situations (Schreyer 208). This is especially likely when those genres are situated relative to 
others in an institutionally defined genre set. But, like the adaptive function of filmic genres 
described in Chapter 2, rhetorical genres can define situations and users only to the extent that 
they can be assimilated into an existing generic scheme, beyond which point the generic forms 
must themselves be adapted to accommodate the emergent situation. Hence, rhetorical genres 
adapt—rather, are adapted by users—not to changing situations but to changing situational 
frames.  
The second reason I reject the idea that this model assumes rhetorical genres as a 
foundation has to do with its generally reflexive and non-totalizing approach. Neither filmic nor 
rhetorical genres exist independently of the users who employ them. There is no special use case 
or critical Archimedean point in or from which subjects can neutrally describe or appeal to genre. 
Genre use is performative and adaptive, so that not only is genre actually an affirmation or 
contestation or transformation of genre, but its mechanism involves the dynamic assimilation and 
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accommodation of data and schemata, respectively. The relation of text to attributes is 
isomorphic with the relation of genre to texts, and users reconfigure textual and extra-textual 
attributes into systems and noise such that an apparent textual or generic totality emerges long 
enough to operate toward some rhetorical end. But there is no stable system or boundary, only a 
temporary arrangement whose organizing principle is contingent upon variable rhetorical 
conditions. 
I would suggest that this principle of adaptive configuration extends beyond filmic or 
artistic genres generally and to rhetorical genres as well, such that the distinction between them 
is always tentative and likewise contingent upon the interpretive and rhetorical circumstances of 
their employment. Altman’s pragmatic genre theory implies a radically contingent text as one 
implication of its deconstructive sensibility and critical moves. That is, it tracks the 
reconfiguration of textual elements and the reconstitution of genres, but it leaves lacunae where 
there might be the stable, unified textual whole. Instead, the appearance of the text is a function 
of the momentary (rhetorical) stabilization of variable configurations and reading strategies. In 
other words, not only is “western” or “film noir” a function of the rhetorical conditions of its 
invocation, so is the attribution of a text as such to an artistic or rhetorical genre. Attribution of 
this sort may often seem uncomplicated and self-evident, but there are less obvious cases that I 
shall discuss in a moment, and anyway, there seems to be no other way of defining artistic and 
rhetorical genres oppositionally without recourse to textualism. This is a non-totalizing way of 
accounting for the shifting functions of some kinds of art and even the social boundary crossing 
between art and rhetoric. 
While this posited model would require extensive work to flesh out, I hope I can illustrate 
it with a couple of examples to show what I mean. First, neither rhetorical nor artistic genres are 
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recognizable as such according to textual features on their own; they are framed as such by user 
activity according to configurations of attributes. Second, users organize these configurations 
according to broader social, cultural, and historical frames. Whether a text is considered at a 
given moment to belong to an artistic or rhetorical genre—or whether a genre is broadly artistic 
or rhetorical—is a matter of the taste politics and general activities that dominate a given group 
at a given time, whether that group is, say, formal and institutional or informal and subcultural. 
Third, this model has significant implications for film studies, especially in areas in which 
artistry and rhetoricity can be evidently quite fluid.      
 I would suggest that texts exist on a spectrum between rhetorical and artistic orientations. 
We select particular characteristics to emphasize when proffering a text as art, or we stress others 
when employing a text rhetorically. Below is a tabular comparison of some characteristics or 
values or functions we might associate with artistic and rhetorical texts and genres.  
Artistic Rhetorical 
● Universality 
● Expression 
● Abstraction 
● Implicit Meaning 
● Affect 
● Art for Art’s Sake 
● Truth 
● Allusion 
● Ambiguity 
● Showing 
● Form 
● Interpretation 
● Locality 
● Communication 
● Concreteness 
● Explicit Meaning 
● Cognition 
● Instrumentality 
● Persuasion 
● Referentiality 
● Clarity 
● Telling 
● Content 
● Comprehension 
 
I want to be clear that I am not describing these as rigid or exhaustive categories. Instead, I offer 
them as examples of the kinds of dichotomies that might structure the cultural and practical 
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distinctions between artistic and rhetorical texts. These artistic attributes are historically and 
culturally situated, as are their relative values, and they ought not to be thought of in any 
totalizing sense: not all art possesses all or only the attributes to the left and not all rhetorical 
texts possess all or only those attributes to the right. Rather, these attributes and values frame and 
are framed by a text, relative to the social use the text is put to for a given group, and according 
to historically and culturally variable criteria. Consequently, texts can shift across between 
artistic and rhetorical genres, and what counts as art is contingent on 1) what attributes count as 
artistic at a given place and time and for a given group and 2) whether those attributes are framed 
as present or prominent or dominant in a given text.  
Now, the idea of a text’s meaning or utility as contingent upon a socially-situated 
subjectivity is not particularly radical for either literary or rhetorical studies. Devitt 
acknowledges reader response theory’s insight that “readers recreate texts in their own contexts” 
and that this “fits in easily within rhetorical genre theory and the idea that readers construct the 
genre’s situation out of their differing material realities” (182). On one hand, this idea suggests 
that a reader has some degree of a priori awareness of what s/he is supposed to do with a given 
text under given circumstances. But, on the other hand, s/he may not be aware of why one kind 
of text seems to cue a certain kind of reading response. To return to Bordwell’s constructivist 
terminology, how does our reader know whether to search for implied or symptomatic meaning 
in a text or to stop at the referential and explicit—whether to interpret or just to comprehend the 
text? The apparently individual and ad hoc nature of that relationship between reader and text 
abstracts it from the broader system of values and genres that frame art as such and, more to the 
point, distinguish it from non-art.    
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Consider the first of the values listed above. Universality is indeed a conventional 
distinguishing feature of artistic genres—at least of post-Romantic art—but it is not a feature 
fixed or guaranteed by the text’s internal functions or structure.153 It is instead read into the text 
as part of meaning construction, a semantic field that is constructed and highlighted by readers 
such that the text can be assimilated into the genre of “art” without perturbation. That is to say, 
the text and the genre “art” have a dynamic and mutually constitutive relationship, and one that 
has to be framed in terms of the priorities and values of a given period. To illustrate this point, 
let’s borrow an example from literature.  
We might ask whether Hamlet is about existential angst, or a Freudian family drama, or if 
it is really about the complications that arise in a monarchic system of dynastic succession when 
primogeniture is not formally codified. We can say that in some sense all three are correct, but 
the referential and explicit meanings are more historically and politically localized than the 
others; they speak more directly to the political concerns of 16th century English subjects. So 
maybe we could say that the plot, which is referentially local, is a vehicle for the general, more 
abstract themes, but now we are constructing symptomatic meanings and a hierarchy among 
them. Making Shakespeare a philosopher of the human condition or the psyche in this way 
minimizes the extent to which Hamlet—as well as, say, King Lear, Richard II, Henry IV 1 and 2, 
or Titus Andronicus, among others—are all in some way about questions of dynastic succession 
                                               
153 Devitt discusses universality as a function of the genre poetry, noting that literary genres “strive to act not just in 
their contemporary situation but in future situations as well,” such that “it seems to be a defining function of at least 
some literature to universalize” (182-3). While there is no space to distinguish our approaches point-by-point, 
suffice it to say that I do not take universality or any other feature associated with literature or art generally to be 
internal to the text so much as constructed by a reader and more or less agreed upon by her or his relevant social 
group. Hence, universality is constructed and reconstructed through subsequent readings and uptakes. See Devitt Ch. 
6. 
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and the political transfer of monarchical power more broadly.154 These political questions are 
somewhat remote to 20th- and 21st-century readers, but would have been particularly urgent to 
Elizabethan English audiences, who faced multiple succession crises between Henry VIII’s death 
in 1547 until James I’s ascendance in 1603. This is not to say that there are absolutely no 
transcendent questions, only that Hamlet, like other art, is not inherently universal. It had to be 
universalized and by users with a stake in doing so.    
Who made Shakespeare universal and why? This process didn’t begin in the post-
Freudian era. Rather, it is the result of 18th, 19th, and 20th century editing, commentary, and 
pedagogy, as various editions and critical interpretations re-framed a Shakespearean text and 
passed their situated perspectives and values along.155 Other authors, too, are subject to these 
processes of critical revisions. For instance, William Empson complained about the 
“Christianizing” tendency of early- and mid-20th century literary critics, who not only read 
Milton as a pious Christian, but attributed spiritual allegories to anything supernatural in the 
works of authors like Marvell or Marlowe.156 One explanation for why Shakespeare or Milton or 
Marlowe or any other historical writer of English literature might be framed in a particular way 
can be found in Terry Eagleton’s essay, “The Rise of English.” Eagleton argues that the 
emergence of English literature departments in Victorian universities corresponds to the influx of 
urban, middle-class students into higher education. These upstart students lacked the training in 
Greek and Latin traditional for upper-class undergraduates, and hence were ignorant of the 
classics. Moreover, their bourgeois pedigrees signified an absence of cultural and moral 
refinement, especially as the Church’s influence waned in British social life. English literary 
                                               
154 I am indebted to Kurt Schreyer for this perspective on Shakespeare’s histories and tragedies. 
155 See McLeod. 
156 See Culler Ch.4  
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study, then, was instituted to construct a cultural heritage befitting Britain’s hegemonic 
ambitions and to socialize the newly empowered middle class into a more sensitive, cultured 
version of the liberal, imperialist ideology of Victorian England.157 This involved not only 
elevating the work of Shakespeare under the Romantic rubric of creative genius, but also 
recuperating the social radicalism of Romantic writers like Blake and Shelley (Eagleton 17).  
Eagleton’s thesis, and the point I wish to emphasize, is that aesthetics as a discipline is 
ideological because the traditional, institutionalized study of artistic form involves abstracting 
and fetishizing the artwork.  
It is, in fact, somewhat improbable that the Iliad was art to the ancient Greeks in the same 
sense that a cathedral was an artefact for the Middle Ages or Andy Warhol's work is art 
for us; but the effect of aesthetics was to suppress these historical differences. Art was 
extricated from the material practices, social relations and ideological meanings in which 
it is always caught up, and raised to the status of a solitary fetish. (Eagleton 18-19). 
Eagleton underscores the fetishization of artworks at the expense of the material conditions of 
their production. But this process of reification, we should note, is discursive and rhetorical. The 
extrication and abstraction of artworks from their immediate rhetorical situations is a matter of 
framing that is carried out through particular kinds of writing and discourse. 
Artworks are not inherently universal, nor do they become universal on their own. 
Certain textual characteristics are selected for in a manner that assimilates well into a present 
                                               
157 Eagleton quotes George Gordon, an early Professor of English Literature at Oxford: “England is sick, and […] 
English literature must save it. The Churches (as I understand) having failed, and social remedies being slow, 
English literature has now a triple function: still, I suppose, to delight and instruct us, but also, and above all, to save 
our souls and heal the State” (20) 
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interpretation and the text is framed according to a rhetorical need for a group. In this way, we 
might say that rhetorical genres become artistic genres through their uptake into other rhetorical 
genres. But what group decides? Here we could borrow from concept of an art world, or the 
social worlds of artists, critics, patrons, scholars, curators, educators, and so forth, who produce, 
write about, fund, study, preserve, and teach about art. These are the groups to whom a work is 
presented as a candidate for consideration as art, which, ipso facto, defines the work as an 
artwork.158 This doesn’t tell us whether the artwork is good or not, but it does allow us to define 
art beyond the accepted conventions of canon or a sort of internal formalism. These actions and 
activities that various members of the art world are involved in are carried out by means of sets 
and systems of other genres geared toward the art world’s material and axiological infrastructure. 
In short, a given text or, more precisely, a given configuration of textual attributes that more or 
less comply with the values of the art world has to be presented to said art world via uptake into 
the rhetorical genres that 1) constitute and facilitate the user group and 2) negatively define the 
artwork qua art via a paratextual relationship.  
In the sections that follow, I will lay out some examples of topics or concepts in film 
studies that can be productively framed in terms of an artistic/rhetorical opposition while also 
illustrating some finer nuances to this distinction. These ought to be understood as inchoate 
reflections and in need of elaboration and revision, but which nevertheless demonstrate the 
potential of rhetorical genrefication as a model to offer new ideas about the relations among 
texts, paratexts, users, and user groups.    
 
                                               
158 See Becker. 
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Paracinema 
Literature is something of a hard case because the common modality of written language 
makes potential slippage between artistic and rhetorical generic valances a constant worry. But 
what about film? The decentering of filmic texts in terms of meaning construction does not 
necessarily entail a one-for-one swap with their rhetorical paratexts. Two cases I have already 
mentioned will show the need to account for slippages between artistry and rhetoricity. The first 
and, in a way, simpler case is that of paracinema. In “Trashing the Academy,” Sconce uses that 
term in a few different ways: 
As a most elastic textual category, paracinema would include entries from such 
seemingly disparate subgenres as 'badfilm', splatterpunk, 'mondo' films, sword and sandal 
epics, Elvis flicks, government hygiene films, Japanese monster movies, beach-party 
musicals, and just about every other historical manifestation of exploitation cinema from 
juvenile delinquency documentaries to soft-core pornography. Paracinema is thus less a 
distinct group of films than a particular reading protocol, a counter-aesthetic turned 
subcultural sensibility devoted to all manner of cultural detritus. (Sconce 372) 
It is notable that Sconce uses the term for both the category and the reading protocol, since it is 
the latter that constitutes the former, especially as expressed through the then-vibrant network of 
paracinema fanzines.159 These publications rail against the aesthetic and cultural authority 
assumed by media and academic institutions and what they see as the conservative and elitist 
tastes that keep art boring.  
                                               
159 “Publications devoted to this 'trash' cinema include such magazines, fanzines and ersatz journals as Psychotronic 
Video, Zontar, Subhuman, Trashola, Ungawa, Pandemonium, and the RE/Search volume, Incredibly Strange Films” 
(Sconce 372).  
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Though their object choice is different from conventional art worlds, paracinematic 
audiences seek similar effects. In distinguishing scholarly from paracinematic reading protocols, 
Sconce notes that:  
while the academy prizes conscious transgression of conventions by a filmmaker looking 
to critique the medium aesthetically and/or politically, paracinematic viewers value a 
stylistic and thematic deviance born, more often than not, from the systematic failure of a 
film aspiring to obey dominant codes of cinematic representation. For this audience, the 
'bad' is as aesthetically defamiliarizing and politically invigorating as the 'brilliant.' 
(Sconce 385) 
Important for our purposes is that paracinematic audiences function as an art world, albeit as 
informed by oppositional values—the counter-aesthetic—and aimed devalued, rejected, or 
ignored texts. In some cases, though, paracinema fans do not simply reverse the values of 
institutional art, trading high-brow art cinema for low-brow schlock movies, for instance. 
Instead, they look beyond narrative fiction film to rhetorical genres like the aforementioned 
government hygiene films, fast food training videos, or televangelist sermons, which mingle with 
liminal cases like juvenile delinquency documentaries and soft-core pornography (Sconce 
372).160  
Sconce emphasizes how the defamiliarizing and surreal effects of a paracinematic film’s 
“formal bizarreness and stylistic eccentricity” translate its cinematic excess to a kind of art unto 
itself (386). However, we should note that rhetorical genres like instructional or safety films, 
                                               
160 The paracinematic ethic is evident in more recent digital platforms, like the found footage website/live touring 
show Everything is Terrible!, and in original creative productions such as Adult Swim’s Tim and Eric Awesome 
Show, Great Job!, BBC Channel 4’s Garth Marenghi's Darkplace, or Amazon’s Comrade Detective. 
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hygiene shorts, or work-out videos are likewise subject to an aesthetic reading protocol—even if 
an ironic one—and are thus re-framed. Not only are they exhibited outside of their original, 
localized, and instrumental contexts, but insofar as they are assessed and evaluated according to 
aesthetic rather than rhetorical criteria, they have been reconfigured as art for an art world, even 
if a limited one. 
 
Operationalism 
If paracinema ‘artifies’ rhetorical genres, then its counterpart would involve ‘de-
artifying’ texts, or reading them as rhetorical in the broad sense described above. An example of 
this perspective would be the operational aesthetic, as described by historian Neil Harris. In his 
biography of P.T. Barnum, Harris introduces the term “operational aesthetic,” which he defines 
as “a delight in observing process and examining for literal truth” (79).  This brief definition is 
hardly satisfactory, and it takes Harris an entire chapter to tease out the various forms and 
instances of this phenomenon of spectatorship. Briefly, the operational aesthetic, or simply 
“operationalism,” describes a particular relationship to an artwork or other textual object in 
which the observer gains pleasure from witnessing and coming to understand the various parts 
and how they function. More simply, it is the pleasure of learning how things work and an 
embrace of informative and explanatory texts as such. 
Though they serve Harris’s starting point, operationalism was not limited to Barnum’s 
sophisticated hoaxes, but was an emerging cultural value in antebellum America, especially in 
the industrial northeast. Education reform for the public and populist appeals to the good sense of 
the common man fed a growing distrust and even contempt toward experts and specialists. 
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Americans sought to educate themselves, or to feel like they had done so. Public lectures and 
how-to manuals on any conceivable subject exploded in popularity (Harris 73-5). The growing 
presence of technological marvels also accustomed the public to jargon and specialized technical 
language as literary discourse. 
         Harris writes that “the language of technical explanation and scientific description itself 
had become a form of recreational literature by the 1840s and 1850s. Newspapers, magazines, 
even novels and short stories catered to this passion for detail” (75).  The preternatural detective 
stories of Poe exemplify operational pleasure in literature, as does the popular genre of sea 
novels. Melville’s novels in particular appeal to operational aesthetic. They featured not only 
detailed accounts of seamanship and whaling, but also “immense and erudite discussions of 
anatomy, geology, and physiology […] floods of data, anecdotes, measurements, [and] whaling 
lore. Such detail satisfied the same relish for acquiring knowledge that led to travel literature, 
how-to-do-it manuals, and almanacs of useful information” (76-7). Harris argues that the 
influence of American writers like Poe and Melville carried operationalism through the 19th 
century and into the 20th, informing the genres of science fiction, detective fiction, and exotic 
travel narratives and expanding beyond the US through authors like Conan Doyle, Bram Stoker, 
and Jules Verne (88). 
I would suggest that the operational aesthetic is evident through the 20th and into the 21st 
century as well, in the jargon-packed novels of Michael Crichton, John Grisham, and Tom 
Clancy or the technical-language-as-poetry dialogues of Aaron Sorkin; in television police 
procedurals, true crime TV, cooking shows, travel programs, and The Joy of Painting; in the self-
conscious illusions of Penn and Teller and the myth-debunking of Mythbusters or Adam Ruins 
Everything; in behind-the-scenes featurettes on DVD special features and in all manner of DIY, 
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pop culture criticism, and edutainment YouTube videos; in web listicles and professional and 
amateur expertise podcasts on all sorts of topics.  
It is crucial to note that these are popular forms of media and that operationalism is not 
associated with formal experiment for its own sake so much as it is with recreation and learning 
as entertainment and intellectual exercise. A key takeaway, returning to Harris, is that the 
operational aesthetic developed in America as a populist, pragmatic phenomenon. It formed out 
of a trend of amateur curiosity. 
No great galleries existed for the public to stroll through [in the 1840s and 1850s], no    
historic buildings featured ancient murals and statuary. Instead, paintings and sculpture 
stood alongside mummies, mastodon bones, and stuffed animals. American museums 
were […] repositories of information, collections of strange or doubtful data. Such 
indiscriminate assemblages made artistic objects take on the innocent yet familiar shape 
of exhibition curiosities. (Harris 78) 
Artworks were framed in such as way as to be treated as curiosities and assessed along similar 
lines—for their literal truth, their pragmatic utility, their efficient functioning, their clever design 
or skillful execution. “Onlookers were relieved from the burden of coping with more abstract 
problems. Beauty, significance, spiritual values could be bypassed in favor seeing what was odd, 
what worked, or was genuine” (Harris 79). This trade-off—the celebration of skillful or clever 
form at the expense of challenging or profound content—is not so alien to us today. Accusations 
of the vacuity of popular artworks persist, as do such popular sentiments as ‘my kid could paint 
that.’ These sentiments carry the genes of the operational aesthetic, and they do not indicate 
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something inherent to the artwork itself—something that would justify distinctions between high 
and low art or between art and rhetoric—so much as the attitude or perspective of the art viewer. 
There are several key points to take away from this.  
1. First is the broader historical frame. As Harris argues, operationalism constitutes a 
cultural value in the United States from the antebellum period forward, one that 
continues to be evident because it is generated by the sociological interactions 
among art, technology, and an increasingly literate if not refined mass population. 
Even if the conditions that birthed it in the Jacksonian period have changed, 
operationalism persists because its values have become acculturated into 
American middle-class taste cultures.  
2. Second, operationalism is a reading position. It involves a set of attitudes, values, 
biases, and blind-spots in the eye of the beholder, not in the art itself. It may 
privilege some artworks over others, and certain artists themselves may embrace 
those valued elements—such as puzzles or technical jargon—but ultimately 
operationalism is defined by the pleasure of the audience.  
3. Third, since it rests with the reader and not the text, any and all art may be subject 
to an operationalist gaze. Recall Harris’ point that paintings and statuary shared 
exhibition space with archeological and biological curiosities. High art and low 
art are equally open to operationalist assessment, as are artworks from the 
different media. However, art considered along these lines is approached in a 
mode of analysis and cognitive stimulation, not of reflective meditation.  
4. Hence—point four—the lines between art and technology may be blurred because 
the operational aesthetic seeks the same kind of pleasure from both.  
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5. Fifth and finally, the unclear distinction between kinds of aesthetic pleasure and 
the perhaps vulgar fetishization of technique can re-frame artworks as rhetorical 
and didactic. Hence, period pieces and biopics are read as about the eras and lives 
they depict. Espionage or legal thrillers are about spy tradecraft or courtroom 
procedures. Science fiction films like The Martian (2015, dir. Ridley Scott) or 
Interstellar (2014, dir. Christopher Nolan) are about illustrating the practicalities 
of terraforming Mars or concepts from theoretical physics.  
Operationalism privileges the apparent technical accuracy of referential content over thematic 
profundity or formal nuance.161 One consequence of this is a complicated web of various forms 
of rhetorical genres taking one another up, as fictional films and TV shows become educational 
tools,162 and expert commentary on historical or technical accuracy serves as criticism.               
 
Documentary Mode 
While paracinema and operationalism complicate the art/rhetoric distinction through their 
own readerly practices, documentary as a genre has such problems baked in, so to speak. 
                                               
161 There is another kind of operationalism, though, which is focused on the form of the artwork at the expense of its 
content. One might think of Christopher Nolan’s experiments with character and plot in films like Memento (2000), 
The Prestige (2006), and Inception (2010), or the complex intertwining plots and frame narratives of television 
shows like Arrested Development or How I Met Your Mother. Even the use of unconventional time signatures, 
polyrhythms, chord progressions, and song structures in popular music from Dave Brubeck to Frank Zappa to so-
called progressive metal, “mathcore,” or technical death metal bands like Meshuggah, Dillinger Escape Plan, or 
Necrophagist, respectively, exploits the audience’s operational pleasure of figuring it out. For more on 
operationalism in television narratives, see Mittell’s Complex TV.  
162 For example, clips of My Cousin Vinny (1992, dir. Jonathan Lynn) is famously used in law schools as a teaching 
tool. In 2003 the Pentagon advertised an internal screening of The Battle of Algiers (1966, dir. Gillo Pontecorvo) 
with fliers that read “How to win a battle against terrorism and lose the war of ideas. Children shoot soldiers at 
point-blank range. Women plant bombs in cafes. Soon the entire Arab population builds to a mad fervor. Sound 
familiar? The French have a plan. It succeeds tactically, but fails strategically. To understand why, come to a rare 
showing of this film.'' See Kaufman. 
215 
Documentary is as fraught as other filmic genres with definitional complications, but its peculiar 
conceit as non-fiction cinema makes it something of a special case and a good one to close on. 
By now it should be clear that, if we are to treat documentary as a filmic genre, then it is subject 
to and defined by the same process of rhetorical genrefication as westerns or musicals. Dirk 
Eitzen argues in a similar pragmatic vein, claiming that “there is no such thing as a text that is 
intrinsically and necessarily a documentary. It is a particular kind of reading frame that makes a 
text a documentary. In other words, a documentary is what people are accustomed to make of it, 
no more and no less” (98). For Eitzen, a documentary is a film that people presume makes truth 
claims, based on paratextual “indexing” or conventional stylistic cues, whether the film makes 
truth claims in fact. A film’s “documentariness,” its ability to make truth claims (or to lie) is 
contingent upon the interpretive framing of a given viewer.163 
The meta-generic label “documentary” likely evokes generally similar but non-identical 
kinds of textual and extra-textual attributes among similarly situated users. But whether those 
attributes add up to art or rhetoric in a given instance is a different matter. Koyaanisqatsi (1982, 
dir. Godfrey Reggio), for instance, makes extensive use of experimental photographic and 
editing techniques and pairs them with an avant garde minimalist score. Yet its non-fictional 
referential content, and the way its form frames that content, makes a powerful implicit case for 
the environmentally destructive and dehumanizing effects of modern life. It presents strong case 
                                               
163 Eitzen’s model shares my focus on the definitional practices of viewers and the influence of “indexing” 
discourses. He is primarily occupied with the question of documentary specifically and its particular relation to truth 
claims and its reception among everyday viewers along those lines. My project, however, applies a similar 
pragmatic principle to all film genres and examines the idea of genre in light of the functions ascribed to it. 
Moreover, this project points to concrete expressions of genre as taken up into rhetorical genres and therefore 
indicative of broader social relationships, activities, and conflicts.   
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for both artistic and rhetorical readings, as both narrative and argumentative, both poetic and 
didactic. 
Bill Nichols notes well this slippage among operations within one text, and it necessitates 
a parsing of documentary aesthetics in terms of his now-famous modes: poetic, expository, 
observational, participatory, reflexive, and performative (Introduction 31-2).164 It is significant 
that Nichols chooses the “mode” as a concept—as opposed to something like “subgenre”—to 
distinguish among different kinds of documentary approaches.165 This is significant because, on 
the one hand, like subgenre mode is a way of acknowledging variation within a genre 
(conventionally understood) without sacrificing the sense of a coherent and stable organizing 
principle that “genre” suggests to users, as we saw among the 28 Days Later fans in Chapter 3.166 
On the other hand, “mode” implies flexibility, a non-totalizing suggestion that a text can move 
into and out of and among different modes at different points and still maintain its integrity.  
[Modes] give structure to the overall film, but they do not dictate or determine every 
aspect of its organization. [....] A more recent film need not have a more recent mode as 
                                               
164 Nichols’ consistently uses documentary history and his proposed modes to structure and illustrate one another. 
There is not space here to attempt even a brief overview of documentary history, but it is worth noting that 1) 
documentary and avant garde/experimental film share a complicated history of influence and cross-pollination, but 
2) histories of documentary have traditionally treated the two in isolation, to the effect that documentary has been 
able to maintain its expository utility for the scientific, social, and political “discourses of sobriety” involved in 
knowledge production and dissemination and social control. For historical accounts along these lines, see Nichols 
(Representing Reality ch. 1-2 and Speaking Truths), McLane, and Rees.      
165 I did cite observational documentary as an example of a genre in Ch. 1, and Nichols likely would object to this 
characterization, at least when understood in terms of conventional notions of genre. My point was that, when 
applied to a specific text—say, Salesman (1969, dir. Albert and David Maysles)—the label “observational 
documentary” organizes textual and extra-textual attributes in such a manner as to suggest a certain interpretation 
and framing. Furthermore, in this particular hypothetical case, both the film and especially the label index the social 
group for whom such a label is meaningful, namely scholars and students in film studies, a field in which Nichols’ 
writings on documentary are influential and widely taught.    
166 In adaptive terms, subgenre and mode are both ways of accommodating perturbations in a scheme. Logically, 
this strategy is self-defeating, since variable concrete instances can be accommodated only if the principle is 
sufficiently abstracted or qualified through ad hoc stipulations. This is not to say that the strategy is not 
pragmatically or rhetorically effective.   
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its dominant. It can revert to an earlier mode while still including elements of later 
modes. [....] The modes do not represent an evolutionary chain in which later modes 
demonstrate superiority over earlier ones and vanquish them. Once established through a 
set of conventions and paradigmatic firms, a given mode remains available to all. 
(Introduction 32) 
Where expository and poetic documentaries would seem to be one another’s antithesis, Nichols 
admits each mode as potentially coexisting alongside its counterpoints within the text, available 
to a filmmaker as aesthetic options for different kinds of subject matter. In this way, “mode” 
suggests the sort of variation within a single text that “subgenre” would imply among multiple 
texts.  
Perhaps because of the aesthetic orientation of his scholarship, Nichols is at least partially 
committed to a textualist account of documentary history and form in the manner of conventional 
genre criticism and theory. But his awareness of the variety of social uses documentaries and 
documentary form has historically been put to—e.g. propaganda or resistance—imbues his 
models with a pragmatic sensitivity. Despite his own Archimedean system building, Nichols 
makes room in his models for the the variegated uses of documentary by filmmakers. Hence, 
“mode” allows Nichols to acknowledge the formal coexistence of different approaches to non-
fiction filmmaking operative within one text while still being able to claim that there is some 
such thing as “documentary” as a meaningful category.   
As it relates to documentary as a genre, “mode” is functionally the same as “subgenre.” 
But in terms of organizing a particular text, mode is less totalizing and determinate than 
“subgenre.” In this way “mode” provides enough latitude for a documentary text to be read both 
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artistically and rhetorically in a way we don’t typically expect from a fiction or experimental or 
instructional film. Documentary in this sense doesn’t disavow its rhetorical and artistic slippage 
but wears it proudly as a function of its peculiar philosophical issues. Where the most referential 
of instructional films can be attended to for their form, and where any fiction film can be framed 
in terms of its various representations’ relations to reality, documentary’s dominant axis of 
meaning construction appears to be exactly the questions of when, where, and to what extent it is 
rhetorical and/or artistic. This looseness of meaning construction makes documentary in all its 
modes particularly versatile in terms of its social use and its uptake into various other genres. 
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Appendix 
 
IamShartacus. “Was 28 Days Later a zombie movie? My relationship hangs in the 
balance.” Reddit, 24 May 2011. 
[Below are screenshots of the full thread analyzed in Chapter 3. User comments are cited 
in-text by name.] 
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